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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Our Fathers gave us liberty,
But little did they dream,
The grand results that flow along
This mighty age of steam;
For our mountains, lakes and rivers,
Are all a blaze of fire,
And we send our news by lightning,
On the telegraphic wire1
The advent of canals, postal roads, steam navigation, and steam railways changed the entire pace of
American nineteenth century life, from that of a walking society to one which began to travel at speeds
that exceeded a gallop on a horse. The rise of the corporation and the industrial revolution created new
models for the application of speedy communication. Perhaps most important of all, the telegraph
fundamentally changed communication expectations, making information transfer over distance into a
near-real-time experience. Historian Daniel Walker Howe has illustrated the American adulation of new
technology in his book, What Hath God Wrought, and writes of “The communications revolution [that]
gave a new urgency to social criticism and to the slavery controversy in particular.”2 Newspapers of the
era form a record of the vast adjustment to possibilities and expectations that were inherent in this
communications revolution. News media of the time were changed by technology in much the same
way that twenty-first century media have been altered by the advent of universal Internet connections.
This project reexamines an extended period of journalism that has often been dismissed as a
mere commercializing of the Press. Historians of journalism and historians of communication have
focused on periodizing their fields and assigning developments to key concepts, such as the Penny Press,

1

Jesse Hutchinson, Jr., 1850, Roude Folk Song Index 4556.
Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford,
2007), p. 7.
2

2
the Party Press, the Frontier Press, or the Muckraking Press. A consensus has seemed to state that the
press grew bigger but did not fundamentally change between these periods and, at a surface glance, the
generally type-heavy and grey pages of Victorian-era newspapers would support that consensus. But an
examination of newspapers and the people who owned them and worked for them shows that they
were accomplishing new things while choosing new roles for their publications – becoming more factual
and less literary, appointing themselves as arbiters of national issues, and moving the center of
newsmaking authority to an indefinite location somewhere in the new web of communication that
developed over the iron wires of the telegraph.3
The new technologies in transportation and communication were all implemented just as the
pivotal event of the American Civil War gave impetus to the fundamental social changes being made as a
result of that national conflict. Like the spark that ignites an explosion, the outbreak of war mobilized
the potential of communication technology. Rapid advances made in news and newsgathering during
the war did not end, however, with the conclusion of combat. Instead, over the next thirty years, a
newly professionalized news industry explored the full range of possibilities inherent in robust
communication technology. In the same way that scholar Benedict Anderson has described nationalism
as creating an imagined community, the news process created an imagined community of readers who,
themselves, had developed new expectations of what represented “the news.” 4
This dissertation argues that the introduction of fast, networked communication, coupled with
major events that demanded its rapid integration, resulted in a press that developed into a new and

3

A popular folk notion has held that copper wire was the primary material for telegraph cable and that spread of
the telegraph was made possible through frontier discoveries of massive copper deposits such as those in
Michigan’s Keewenaw peninsula. Morse’s demonstration line between Baltimore and Washington was made of
copper, but iron wire quickly became the standard for telegraph installation. Iron wire for the 1860 Pacific
Telegraph weighed 350 pounds per mile, according to Joshua D. Wolff, Western Union and the Creation of the
American Corporate Order (New York: Cambridge, 2013), 57, while costlier copper would also have weighed twelve
percent more.
4
The concept of imagined community is borrowed from Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (New
York: Verso, 2006), though the work of David Paul Nord is also important to this concept. Nord, Communities of
Journalism: A History of American Newspapers and Their Readers (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001).

3
specialized organism compared to the press of the Early Republic. While it would never be confused
with the later press of the twentieth century, this new press had much about it that was “modern.” Its
development shows a transition made due to the exigent circumstances of the increasing pace of
communication in society. The majority of newspaper historians have claimed over time that the
professional press did not exist until after the 1890s, but the signs of adaptation and change seem to
come much earlier, particularly during the Civil War. Rather like the early users of the United States
Defense Agency computer network, ARPANET, who did not foresee the future effects of the Internet
and its Worldwide Web, early newspaper users of rapid communication did not instantly create a fully
rationalized system. The creation of news networks based on quick surface and electrical
communication

transformed

an

earlier,

more

gentile

relationship

between

editors

and

“correspondents,” literal letter-writers, and replaced the latter with a professionalized corps of
reporters. At least one author, Thomas Standage, has referred to this phenomenon as the advent of the
“Victorian Internet.” 5 While the label is appealing, such a characterization must be treated cautiously.
Communication scholar Richard John has warned that Internet is a poor technological analogy for the
emergence of the telegraph.6 John is right that the technical workings of the nineteenth century
networks do not allow the kind of common personal access that has democratized information flow in
the twenty-first century. The evidence that people of the later nineteenth century reacted to
overwhelming advances in information technology in much the same way that the Internet has
challenged society today, however, can be seen in adaptations made in the press; in its form, its
content, and its business methods.
Much of the history of journalism written in the late twentieth century has been aimed at
explaining how “modern” objective journalism rose from quaint antecedents to the height of full-news

5

Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the Nineteenth Century’s Online Pioneers (New York: Walker, 1998).
6
Richard R. John, Network Nation Inventing American Telecommunications, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2010), 2.
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journalism. Authors in doing so have generally assumed that objective and factual reporting represented
the ultimate development of journalism, and many have tried to look back for specific trails that set
newspapers on the road to that perceived ideal. Yet the “modern” paper used as a reference point may
have been only a fleeting phase of communication. Media historian John Nerone has noted that
American fascination with “freedom of the press” was a Cold War affectation in which emergence of a
corporate American press could be contrasted with the state presses of restrictive political systems.
“Postwar [WWII] thinkers at once embraced freedom of the press as a safeguard against fascism,” writes
Nerone, but then explains that a corporate press’ existence had to be balanced against the individual
rights of the people. This was done in the seminal liberal work Four Theories of the Press by defining
modern journalism as a balanced approach using university-trained journalists to work for large
corporate entities in an industry with high barriers to entry. “We are forced to conclude from
descriptions of media systems in Four Theories that only private capital imposes no restraint and that it
is a benign organizational form,” Nerone says in revisiting the original publication. So to some extent the
idea that the nineteenth century press could not be understood as professional or modern is related to
the fact that it did not exist in the same political environment that defined the late twentieth century.7 It
has taken the disruption of the past decade to show that new technology and unexpected events
combine to create their own stimulus and organic change within media. The disruption has also created
a faulty and artificial divide between “objective” and “professional” journalism, holding papers of record
such as the New York Times as representative while dismissing the sensationalist press and the reform
press as not suitable for study. Journalism analysts of the 1990s saw their industry as a mature and
consolidating one facing incremental adaptation; none would have predicted that the combination of
the Internet and the Great Recession together would sap print advertising revenue from a high of $49.4
billion in 2005 to less than half of that amount by 2011. Overall newspaper revenue in 2013, including
7

John Nerone, ed., Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1995), p. 5-6,
14, 27.
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circulation and online advertising, stood at $37.6 billion. Those same analysts could not have predicted
the massive shrinkage in newsrooms and news staffs: More than 15,000 reporters, editors, and other
“front line” print news professional positions were eliminated from after 2004, according to American
Society of Newspaper Editors figures.8 The radical shift has led to the term, “New Journalism,” for the
digital and broadcast world of news dissemination that has largely replaced the old-format “Full News”
model. Even the term “New Journalism” is under challenge by a combination of social media and
crowdsourcing that has begun to choke off interest in long-form professionally produced publications
appearing in newspaper style.9
I hypothesize that the same sort of cause – the effects of disruptive technology – led to the
dramatic news transition that took place in the 1860s and beyond, but in the opposite direction. Print
circulation grew enormously; news staffs burgeoned; and new literacy in use of networks and
transportation were developed on the fly to serve impatient subscribers. Novel practices of the 1840s
and 1850s, such as printing separate columns of telegraphic news became standard expectations in the
post-war years. Fluency in the use of communication technology, meanwhile, gave new prominence to
previously excluded voices and took control and authority away from editors who once mediated the
pace of local news. Eventually, despite near-monopolistic ownership of news associations, a media elite
in New York City was superseded and toppled by more robust users of network technology in what was
then the West.
This dissertation analyzes the evidence of newspapers; their significant change in content,
layout, and page development; their position within growing networks as democratizers of technology;

8

Alan D. Mutter, ”Newspaper Job Cuts surged 30% in 2011,” Confessions of a Newsosaur , entry posted December
19, 2011, http://newsosaur.blogspot.com/2011/12/newspaper-job-cuts-surged-30-in-2011.html (accessed May
22, 2014); Associated Press, “Newspaper Industry Revenue Continued to Fall in 2013,” entry posted April 18, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/18/newspaper-revenue-2013-industry_n_5174725.html (accessed May
22, 2014).
9
Casey Newton, “Why Circa Failed,” TheVerge.com explains the 2015 collapse of an online edited newspaper
because readers were impatient with its form and its lack of aggressive partisan bias.
http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/24/8842009/why-circa-failed (accessed June 24, 2015).

6
and their increasing sophistication in business methods and acceptance as entities worthy of collegiate
program development to show the significance of advances made in what otherwise might appear to be
a fallow time. Its intent is to veer away from the lure of the biographical study of romantic personalities
and vaunted news organizations in order to focus on the record left by the work itself. This project’s
scope is national, although primary emphasis is on news organizations and newspapers east of the
Mississippi River, where population and business density forced the most rapid change and where
media technological innovation on a mass scale was concentrated.
Historians have often dismissed journalism in the mid-to-late nineteenth century as a
backwater, a period of marking time between the 1830s innovation of the Penny Press and the ultimate
commercial success of the so-called “Yellow Journalism” and the battle of Hearst and Pulitzer’s news
empires in the late 1890s. This is partly due to a robust fascination with the press as a physical harbinger
of freedom of expression, especially its role in the frontier and westward movement, a triumphalist
narrative made popular during the Cold War and in American celebration of the nation’s bicentennial.
Pictorial books such as Robert F. Karolevitz’s Newspapering in the Old West and a vogue for press
antiquities expressed in efforts like Frank Luther Mott’s Oldtime Comments on Journalism, emphasized
eccentricities rather than examining the news business systemically. More recently, historians have
examined aspects of the nineteenth century Press as interesting phenomena on their own, as can be
seen in the work of writers such as William Huntzicker on the Penny Press or Menahem Blondheim on
telegraphic news. That a more synthetic approach has been undertaken can be seen in the Annual
Symposium on the 19th Century Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression, held annually in Chattanooga,
Tennessee and producing semi-annual volumes of collected essays.10

10

Robert F. Karolevitz, Newspapering in the Old West: A Pictorial History of Journalism and Printing on the Frontier
(Seattle, WA: Superior Publishing Company, 1965); Frank Luther Mott, ed., Oldtime Comments on Journalism
(Columbia, MO: The Press of the Crippled Turtle, University of Missouri, 1955), hand-pressed brochure series
produced by the Linotype school.
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The role of the press during the Civil War and the decades immediately following has been
approached as a colorful subject within Civil War literature. While Brayton Harris states “On average,
there has been one book about the Civil War published every day since the shooting ended,” he notes
that only a few of those books have focused on journalism or the popular press. Within the study of
journalism history, James Crouthamel states that “Press coverage of the Civil War is the most heavily
researched topic in the history of American journalism.” This makes it a standout in a relatively narrow
field of study. Crouthamel’s is one voice that claims the Civil War “brought no fundamental changes to
the [New York] Herald or other metropolitan newspapers,” arguing that the conflict merely
“accentuated developments already underway.”11 His statement is interesting for seeing antecedents to
developments brought by the war.
Of those historians who have taken an interest in this period of journalism, most have
concentrated on the development of the professional war correspondent as the significant feature of
the era. Charles Dickens coined the term in 1844 in the serialized novel, Martin Chuzzlewit. His fictional
editor, “Colonel Driver” of the New York Rowdy Journal, introduced “My War Correspondent, sir—Mr.
Jefferson Brick!” to a visiting Englishman. While more than twenty actual war correspondents covered
the Mexican War (1846-1848), historians broadly have credited British reporter William Howard Russell
with creating the craft of war correspondence during the Crimean War (1853-1856). It was not until the
American Civil War that hundreds of correspondents took to the field to report on the armies of both
sides. While the war correspondent is an appealing avenue of study, the importance of the war
correspondent per se is not as significant for American journalism as the sudden advent of so many
reporters in the field and the subsequent increase in competitive news flow from on-the-spot

11

James L. Crouthamel, Bennett’s New York Herald and the Rise of the Popular Press (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1989), 182, n. 21; ibid, 112.
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individuals. The New York Herald, for example, was managing sixty-three reporters in the field during
the war, up from an antebellum reporting stable of eight.12
Historians of the Civil War press may be divided into two camps, the narrative and the
analytical. The narrative historians predominate and focus primarily on the parallel story of the
development of war correspondence alongside the campaigns of the Civil War. The analytical historians,
meanwhile, have attempted to tell the story of “the Press” as a larger entity affected by the war. In each
case, however, the overwhelmingly colorful stories of correspondents themselves have conspired to
take center stage. The lure to venture into anecdote and personification is immense in this robust time
of outsized personalitites such as those of Horace Greeley, James Gordon Bennett, or Wilbur Storey.13
The narrative school includes the wave of personal reminiscences of journalistic participants
published immediately following the war, both as stand-alone autobiographical volumes and as articles
contributed to collective works such as The Century magazine (later published in book form in the fourvolume Battles and Leaders of the Civil War). J. Cutler Andrews lists more than 90 such books and
articles in a special bibliographic section, with an even larger number of autobiographies. These included
offerings from correspondents themselves, but also from others involved in the news process, including
telegraphers, editors, and political operatives. These memoirs, such as those of correspondent Sylvanus
Cadwallader, were generally written in a highly informal style and with a deeply personal slant and with
little attempt at balance or comprehensiveness. While they open windows onto process, methods, and
12

Charles Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, World’s Classics edition, ed. Margaret Cardwell (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 225. Dickens had traveled to America in 1842. He was unimpressed with American newspapers: in
Chuzzlewit he named the Rowdy’s New York competitors the Sewer, the Family Spy, the Private Listener, the
Peeper, the Plunderer, and the Keyhole Reporter. Crouthamel, Bennett, 119. Russell’s claim to be the first civilian
war correspondent is engraved at his tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral in London; Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty:
The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2004), 2. For
development of American war correspondence in the 1840s, see Tom Reilly, War with Mexico! America’s Reporters
Cover the Battlefront, ed. Manley Witten, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2010).
13
More recent works such as David Bulla and Gregory Borchard’s Journalism in the Civil War Era (New York: Peter
Lang, 2010) take a more measured approach.. Another 2010 volume, illuminating development of war
correspondence in the 1840s, is Tom Reilly’s posthumously published War with Mexico! America’s Reporters Cover
the Battlefront, edited by his student Manley Witten.

9
personalities during the war, they must be approached with caution. Many are casuistic and sometimes
argumentative narratives written years after the fact in order to reinforce a personal view of an issue in
debate. As one example, two separate authors each claimed to have been the first United States military
telegraphers, their accounts naming many of the same people but in bewilderingly different
circumstances. In Cadwallader’s case, the posthumous publication of his memoir in the 1950s showed
the writer determined to claim for himself the role of mentor and sometime savior of Gen. Ulysses
Grant, especially when it came to that general’s rumored alcohol abuse. Cadwallader showed his
manuscript to a few contemporaries, but he chose not to publish it at the time as being too
controversial.14
Narrative history took a leap forward with Louis M. Starr’s work dealing with correspondents
and centered around the New York Tribune. Starr was aided in his work with the discovery of hundreds
of previously unpublished letters written to Sydney Howard Gay, literally a “barn find.” The letters were
found in 1950 in a trunk in what had been a Staten Island stable during the Civil War when Gay served as
the Tribune’s managing editor. Starr had unique personal access to the papers of other journalistic
leaders, including those of Frederic Hudson, the New York Herald’s managing editor, and Herald
reporter and later railroad magnate Henry Villard. Among his other contributions, Starr revealed the
root of the “Bohemian” title used by reporters of the early war years who styled themselves the
“Bohemian Brigade.” The euphonious title captured imaginations at the time, and it has continued to
fascinate authors and historians. During the Civil War, willful behavior on the part of these New York
City-based war reporters antagonized military leaders at many different levels. It led to the larger press

14

J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (1953; repr. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985),
764-772;

10
corps being characterized as reckless individualists whose loyalty and morals were dubious and whose
independent ways should be suppressed.15
Perhaps the watershed contribution to the narrative genre has been J. Cutler Andrews’s
authoritative works on the reporting of the Civil War, a comprehensive pair of books that were
produced straddling the war’s centennial and that focused on the lives and work of correspondents and
editors. Journalism historian Debra Redding van Tuyll calls the books the most noted scholarly works on
Civil War reporting, but she states “While each of these works is packed with compelling stories of
bravery and daring and sound analysis of the reporting, they lack an important element: context.”16
Andrews began his work as World War II was still unfolding. He published his 648-page review of
Northern reporting in 1953, having tapped private manuscript collections and memoirs that had not
been generally available to the public or perhaps had been overlooked. Andrews’ approach followed the
lead set by Carl Becker of paying attention to history from the bottom up, and his writing style showed a
flair for narrative and detail that mirrored the storytelling of a Bruce Catton or Garrett Mattingly. Like
those peers, Andrews created breezy dialogue and novelistic detail to go beyond the historical record.
The opening of one chapter, for example, includes an emotional and improbably detailed “conversation”
between a reporter for the Charleston Mercury and a ship captain that reads like a screenplay: ‘”Aye,
aye, sir, I’ll take my chance,’ said the Mercury man gleefully as he waved a greeting to the crowd on
shore, for the steamer was even then casting off and he could not have remained behind had he wished
to,” the passage concludes. Andrews explained that: “When I write I prefer a combination of narrative
and expository history to the topical, or problem-oriented, approach … In my view, history should tell a

15

Louis M. Starr, Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Correspondents in Action (New York: Knopf, 1954),
http://www.archive.org/stream/bohemianbrigadec027541mbp/bohemianbrigadec027541mbp_djvu.txt (accessed
June 26, 2011). Many of the reporters had been frequenters of a basement beer garden named “Pfaff’s Cave” in
New York City, described by poet Walt Whitman as “[T]he vault …where drinkers and laughers meet to eat and
drink and carouse.” It was the popular haunt of bon vivant Ada Clare, self-styled “Queen of Bohemia,” whose
theory held that Bohemians paid no attention to social rules and conventions but instead did just as they pleased.
16
Debra van Tuyll in the forward to Bulla and Borchard, Journalism in the Civil War Era, xi.
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meaningful story as well as analyze the character and behavior of its principals.” It was an approach
favored in the 1950s, but one that has since been criticized by historiographers for giving too much
license to historians to invent details beyond the evidence. Andrews’ work has remained relevant
because his scholarly attention to documentation was impeccable. He defined his historical window
narrowly, from 1861 to 1865: he admitted difficulties and shortcomings up front, e.g. describing the
problem of obtaining back files of Southern newspapers, many of whose offices had been destroyed
during the war. These scholarly touches created a high standard which the field has largely preserved.17
Since the 1990s, the apparent resurgence of interest in Civil War media has led to narrative
works on other facets of the press during the conflict. Authors have remained fascinated by the
correspondents themselves. Some books simply retell existing, repackaged information initially revealed
by Andrews and others. Harris’ Blue & Gray in Black & White (1999) is one such example, as is James M.
Perry’s A Bohemian Brigade (2000). While these add relatively little new interpretation and largely
revisit ground already churned by Andrews, Starr, and others, specialization in some works has led to
new insights. Ian F.W. Beckett chronicled the British correspondents of the London Times—Antonio
Gallenga, J.C. Bancroft Davis, Charles Mackay, and Francis Lawley, in addition to the better-known
William Howard Russell. Beckett intersperses large verbatim extracts from Times articles with a
chronicle of its correspondents’ activities and summaries of wartime events and characters. Although
the process isolates the London reports from the context of other papers’ news offerings, Beckett’s
description of the failures of the Times and its biased reporting shows how a dominant foreign
newspaper lost credibility within its own country due to a rigid editorial policy favoring the South.
Some narrative historians make novel claims, often with great breadth and a modern
interpretation. One such is Standage with his “Victorian Internet” populism. “The telegraph,” he writes,

17

Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War; Andrews, The South Reports the Civil War (1970; repr. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), vii-viii, 3.
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“had annihilated the distance between the soldiers at the front and the readers back home … Rather
less conveniently, it had also annihilated the distance between the enemy capitals.” While focused more
on British newspapers’ use of telegraphic information during the Crimean War than on American
newspapers during the Civil War, Standage’s undocumented 1998 work holds that the telegraph
disrupted many facets of society, not least the world of journalism. News took on “[T]he illusion of
global coverage, providing a summary of all the significant events of the day, from all over the world, in
a single edition.” The corollary effect, however, was to remove control and rationing of the news from
the hands of local editors, who had to compete with rival and national publications in order to meet
reader expectations of getting the very latest news, rather than simply the news that fit an editor’s
interest. “Increasingly, news was worth money,” Standage writes. “If there were four developments to a
major story during the day, newspapers could put out four editions – and some people would buy all
four.” 18
While the narrative school was flourishing, the scholarly study of Civil War journalism emerged
as the centennial approached.19To use one example, Robert S. Harper’s 1951 work on Lincoln and the
press gave context to journalistic work of the time by matching published stories with the histories of
individual editors and their relation to Lincoln and his policies. While the bulk of Harper’s writing is a
simple chronicle of incidents, with corresponding snippets of press coverage and Lincoln anecdotes, his
book also details the casual closeness of politicians to working editors and newspapers. Harper was a
student of historian Allan Nevins, and his narrative approach closely follows the American triumphalist
tone. Nevins, in his own monumental Civil War history, held that American newspapers at the dawn of
the sectional conflict were “lifted … to special importance.” Nevins noted that “Except England, no other
country possessed dailies which purveyed intelligence so intelligently as the best sheets in the larger

18

Standage, Victorian Internet, 152-53, 156-57, 149.
A similar resurgence has occurred with the sesquicentennial, though public interest in the 150 th anniversary has
not reached the heights expressed in the 1960s for the centennial.
19
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American cities.” His student Harper was particularly interested in the opposition press and its function
during the sectional conflict; but in examining the issue, he explained a significant number of generally
accepted business practices, such as political ownership of newspapers. His excerpts reveal journalism
changing under pressure. “[T]he molders of the Constitution made no provision for handling a sectional
and intensely partisan press in a period of civil strife. Whether the press should remain free when the
safety of the nation is paramount raised a question which is still unanswered. Lincoln had no precedent.
He set his own,” wrote Harper.20
Similarly without precedent was the situation faced by Southerners, whose newspapers had to
adjust to the fact of secession. In 1966 Donald E. Reynolds published a tightly focused analysis of
southern editors’ responses to the secession crisis from January 1860, to a cutoff date of mid-May,
1861. He tracked the rapid shift of Southern editorial opinion from “…generally Unionist position in 1860
to a predominantly secessionist viewpoint a year later.” Reynolds identified a split in mental approach
and openness that hobbled Southern adaptation to journalistic changes during the war almost as much
as physical shortages and blockade isolation did. He reviewed more than 200 newspapers, both rural
and urban publications. Among his findings, Reynolds claims that newspapers framed reality for much of
the interior of the South and did so in a highly biased manner. “Editors carefully selected news that
reflected their own viewpoints,” he wrote, adding that such news was “[M]aterial that had been lifted
bodily and, sometimes, without acknowledgment from other journals.” Reynolds discovered uneasiness
on the part of journalists at the impact of new technology, such as the telegraph, that might bring
outside information to their readership in ways that competed with the editors’ views or threatened
their monopoly over news distribution. He wrote that: “The isolation of the Southern press from any
influences that might have restored to it a national perspective and its intensely partisan nature helped
make Southern newspapers the perfect vehicles to emotionalize both real and imaginary sectional
20
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differences.” From Reynolds’ book, it can be concluded that the press had real power to shape an
imagined community. Even remote editors in journalistic backwaters knew that they held that power,
and their opposition to losing it showed they also recognized the forces of change that were reshaping
the news business.21
Some of the analytical historians argue against conventional interpretations of the causes of
journalistic progress. Michael Schudson’s Discovering the News concentrated primarily on the post-Civil
War changes that led, first, to professionalization of newsgathering and, second, to the split between
news as entertainment and news as information, a phenomenon he locates in the 1890s. In Schudson’s
introduction, he challenges popularly accepted explanations of reasons for the “revolution” in
journalism that accompanied the rise of the penny press and its remarkable success during the Popular
Press period. Schudson attempts to rebut claims that a national increase in literacy, improvements in
technology, or any form of “natural history” of evolution of the news enterprises built the new
journalism of the 1840s. He argues, instead, that it was the emergence of “professional methodology”
that moved newspapers to prominence and to change. Schudson warns, though, that for all the progress
made in the nineteenth century, “[O]bjective reporting did not become the chief norm or practice in
journalism in the late nineteenth century.” His finding may be true in a general sense, and certainly
nobody would confuse a front page from the 1880s or 1890s with one from the twenty-first century on
the basis of objectivity or reporting standards. His argument seems to dismiss ample contemporary
evidence of a focus on technology, literacy, and other building blocks of an advanced reading culture as
a public good to be sought.22
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Writing on the origins of the Popular Press of the 1830s is a dedicated but small group of
historians specializing in the area. The popular press, because of its size and investment, tended to lead
in journalistic trends. This was especially due to its dominance of the New York Associated Press and its
influence on setting the telegraphic news agenda. Writing on the popular press, William E. Huntzicker
presented a remarkable and comprehensive survey of the genesis of the penny press of New York and of
journalistic developments from 1833 to 1865. Huntzicker is a proponent of the idea that the Civil War
and technological leaps brought change to journalism. While his work is focused primarily on editors
such as Greeley, Henry J. Raymond, and James Gordon Bennett and their business practices, its
comprehensive sweep takes in specialty publications, western newspaper “wars,” and Southern and
regional journalism. Huntzicker’s final chapter, “Reflections on the Popular Press,” is especially useful. In
it, he notes that the changing nature of journalism at the time of the war can be seen in the creation of
specialized job descriptions such as managing editors, phonographers, paragraphers, special
correspondents and special artists. However, Huntzicker—like Schudson—also warns that though the
trend in leading newspapers was not necessarily divorced from political journalism. He writes, “[T]heir
revolution did not immediately transform partisan journalists into objective reporters.” Instead,
Huntzicker claims, the time saw the building of structure that professionalized the newspaper and
harmonized the process of newsgathering and dissemination.23
Another scholar of the popular press is James Crouthamel, mentioned earlier, whose 1989 work
concentrated on a single newspaper, the New York Herald, and its controversial and innovative editor,
James Gordon Bennett. Crouthamel’s deep focus on the Herald and Bennett is particularly useful on the
editorial change that the Civil War brought. In a rare direct editorial discussion, Bennett is quoted as
23
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saying that the newly-trained corps of professional reporters who had been covering the war would not
be dismissed at the end of the conflict, but they would now be “[sent] as our ambassadors to all the
great capitals of the world … Just as there is a Herald’s headquarters tent with every army … so shall
there be a Herald legation in all the chief cities from Melbourne to Spitsbergen.” While Crouthamel
denies that the Civil War brought significant change, Bennett’s attitude indicates a serious change in the
way newspapers viewed their correspondents. Earlier, they had been a haphazard network of letterwriters. Crouthamel’s chapter “Technology and the News,” outlines the course of news adoption from
1840 to 1860, based on the triumph of general distribution newspapers over the mercantile press.
Crouthamel also introduces his work with comments that community desire and input created the
organism that was the Herald: “The Herald, editorial columns aside, was the best newspaper of its time,
and it was written in a style that identified with rather than spoke down to its readers.” The inference
that identifying with the reader could dictate editorial style adds further weight that news organizations
recognition of the needs of their readers as much as the whims of their editorial leaders.24
Scholars who have paid attention to communication systems themselves have contributed
greatly to understanding of the functioning of the media world. Richard R. John’s significant and
thoughtful research on the postal system, published in 1995, provides a detailed picture of the
environment that the newspaper occupied in antebellum times. His later work on the telegraph and the
telephone give brilliant detail to the emergence of networked communications. Although John’s work
does not directly touch on the Civil War, it explains factors that affected news distribution as well as the
culture that surrounded it. According to data cited by John, by 1840, some 39 million newspapers
annually were mailed in the United States, compared to fewer than 2 million in 1800. This created an
“imagined community,” such as those nationalistic ones theorized by political scientist Benedict
Anderson, but in this case one that was dependent on the mail, and that reinforced male domination of
24
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information. Women were rarely welcome (and were often victimized or heckled) at the post offices
themselves. The offices were often located in stores, taverns, or “public houses,” that served as the local
commons but were socially off-limits to females. In addition, John carefully delineates the preJacksonian development of the American postal network as an information structure that created its
own demand, independent of technology. Only the postal system had the capability to “broadcast”
throughout America, establishing expectations that later news evolution had to meet. John’s definition
of the effects this distribution system had is compelling: “[I]t may well be the periodical character of the
information that the postal system transmitted that most sharply differentiated the information that
Americans received in this way from the other kinds of information that were available to them at the
time,” he wrote.25
The topic of imagined communities or the distributed nature of the audience for the Press has
further extended journalistic history and given a fruitful area for understanding of mass audiences. Like
John’s picture of imagined community and Crouthamel’s theory that readership defined the newspaper,
David Paul Nord’s scholarly essays written over the course of twenty years shed an interesting light on
the idea of the American newspaper of the nineteenth century as a created community, a concept Nord
attributes to Alexis de Tocqueville. For Nord, journalism has been in an ever-shifting balance between
supplying facts and providing a public forum for debate and opinion. Citing Tocqueville’s 1831
Democracy in America, Nord quotes: “A newspaper can only survive if it gives publicity to feelings or
principles common to a large number of men. A newspaper therefore always represents an association
whose members are its regular readers.” Tocqueville referred to the multiplicity of U.S. newspapers as
“bizarre” and explained that their existence must be due to the complex electoral politics of the country.
Tocqueville wrote, “The more numerous local powers, the greater the number of people required by law
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to exercise them and the more insistently this necessity is felt, the more newspapers abound.” He
continued, “The newspaper represents the associations and one may say that it speaks to each of its
readers in the name of all the others, sweeping them along all the more readily as they are individually
powerless.”

26

Nord argues strongly that the reading community, instead, exercised control over

newspapers and effectively brought varying types of news coverage into being. He writes, “American
journalism has never had a golden age. Americans have always exploited the press, have always used
both the information and forum function of the press to build groups and communities in their own
interest and image – and to tear others down.”27 In this, Civil War journalism conforms absolutely in its
North-South opposition, especially in Southern insularity of opinion cited earlier. But the actual use of
the newspaper as an information asset undermines the idea that such communities had firm
boundaries. In fact, news boundaries overlapped. Richmond newspapers, in particular, proudly declared
that they had “full files” of the most recent Northern newspapers, obtained from treaty boats, military
sources, and commercial travelers, while Northern papers often reprinted stories culled from Southern
newspaper pages. While Nord is more interested in journalism of the late 18th century and of the later
Progressive era, his concepts of community have merit for discussion of Civil War journalism.28
Technology specialists have contributed an approach based on the hardware of industrial
advances and its effects on the communication structure of the nation. Several authors have
concentrated on technology and the emergence of networks, primarily in the form of the telegraph, to
explain the larger impact of wartime coverage on journalism and on national news expectations. The
best of these, Menahem Blondheim, incorporates communications theory of Harold Adams Innis and
Marshall McLuhan to argue that the overlooked area of wire news actually explains the emergence of
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oligopoly in “[T]he supply and demand for information.” He illustrates his argument by tracking the
emergence of the Associated Press. Blondheim’s central thesis is that an Associated Press monopoly in
the late 1870s essentially nationalized the news and skewed national coverage toward Republican
politics. But it was during the Civil War that the telegraph itself was temporarily taken over by the
government and the New York AP was given a limited government monopoly. Blondheim’s description
of the circumstances and business arrangements is detailed and useful. The work is thoroughly
documented; the footnotes alone make a rich and coherent source. His carefully crafted text illuminates
newspaper relationships with the U.S. Post Office, some business practices, and typical expenses; and
the change over time that technology brought to the creation and the spread of news.29 At least two
more recent works extend knowledge of the telegraph as an information system and network; they
include David Hochfelder’s The Telegraph in America and Richard John’s Network Nation. John’s 2010
work meticulously describes the postal telegraph movement and the frequent debates over whether the
government, rather than private industry, should have controlled the wires. Hochfelder explores the rise
of Western Union and its “hard-headed business practices,” including monopolistic use of rights-of-way
in order to prevent competitors; he also examines claims that the nature of the telegraph significantly
changed American prose writing styles.30
Historical approaches to nineteenth century journalism continue to evolve, especially as new
lines of analysis allow historians to realize new possibilities in the field. The departure from biographies
of editors or episodic descriptions of the romantically characterized correspondents does not necessarily
mean devolution to a bloodless, institutional form of history. More recent examples of the analytical
school include the work of David B. Sachsman, S. Kitrell Rushing, Debra Van Tuyll and others. Building on
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The Annual Symposium on the Antebellum Press, the Civil War, and Free Expression held at the
University of Tennessee in Chattanooga has led to two significant books of essays concerning Civil War
journalism with a broad range of approaches. These have focused intense examination of journalism in
specific states and regions, to investigation of individual journalistic incidents. One such is the “bogus
proclamation” of 1864, in which telegraphic journalists made up a Presidential order calling for 400,000
additional troops, bringing down heavy censorship and leading to the arrest and imprisonment of
several editors, reporters, and the entire staff of the Independent Telegraph Company. The essays have
shown that controversial new thinking on Civil War journalism is not only possible, but is fruitful, and
that reexamination of the primary sources on a regional and even local basis can open promising
channels of historical interpretation.31
Too intense a focus on personalities has obscured the very real changes that came to the news
under the pressure of wartime needs and demands and in the decades afterward. This dissertation
seeks to add understanding of the paper as an indicator of the new thinking and the development of a
complex, systems approach to an imagined community in the later nineteenth century. The signs of this
transition came in changes in content and layout exhibited by many newspapers. The reactions of
individuals to pressures to innovate in news media cement this evolution as an intentional reaction to an
overwhelming flow of simultaneous events. The basis for rapid linked and networked communications
existed before the Civil War, but it was not well understood and, in many cases, the technical
capabilities were feared or disbelieved. It took the pressure of war to change the method of
newsgathering and publication, and the advantages of peace to build systems that maximized the
overall effect that these changes wrought.
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The period of study is from 1840 to 1893, the year that the New York Associated Press was
disbanded and a new, national, Associated Press was formed. The study has a concentration on the Civil
War years and the effects of news demand and utilization of new technology to meet that demand.
While the war seems to be the most pivotal cause, introduction of new press forms beginning in the late
1830s and of new steam-powered production processes in the 1840s and 1850s set the stage for the
journalistic leap that was to come. The post-war decades show the absorption and standardization of
new news practices, including the extensive use of telegraphic networks. The study closes with the 1893
takeover of the New York Associated Press by the Western Associated Press, just before the rise of
Yellow Journalism, the boom in the media empires of William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, and
the advent of the muckraking progressive press.
With Chapter Two the study examines the transition that occurred in newspapers during the
American Civil War, showing evidence that classified advertising was stricken from the front pages of
many publications due to news pressure, that large-format graphics were introduced in order to explain
complex news stories in ways that words couldn’t, and that editors and publishers were intentional in
these decisions. The work then moves in Chapter Three to an in-depth look at a major national incident,
the New York City Draft Riots, in an attempt to show that the Press was responding to news events in a
new way and that newspapers did not revert to earlier forms under pressure but instead hewed to their
new, more-professionalized mode. News organizations were doing a particular kind of work, Media
Framing, that has been extensively documented in twentieth and twenty-first century media. Analysis of
the Draft Riot shows that a transition in news gathering had occurred and that the Press was continuing
to grow into its new role as arbiter of fact.32
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The fourth chapter shows development of the network that sped the news transition. Where
telegraphic communications were robust and interlinked, we see rapid news change and
professionalization, while where telegraphic networks were less-well-linked (e.g. the South during the
Civil War) newspapers did not make the same jumps and editors often express doubt about the validity
of remote news sources and the means of transmission.
Chapter Five demonstrates that effects of the Press transition, so heightened by wartime
pressures, can also be seen in a longer frame. Using a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of newspaper
treatment of a major issue – reaction to immigration – over the broad period of the mid-to-late
nineteenth century. Newspapers moved from reactive coverage (immigrants are bad) to prescriptive
coverage (you can trust some immigrants as citizens, and here’s why). We can see the newspaper
changing its social role and responsibility to deliver national attitudes at an early time. The analysis also
shows the nature of informational trust and borrowing of news content across an increasingly
connected nation.
Chapter Six shows the eventual shift of power that a highly-connected, fast-news-cycle media
could bring. At the midpoint of the nineteenth century, it would have been ludicrous to state that
entrepreneurs in the pioneer city of Chicago could control the entity that would distribute national
news. That role clearly belonged to an East Coast metropolis, specifically to the commercial hub of New
York City. By the beginning of the 1890s, though, young leaders of the Western Associated Press were
able to engineer a form of putsch to dethrone their New York competitors and create a national
Associated Press. The chapter reinforces the argument that news reporting was increasingly taking place
in a virtual world, that is, local papers may have run news based not on knowing of a particular

Nineteenth Century News,” paper presented at the Social Science History Association annual meeting, Chicago,
November 21-24, 2013. .
.

23
publication or reporter but simply because of trust in the newswires.33 It also shows how early news
adopters of the networked communication technology could lose their advantage by failing to follow upto-the-minute use of that technology. New York editors had thought that their prestige, history, and
location would keep them permanently in power. The race had moved from reporting the news within a
locality, to moving the news to feed a national appetite.
Chapter Seven uses the correspondence of editors, particularly Whitelaw Reid of the New York
Tribune, and records of professional organizations such as the Western Associated Press, to show the
complex nature of journalism as a professionalizing business in the later nineteenth century. Minutes of
meetings and collections of letters demonstrate that practitioners thought of their news trade as a
profession demanding particular forms, skills, and knowledge. Academic schools of journalism would not
arise until the end of the century, but the field already had begun thinking of itself as having a public
image and reputation to protect, far from the hearty pioneer image of an independent printer going it
alone. Chapter Eight concludes the work.
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CHAPTER 2 THE CHANGE BROUGHT BY WAR
On April 10, 1862, Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune took an enormous gamble with a bold
change in the newspaper’s format. Gone from the front page were any of the long unbroken columns of
revenue-producing business advertisements that had been the standard for the newspaper’s 21 years of
existence. Replacing them instead were columns of news items, a big illustration, and telegraphic
dispatches. The Tribune’s editorial leadership knew their departure from the norms might not be
popular, especially with advertisers accustomed to having primacy of placement within the day’s usual
eight-page paper, and so they listed an explanation in italic type at the head of the first column of page
four’s editorial.
“An imperative necessity constrains us to change henceforth the appropriation of our several
pages – taking the first for Telegraphic and other freshest News of the morning, and transferring
Advertisements over mainly to the sixth and seventh. For want of such an arrangement, our Editorials
have often been in good part crowded out by midnight dispatches and letters containing War News. We
hope to make the change palpably advantageous to both readers and advertisers,” read the editorial.1
The Civil War’s overwhelming demands on government, the economy, and society created new
demands in turn on journalism and pushed the communications industry to adapt speedily to a faster
cycle of information than had ever been present before. At the same time, ingenious use of new
technology and the growth of information networks provided a vastly higher volume and broader range
of news, while a growing audience of readers seems to have become both more sophisticated in their
demand for news and less elite in their literary expectations. Editors and their correspondents were
presaging, rather than prescribing, the future course of the news media in America when they engaged
in or confronted modernisms forced by unique circumstances. The choices they made in the new news
coverage were not based on any particular plan, but were an adaptation to changes in technology,
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information formats, and availability. Their experiences—failures, as well as successes—offer a unique
window into a change in the velocity of information and the reach of networks that was both demanded
and enabled by massive wartime appetites for nationally-integrated news, and equally massive demand
that reliability of information supplant the comfort of partisan verities. In a national conflict that was
eating up hundreds of thousands of lives and huge amounts of capital, readers needed information that
was factually correct, rather than just “right” based on political or national leanings. Wartime pressures
clearly accelerated a process away from the dominant model of the newspaper as primarily a political
vehicle (supported by advertising, as well as political subsidy) for the personal view of its editor or party
owner, and toward the group enterprise that staked its reputation on delivering a brand of news
coverage acceptable to a wide readership hungry for facts.2
For readers of the penny press of New York City, the newspaper changed literally overnight.
Friday’s final Tribune edition, April 9, had carried two full pages of advertising columns on its first and
second page. The grey screed included exhortations for boot blacking, liver medications, clothing, stage
shows, and popular literature, including one advertisement that read: “Get it at once. Prison life in the
tobacco warehouse at Richmond [Libbey Prison]. By a Ball’s Bluff Prisoner.” On Saturday morning, by
comparison, the front page instead was dominated with a four-column-wide map of the Yorktown,
Virginia, area as an aid to understanding Gen. George McClellan’s Peninsular Campaign. The map was
flanked by emphatic headlines and news columns describing the Battle of Pittsburgh Landing (Shiloh)
and reading, in part, “TWO DAYS’ FURIOUS FIGHTING./The Rebels Driven from the Field./A.S. Johnston
Killed./Gen. Beauregard Wounded./Heavy Loss on Both Sides.”3
While the single-column-wide, decked headlines (in which an outline of the major parts of the
news story was stacked in order of appearance) might look archaic to a modern reader, the overall
2
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appearance of this new newspaper would be entirely familiar. By combining graphics, articles, bold
headlines, and a layout that broke the dominant single column format, Greeley and his staff had
innovated in the momentous spring of 1862. The Tribune’s adventure demonstrated a change in the
social nature of news publications that altered an old power relationship – that of the advertiser and his
business coming first with the editor – to substitute a new master, the actual news itself and, by
implication, the reader.4
The New York Tribune was not the only paper to experiment in the mid-War years, and that,
coupled with the Greeley admission that the change was an “imperative necessity” rather than a
calculated marketing ploy, shows an evolution. Journalist Murat Halstead, writing a retrospective of
journalism from the 1850s onward, later remarked that “In all the cities of the nation the changes in the
press have been as marked as in New York, and in some of them even more remarkable.” Halstead
particularly cited the concentration on news rather than on running masses of literary and political copy.
Before the war, he said, “Men who knew news at a glance were scarce. The faculty of understanding,
gathering and presenting intelligence in good form for publication was a rare one.”5
Independent journalists were just one development in that process. Newspapers themselves
and the technology they relied upon underwent significant changes during the Civil War that both
professionalized and nationalized “the news.” Newspapers ended the Civil War as vastly different
creatures than they had been at the time of the war’s inception. This virtual catalyzing (a change which
leads to a new thing that cannot be undone) of the newspaper marks an important moment in American
history, for newspapers would increasingly come to dominate public influence, frame debate over
crucial issues, and validate elements of national identity for the next century or more, until the advent
4
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of broadcast and, most recently, the Internet’s World Wide Web would significantly disrupt the model
again.
The foundation of newspaper networking can be traced to the Post Office Act of 1792, which
Richard John has described as transformative in creating a “national community.” The act created
enormous privileges for newspapers. The primary privilege was the definitive decision that newspapers
had a right to a place in the postal distribution system, rather than being carried as a courtesy. By dint of
this decision, newspaper publishers gained an enormous distribution channel that would have been
difficult (if not impossible) to fund and develop privately. But the act did more; it created a favorable
postal rate for newspapers (one cent for distances up to 100 miles, one-and-a-half cents for all other
distances) that made them affordable to individual subscribers. Most important for the development of
newspapers, though, Congress in section 21 of the Act of 1792 created a free exchange system between
newspapers themselves. This meant that a remote frontier editor could trade news at par with even the
most exalted East Coast urban daily, while paying no carrying costs. The act “… created a new kind of
public sphere that was soon destined to transform the boundaries of American public life. Prior to 1792,
the public sphere had been largely limited to government officers and merchants living in the principal
port towns along the Atlantic seaboard,” writes John. As a result of the information flow established by
the act, politics became an ongoing national discussion, rather than a local or regional episodic event.
This had been James Madison’s intent in calling on the public to favor the Post Office Act, which he
theorized would reduce an ungovernably large real territory by extending popular sovereignty virtually,
thus limiting the power of government. Madison may not have intended it, but the act also established
a growing community of editors who “knew” one another across great distances and who borrowed text
from one another freely. Plagiarism, for much of the 19th century, was a newspaper business method.6
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By the time of the Civil War, the exchange system and its fraternal community of newspaper
editors was a fixed and accepted part of American political life, as a description of Abraham Lincoln’s
post-election campaign office in the Springfield, Illinois, statehouse suggests. Attributed to Lincoln’s law
student and later presidential secretary John G. Nicolay, writing as a special correspondent for the New
York Tribune, the passage was initially published on November 11, 1860:
One table is covered with law books, and another is littered with newspapers enough to
supply a country journalist with items for a year. Heaps and hills of newspapers, a few
opened, the greater part still unfolded. If you take the wrappers from a few of these
neglected sheets, you will find, within, whole columns of fervid eloquence, sonorous
with big capitals and bursting with hot Republican sentiment, all carefully marked and
underlined, the sooner to catch the eye of the great chief. Alas for the little ambitions of
village editors. They have sent the cherished begettings of their brains to an oblivion too
deep and too crowded for any chance of rescuing.7

Lincoln himself was owner of a newspaper through the ultimate year of his presidential campaign, the
Springfield-based German-language weekly Illinois Staats-Anzeiger, primarily as a tool to recruit German
immigrant support for Republicans, but possibly also for the exchange advantages. The Postal Act’s
foundation allowed for the growth of inter-newspaper networking. Initially, though, politicians used the
advances of the act to create a push of news from their federal offices to local constituents and to
editors who might repeat speeches and letters. John states that “Congress bombarded the public with
newspaper accounts of its proceedings, pamphlets, reprinted speeches, and reports and documents of
all kinds” such that by 1830, up to 30 percent of all printed material issued in the United States came
from political sources. From 1845 through 1851, Congress tweaked postal laws to give even more
advantages to rural local newspapers, eventually offering free postal circulation for weeklies within the
paper’s county of origin. The Postal Act of 1845 continued to give discounted postage to newspapers
sized at 1,900 square inches or less, or roughly four 20 by 22 inch sheets. Political parties, interest
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groups, religious, and voluntary associations mimicked newspaper structure or developed their own
newspapers in order to take advantage of the exchange system, particularly anti-slavery groups in the
later antebellum period. Examples include the abolitionist National Anti-Slavery Standard, published in
New York by the American Anti-Slavery Society, the farming publication The Cultivator, of Albany, New
York, and the Mormon The Evening and the Morning Star, published in Independence, Missouri. Again,
the net effect was to create the kind of imagined communities coined and described late in the last
century by Benedict Anderson, but based on shared news consumption rather than strictly nationalistic
ideals. “People who never met face to face because of geography and primitive transports formed
communities of interest by sharing information in periodicals carried through the mails,” writes Steven
Vaughn.8
The emerging network that used newspapers and the post to bind communities together moved
largely at a walking pace or a little better—certainly at a sustained speed no faster than 10 miles per
hour—until 1831 when some of the mail first began to ride on the new steam railroads. Newspapers
generally traveled along Post Office subsidized stage coach routes at speeds of about 4 miles per hour,
or were carried slightly faster by post-riders on horseback who traveled from town to town, blowing a
tin horn as they reached each stop to alert those within hearing distance that the mail had arrived.
Steamboats, used to carry the post beginning in 1828, weren’t considered reliable or regular enough to
make much of a dent in the speed of communications, especially since they were vulnerable to changing
river conditions and navigation hazards. American introduction of the electric telegraph (as opposed to
the European optical telegraph) by Samuel F.B. Morse in 1844 brought the promise of new, rapid
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communication of limited amounts of information, and from 1844 to 1847 the post office operated an
exclusive 40-mile line between Baltimore and Washington. It was not postal innovation in these steam
and electric technologies that increased the flow of information, however, but rather their rapid
maturation through government-subsidized private operation. By 1828, John writes, there were more
than 700 private contractors making the “transportation circuit” work to carry the government-operated
mail service. But while Post Office leadership, especially under Postmaster General John McLean (18231829), remained committed to speed, other governmental voices cautioned that regularity of
information delivery was more important for business and financial interests. Congress remained wary
of federal efficiencies, such as official post roads, that might be taken as violation of states’ rights.
American government in general hewed to the idea that if a service could be profitable, it should be
private. Political patronage in awarding local postal jobs, too, meant that efforts to foster universal
technologies (such as postal domination of the growth of telegraph trunk lines) were often derailed for
party convenience. Finally, the Jacksonian distaste for programs that smacked of “internal
improvements” led to stagnation in postal system improvements at just the time that new technologies
in transportation and information handling were emerging strongly in North America. McLean’s complex
system continued to move an amazing amount of printed matter, as well as money from business
transactions, long after his term as postmaster general had ended, but its systematization would remain
at stagecoach speed rather than that of the railroad or telegraph. The post office became a tool of party
politics rather than an innovator on the technology frontier. “The Jacksonians transformed the American
postal system from the central administrative apparatus of the American state into a wellspring of the
mass party,” writes John.9
Newspapers in the decades leading up to the Civil War traveled at the forward edge of episodic
information—some express services allowed major papers to promise information 24 hours before the
9
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mail’s delivery—but relatively slow travel speeds for information and general lack of interconnectedness
between communities meant that local editors were largely able to set the public news agenda in their
hometowns. Thus an antebellum editor receiving an Eastern exchange paper might hold on to its budget
of “news” items for days, if not weeks, feeding them gradually into his own publication at his own pace.
For a local audience largely disconnected from other cities or towns, this kind of news delivery might be
entirely satisfactory. Stories of a deadly fire, a titillating court case, or a significant social event did not
need to be timely to remain interesting. Commercial news, though, which would echo that received in
business correspondence, was tactically important and received prompt printing. This largely consisted
of lists of prices being paid at national entrepôts for commodities, livestock, and agricultural products;
exchange rates for money issued by various state and local banks; foreign economic news, maritime
arrivals and departures, freight arrivals at local warehouses from trains and wagons, and the like. Lists
that the modern reader’s eye would tend to skip over as uninteresting or irrelevant were the currency of
the newspaper of the time. Schudson says that, of the 138 daily newspapers in circulation in the United
States in 1840, most “[A]ppear to have been little more than bulletin boards for the business
community.” Indeed, he writes, until 1830, newspapers had specifically allied themselves by name with
commercial interests, with a majority of papers published in major cities using business-specific terms as
part of their name.10
By 1860, Newspapers were in the forefront of one of the highest-growth industries in the U.S.,
according to the census of that year. Printing, overall, had increased by 168 percent from 1850, and its
proceeds represented a dollar for each of the 31 million people in the U.S. “The increase in this branch
of domestic manufactures is unprecedented in our previous history,” wrote J. M. Edmunds,
commissioner in charge of the census. The field employed 20,159, including 2,333 women, and
represented a capital investment of more than $19.5 million. The print bonanza was unevenly
10
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distributed, though. Of 1,666 “printing houses” registered by the census, only 151 could be tracked to
the 11 Southern states, with a net value of printing of just $1.25 million and capital of $1.17 million. New
York and Pennsylvania were the dominant printing states, holding 60 percent of the business. “The value
of the manufacture in New York alone reached the sum of $12,617,105, which was upward of 40 per
cent. of the total product of the Union,” said the census. It listed more than 51 newspapers in New York
City alone, and described a lively business environment in the second ward: “One establishment issued
31,805,000 copies of newspapers, valued with advertisements at $800,000 per annum, and consumed
78,000 reams of paper, worth $400,000.” Others in the same ward annually published 20, 18.2, and 16.4
million copies of newspapers respectively. In the fourth ward, newspaper production represented 74
percent of the $2.9 million of annual printing income. “the activity of the press has been at once the
index and the instrument of progress in civilization and that mental activity which has contributed to the
present position of the nation in its moral, social, and material interests,” the census writer enthused.11
It is important for modern viewers to recognize the excitement created by the comparatively
dull-looking newspaper of the mid-nineteenth century. The public was wild about newspapers; the
appetite for them was such that future Supreme Court justice Stephen J. Field made his way as a young
man in 1849 in California because he had prudently brought “bundles of New York newspapers, which
he sold for a dollar apiece” in the goldfields. In Charleston, South Carolina, the New York Times
correspondent “JASPER” wrote of a “crazy crowd” lined up ten feet deep at the door of the Mercury in
late March of 1861 to read clippings from that newspaper’s exchange copy of the New York Tribune. The
demand for papers was immense; in New York, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper was selling an
average of 100,000 copies of its weekly by 1860, just five years from its founding.12
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The typical newspaper of the antebellum period was a weekly, printed on both sides of a single
large sheet of paper which was then folded to make a four-page edition. Two such sheets created an
eight-page paper, but, before editors would add more pages, they would first try for a larger page
format. This was partly because print technology limited the speed of the process, in which hand-fed
sheets of paper were imprinted on one side and then needed to dry before receiving the second printing
on their blank side. Faster printing took significant investment. When the Chicago Times was purchased
in 1861, its new owner found himself saddled with a press that could only make 700 impressions an
hour, requiring thousands of dollars in new equipment to make the operation profitable. Horace Greeley
in 1850 spent more than $12,000 to install an 8,000-page per hour steam-driven press made by R. Hoe &
Company, and by 1855 had invested $25,000 in a thirty-four foot tall room-sized press that printed with
ten cylinders simultaneously, took a crew of ten men to operate, and was fed with paper sheets from
multiple overhead trays. Eventually the paper would have three such presses operating simultaneously.
The Tribune, which began running eight-page editions in the early 1850s, used an engraving of the hightech press as its front page symbol, as did the Chicago Press and Tribune which further emphasized its
cutting-edge technology by including a steamboat and a steam train in the graphic. Paper sizes were far
from standard, and some early commercial papers were so large that they were referred to as “blanket
sheets,” while later dailies were initially printed in a format scarcely larger than today’s standard letter
paper. Regardless of the size, “Its front page was almost exclusively devoted to advertising, and the
fourth page likewise was strictly advertising. These outside pages were like the cover of a book or
magazine—one turned to the inside to find the content of the paper,” writes Schudson. There were
exceptions, particularly the New York Times which had printed an all-news front page since the 1840s,
but they were few. In the antebellum period, when a paper grew larger it was usually explained by the
editors as an accommodation to advertisers. “On many occasions we have had to leave out advertisers
for several days … The enlargement of our paper, as soon as we shall be prepared to carry it into effect,
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will enable us, we hope, to deal equally and liberally to all our kind advertising customers,” wrote James
Gordon Bennett in December, 1835, when the Herald announced it would grow in size by one-third.
Most papers were sold by annual subscription ranging from $4 to $10, though a single-issue price of six
cents was typical even after the advent of the penny press.13
Many newspapers were an outgrowth of a printer’s job shop, rather than the free-standing
business enterprise that the news would become in the twentieth century, and part of their purpose
was to advertise the other print services available. An early morning fire that temporarily wiped out the
Detroit Daily Tribune in January, 1859, left an insurance record and a news story that gives the value and
operations of a typical news printing operation in a smaller city. According to the Detroit Free Press, the
Tribune establishment included a boiler and engine in the basement, two large steam presses and
“some small ones” on the first floor, and a steam card press on the third floor. The presses would have
been operated by belts and shafts driven by the steam engine in the basement. Presumably the type
cases and composing equipment occupied the second floor. The newspaper’s assets had been insured
for $21,100, and, wrote the Free Press, “The insurance will undoubtedly cover the actual loss.” By
comparison the building, which was rented, was valued at just $2,500. Newspaper publishing took
toughness and persistence; Henry Barns issued a half-sheet Tribune the next day promising subscribers
the paper wouldn’t suspend operations, and the Free Press remarked “This is the third time he has been
burned out of the publishing business, once before in this city and twice in Syracuse, N.Y.”14
Printers also had to be versatile. The Richmond Daily Dispatch in 1860 advertised its services for
“BOOK AND JOB PRINT NG [sic] , such as pamphlets, circulars, bills of lading, checks, &c., as well as
Postes, Programmes & Handbills,” with “particular attention given to fine work for Banks, Public Offices,
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Insurance, Railroad, and Transportation Companies, Tobacco Factories, &c.” Valuable governmental
print contracts often sustained a paper; as an example, Judge Jesse Buel, the state printer for New York,
also edited and published a weekly Democratic party newspaper (later a Republican organ), the Albany
Argus. The print shop itself formed a hotbed of political and business development; one of Buel’s printer
apprentices was future New York political boss Thurlow Weed, who wrote that as a youth he regularly
worked from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. and always found Buel at the office before him “at his case setting type by
a yellow candle and smoking a long pipe.” Weed himself became a newspaper editor and, later, also
state printer as part of consolidating Republican political power in New York. The ability to do the
physical tasks of printing was as important for early editors as was their writing or creative prowess;
abolitionist editor William Lloyd Garrison “could write at the composing stick while carrying on a
conversation,” and such abilities were considered admirable but not unusual.15
Distribution of papers was relatively simple. Delivery of subscription newspapers was to a public
accommodation, generally the post office or a retail store, or from the newspaper offices and print
shops themselves—in other words, customers came to the news rather than the news coming to the
customers. This was usual for the distribution networks of the time. Postal mail, for example, was
“delivered” to the main post office, where recipients were required to appear in person to claim their
mail (and to pay any delivery charges due on it). Following the so-called “commercial revolution” in
newspapers with the rise of the penny press in the 1830s, street selling by newsboys became a common
feature of urban centers, a unique Americanism that was remarked on by travelers. In 1861, William
Corsan wrote of his transit through New York City’s docks that “As a matter of course, also, the
ubiquitous newsboy was there with his everlasting cry of “’Ere’s the ‘Erald, Tribune, Times, Express, third
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edition! ‘Ave a paper, sir? Three for a dime, sir! Thankee, sir! ‘Ere’s the ‘Erald,”etc.” An 1863 description
in the Washington Chronicle called newsboys an American “original.” “He can generally read just enough
to decipher the news on the bulletin board, or if he can not do that, he gets some friend to read it for
him, and if no literary friend is at hand, he rushes about the street bawling out lies ad liberatum. Yet, if
you trust this boy, he will trust you.”16
By 1850 the average circulation of most papers was about 1,200, with urban dailies and some
specialty publications a major exception to that number. As examples, the New York Sun claimed more
than 30,000 subscribers, the Philadelphia Public Ledger 44,000. Gamalial Bailey’s abolitionist The
National Era claimed a circulation of 250,000 in 1852 while the paper was printing the serialized
publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Circulation was more than just a bragging
point—it also qualified the newspaper for government printing business. The regular printing of the list
of letters awaiting recipients at the Post Office, which could run to several columns, was specifically
reserved for the local newspaper with the largest verifiable circulation.17
Advertising rates varied, but that of the New York Herald published in 1835 close to the paper’s
inception was typical. For a “square” of 16 lines in one column, the Herald charged a variable rate of
from fifty cents for a single day’s insertion up to $30 for a year’s advertising. The commercial Courier
and Enquirer was derided by Bennett for charging $40 annually for ads “hid away” inside its paper. As
the papers matured, ad prices increased and other methods of billing for them became the norm. By
1860, Harper’s Weekly claimed itself to be the “cheapest advertising medium in the country. Price 50
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cents per line.” Advertisers were courted, flattered, and given enormous deference by editors like
Bennett and Greeley, who were able to use the revenue from multiple ad pages to keep circulation
prices low and to continue building their audience. They saw nothing incongruous in occupying the
prime real estate of the paper—its outside pages—with column after column of classifieds for health
nostrums, entertainment, clothing, and the like. A partial list of advertisements in the New York Herald
included 20 for medicines, including “Oldham’s Beobstruant and Alterative Pills (for Universal Use),”
“Mrs. E. Kidder’s Dysentery Cordials,” and “The Unfortunate’s Friend celebrated Medicine” (a specific
for gonorrhea). Editors were certain that readers both wanted these ads—both Greeley and Bennett
wrote that ads were “a portion of the news of the day”--and would still open the paper to reach its true
heart: their editorials.18
Content in most newspapers ranged widely, but relatively little of what was printed would be
recognizably “news” articles to a reader of today. This relative valuation of opinion over information
meant that the newspaper gave voice to issues in a way that created coteries of readership, such that a
follower of a particular paper could be considered to subscribe to the editorial direction of that paper. In
an 1862 description of an Ohio abolitionist leader printed in the radical Democratic Ohio Patriot
newspaper, for instance, the editor could say “He takes the New York Tribune and … generally gets
everything wrong.” Followers of particular editors would fight one another over newspaper opinions,
and the editors themselves brawled in public with surprising frequency. An 1831 encounter between
rival editors William Cullen Bryant and William L. Stone was described by a diarist: “The former
commenced the attack by striking Stone over the head with a cowskin; after a few blows the parties
closed and the whip was wrested from Bryant and carried off by Stone.” In 1835, the New York Herald
reported “We are sorry to learn that the editor of the Transcript received a very handsome thrashing
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yesterday for some improper conduct of a shameless kind. It was performed by a gentleman of the bar,
and in a very workmanship-like style.” During times of stress, mobs of one paper’s supporters often
invaded and destroyed the offices of a rival publication—this generally involved breaking the presses,
scattering the type, and defacing or burning the account books. Murder related to newspaper editorials
was rare, but not unheard of; in 1862 Dayton Empire editor J.F. Bollmeyer, an emphatic Democrat, was
shot and killed while on his way to buy groceries by a longtime friend apparently angered by Bollmeyer’s
editorial support for Southern sympathizer Clement L. Vallandigham. Editorial opinions were robust,
often personally insulting to public figures and private individuals, as an 1835 entry from Bennett shows:
“We seldom have seen an intelligent assemblage bear so patiently such an infliction of ignorance, as
they did from a certain Mr. Willis Hall. Pray who is he?” And editorializing was likely to appear almost
anywhere in the paper beyond the formal columns because the editors often served as reporters as
well. The pro-slavery Detroit Free Press in 1859 printed a nominal news article written by editor Wilbur
F. Storey and headlined “A Disgusting Case – A White Girl Elopes with a Negro.” The piece concluded
with an attack on the girl’s father, a “red-hot abolitionist of the whole-lot-or-nothing, nigger-as-good-asanybody style,” saying “He has the supreme satisfaction of witnessing … his own daughter clasped in the
embrace of a greasy nigger, willing and ready, and even enthusiastically reciprocal, in the sweet game of
dalliance with which lovers (!) delight to celebrate their unions.”19 Yet even Storey, notorious for his
hatred for abolition and abolitionists, needed the excuse of the news aspect of the elopement to
introduce his sop of race-baiting sexual innuendo to his readers.
Exchange papers provided much content, some of it apparently validated solely by the fact that
it came from another newspaper, as the following example shows: “The Woodstock (CT) Standard is
responsible for the statement that a hen, killed in Hartland last week, after a knife was put through her
throat, and her feathers picked off, effected her escape, and ran to her nest in the barn, and laid an
19
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egg!” Other exchange material was often the result of a long string of borrowing. When a May 21
tornado blew the roof off of the Cincinnati Commercial’s building, Harper’s Weekly reported on it in
early June, lifting the entire story from the Cincinnati Gazette. The Harper’s story, in turn, subsequently
appeared in several other newspapers.20
Contributions from special correspondents—literally, letter writers—provided an often eclectic
budget of items from distant cities, financial centers, and foreign countries. The qualifications to be a
“special” owed less to news judgment than to placement and special interests; Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, for example, were among the eighteen foreign correspondents writing in 1851 for Greeley’s
Tribune, which wanted to appeal to the increasing German immigrant population in the U.S. In this
instance, the articles, actually written by Engels, ran under the byline of Marx (the two provided some
500 articles before the Tribune severed the relationship in 1862). Many other specials wrote under a
pseudonym, or used initials only, if a name appeared at all in connection with their letters. New York
Tribune correspondent Sam Wilkerson, in an 1862 letter, wrote “"The anonymous greatly favors
freedom and boldness in newspaper correspondence. I would not allow any letter writer to attach his
initials to his communications, unless he was a widely known & influential man like Greeley or Bayard
Taylor...Besides the responsibility it fastens on a correspondent, the signature inevitably detracts from
the powerful impersonality of a journal.” Special contributions were often only vaguely documented or
offered second- or third-hand impressions of events. A typical example from the New York Times of Oct.
1, 1861, received from Jefferson City, Missouri, began with “A gentleman who arrived here this morning
from the West, states that he saw a gentleman who passed through Osceola on Wednesday last, who
says that the central portion of the town has been burned by Gen. Lane.”21
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Not all of the newspaper’s space was dedicated to advertising, editorials, or correspondence.
Readers expected columns of poetry (often very bad) and installments of literary offerings, such as the
new works of Wilkie Collins or Charles Dickens. The latter’s Great Expectations began serialization in
1860 in American papers, with Harper’s Weekly editorializing that “His peculiar powers are very
different from, perhaps superior to, those required of the editor of a daily paper,” and predicting that
the new work “will have as many admirers as any of its predecessors, and that a new generation of
readers will decide, when it is ended, that the Great Novelist has at last written his great work.” Beat
reporting, too, led to regular rounds made and basic information gathered from warehouses, wharves,
banks, and hotels. It was common for passenger arrivals or departures and the contents of hotel
registers to be published in their entirety, as well as cargo manifests from railways and the docking or
clearing of ships.22
Of increasing significance in the years leading up to the Civil War were the introduction of new
technology—the telegraph—and new business methods in the form of the press association. The
telegraph’s successful demonstration in 1844 –Samuel F.B. Morse’s second message to his assistant
Alfred Vail was “Have you any news?”—and the initial use of the 40-mile line from Baltimore to
Washington, D.C. to report results of the Democratic National Convention beginning on May 24 of that
year were clearly understood by newspaper editors to be the opening of a new era in rapid
communications. The reaction was not entirely positive. Bennett, of the Herald, wrote in 1845 that: “In
regard to the newspaper press, it will experience to a degree, that must in a vast number of cases be
fatal, the effects of the new mode of circulating intelligence. The telegraph may not affect magazine
literature, nor those newspapers that have some peculiar characteristic. But the mere newspapers —
the circulators of intelligence merely — must submit to destiny, and go out of existence.” Bennett’s
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alarm was understandable, but overblown. Many newspapers were ephemeral organizations that
thrived for a few years, then went bankrupt or were acquired, and others were dependent on a single
charismatic editor whose departure wiped them out, but these were the normal pressures of business.
So far from eliminating newspapers, the availability of telegraphic information eventually served to give
smaller publications in the interior many of the advantages enjoyed by large East Coast dailies. The
Mexican War of 1846-1848 had created a new urgency and enhanced public demand for newspapers
whose speed of information could beat that of official political pronouncements and speeches. A scant
group of journalists covering the Mexican War—perhaps the first modern war correspondents—were
able to use an express service put together by the New York Herald and furthered by the New Orleans
Daily Picayune that sent dispatches eastward in stages, first on horseback by fast rider, then by
riverboat, and finally by some of the first installed electric telegraph lines. Though the nature of that
information was often subjective and one-sided, emotionally charged, floridly written, and incomplete,
it yet came to Washington and was forwarded on to New York rapidly. As such, its sheer availability and
velocity gave it credence out of proportion to its inherent value. President James Buchanan was one
who, early, worried about the results of this information revolution. “The public mind throughout the
interior is kept in a constant state of excitement,” he wrote. “They [telegrams] are short and spicy, and
can easily be inserted in the country newspapers. In the city journals they can be contradicted the next
day, but the case is different throughout the country.”23
By the early 1850s, telegraph wires led directly into the editorial offices of papers such as the
Tribune and Herald, where editors like Greeley and Bennett employed staff to take news directly off the
line or to correspond with agents in political centers like Washington, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.
Writes Standage, “The logical solution was for newspapers to form groups and cooperate, establishing
23
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networks of reporters [the term was not used until significantly later] whose dispatches would be
telegraphed back to a central office and then be made available to all member newspapers.”24
The formation of the New York Associated Press in 1848 (following initial cooperation on
Mexican War dispatches by some of its seven founding members as early as May, 1846) created the
germ for a shared basic news feed, made available to remote editors at a flat rate, dealing primarily with
news acquired from arriving steamships from Europe, commercial information, and retransmitted
articles from local papers. Up until the time of the Civil War, however, the telegraph was considered
novel enough technology that its news items were a prestigious sign of modernity and usually run in a
separate column titled either “News from the Magnetic Telegraph” or “Electric Telegraph.” Harris has
written that telegraph charges for individual news stories were large enough to limit the system’s use by
independent correspondents and poorer news organizations: “The Washington-to-New York tariff for a
typical two-thousand-word newspaper column was about $100; from New Orleans to New York,
perhaps $450; this, at a time when the man writing the column might have earned less than $10 for his
effort.” An exasperated Charles A. Dana, receiving a florid battle report from a correspondent early in
the Civil War that began “To God Almighty be the glory! Mine eyes hath seen the work of the Lord and
the cause of the righteous hath triumphed,” telegraphed back “Hereafter … please specify the number
of the hymn and save telegraph expenses.” Joint news services made more economic sense, and the
early entrepreneurial correspondents who, in 1845, began to supply several newspapers from a single
major city, such as Baltimore, became known as “telegraphic reporters,” according to Blondheim. This
was soon shortened to “reporters,” a term that eventually came to characterize most journalists, he
writes.
The New York AP example was weakly imitated with press associations in other areas, but,
because of development of telegraph lines as individual enterprises that terminated mainly in New York
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and, to a lesser extent, in Washington, D.C., and Chicago, other cities did not have the hub advantages
that allowed for collection and rebroadcast of news. Military historian Martin Van Creveld states that,
just prior to the Civil War, both the telegraph and railroads had created nascent integrated systems—
and that Americans had yet to fully understand how a systems approach could outperform individual
enterprise. Though it is estimated that more than 50,000 miles of telegraph wire had been installed
nationally by the eve of the war, one of the vast difficulties for the South, and for Southern newspapers
after secession, was the separation from New York and ancillary Northern hubs that rendered a formerly
integrated web of telegraph and transport services into an assortment of disparate point-to-point
connections. This hindered the effectiveness of Southern wartime press associations, though a Southern
Associated Press and, later, the Atlanta-based Press Association of the Confederate States of America
did their best. “In the East the American Telegraph Company was oriented toward the north-south flow
of telegraphic communications. Secession wrought havoc … pitting two antagonistic polities against
each other at either end of its formerly well integrated network of lines,” writes Blondheim. The
Western Union telegraph, with an east-west orientation and a major hub in Chicago, fared better.25
Even in the North, the influence of New York as the true network hub of the telegraph made it
impossible for Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to impose military censorship on the nation’s telegraph
system. Stanton militarized the Washington, D.C., telegraph office, controlling the American Telegraph
Company lines that connected to the city, but New York’s flow of news was initially unabated as
reporters circumvented Washington by filing from Baltimore and other sites that bypassed Washington.
Even when Stanton took over all telegraph lines in the North in February, 1862, invoking military
censorship, news flow from and to the New York Associated Press continued under a hand-in-glove
working arrangement between government officials and AP managers, who received a news monopoly
in return for obedience to government policy on communication of sensitive information. The North
25
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retained the communication centers and the flexibility to expand and extend its networks, while
formerly important Southern nodes such as New Orleans, Charleston, and Richmond found themselves
communicating using partial, peripheral routes.
Much the same was true of the next-fastest line of communication, the rail networks that
carried information from distant battlefields and that brought printed newspapers to distribution points.
The South held less than one third of the more than 31,000 miles of railway in the U.S., and most of its
railroads were of point-to-point construction, discontinuous with one another, and of widely varying
track gauge. In the North, on the other hand, railroads tended to operate as interconnected large
businesses. While fiercely competitive with one another, they intentionally standardized gauges and
created interchanges. The Northern rail network continued to build during the war, an important
enabler of communication, while Southern authorities were hard-pressed to maintain the existing main
lines. Corsan, the British business traveler already mentioned, wrote: “The speed of the main lines had
been gradually reduced, first from twenty to fifteen, and subsequently to twelve and a half, and even
ten miles per hour. At the last-named rate of speed, the belief was that the rails then down would last
about two years longer. At the end of that time, it was calculated that the companies would be able
entirely to relay those lines essential to their military operations, from the new rails in stock, those being
made in the Confederacy, those taken from unimportant lines in the interior, and those also taken from
the horse-railroads in the streets of the various cities.” In both the gathering and the dissemination of
information, Southern newspapers suffered from the breakdown of networks, a devolution that had
lasting consequences long after the war.26
While the telegraph and railways carried information, the context of communications
immediacy and the nexus of interpretation remained the newspaper. While editors were aware that the
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approaching war would put new demands on them, and that new technology could allow them to
answer those demands in unprecedented ways, it took significant time for the imaginations of editors to
realize that the war would demand new forms of content. As late as 1860 and 1861, much of the “news”
was about the newspaper, itself—its place in political society, quibbles and quarrels between editors,
and defense of its own practices. Greeley’s Louisiana correspondent for the New York Tribune in April,
1861, showed how newspapers were personified as individual characters when he mocked the New
Orleans Daily Picayune without identifying its editor, George Wilkins Kendall:
A singular journalistic war is just now raging between two of our city papers. The
Picayune has the largest circulation … and is an agreeable and vivacious paper, but has
no sort of backbone. On the great topic of the times—Secession—it is neither fish, flesh,
nor good salt herring. At heart it is evidently opposed to the fire-eaters, and occasionally
it plucks up courage enough to denounce the usurpers mildly; but then The [New
Orleans] Delta bombards it as an Abolitionist sheet … this invariably frightens The
Picayune into the most rabid Secessionism for about a week … Come, Mr. Picayune, do
be either something or nothing!27

The Cincinnati Enquirer, a nine-column publication that was emphatically Democratic, publishing in what
was then the nation’s 7th largest city (pop. 161,044) provides a typical example of newspaper-centric
content in 1860. Of its first two pages, more than half of the space is dedicated to advertisements. A
“news” article on page one, headlined “Difficulty between an Ex-Foreign Minister and a Southern
Editor,” discusses a print fight taking place in Savannah, Georgia, between William H. Stiles and J.R.
Sneed. “A very indignant card from the latter gentleman denies an assertion made by Mr. Stiles, to the
effect that the original Sneed was ‘a Hessian, sent here by the British government to shoot down
American citizens for ninety cents a month.’ Mr. Sneed occupies a half-column of the Republican in
clearing his escutcheon of the foul blot, and throws back the slander upon Mr. Stiles with the proper
seasoning of epithets.” In a March issue, the combative attitude of editor Washington McLean and the
Enquirer is readily seen: “We publish this morning a letter from ‘Franklin,’ our regular and excellent
27
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Columbus correspondent, in reply to ‘More Anon.’ It will repay perusal, both as a tart rejoinder and for
its information.” The newspaper’s readership was expected to be partisan not only in politics, but on
behalf of their paper, as well.28
The adjustment of the Enquirer to new demands and new technology can begin to be seen,
though, in a page two story shortly before the fall of Fort Sumter under the heading “Telegraphic” and
the multiple deck headline: “Reported for the Daily Enquirer./Our Exclusive Dispatches./From
Washington./The War News in Washington./Exciting Rumors./Excitement at Charleston on Receipt of
New York News./Why the Administration Changed its Policy./Washington, Saturday, April 6.”
To the editor of the Enquirer: “War, War is the theme of the men congregated at the
hotels, the departments and the corners of the streets, and in every household the near
approach of hostilities has cast a gloomy shadow. That it is already inaugurated at
Sumter and Pickens we do not yet know, but there are many rumors ….It is stated that
the vessels to leave New York to-morrow morning, are not for the purpose of
reinforcing Fort Sumter, but for provisioning it, and it will depend upon the authorities
of South Carolina whether it will be done peaceably or not. I rather think that we will
have to record another Star of the West affair. Four [Here the line failed.—Operator]29

While somewhat over-wrought, the combination of on-the-scene reporting and the unexpected
cutoff of technology brought an immediacy to the news that is lacking in earlier, inwardly-focused copy.
On April 13, the Enquirer editorialized somberly that, in attacking Sumter, the Southern army “[b]roke
the status quo which has prevailed, and upon them rests the responsibility for the bloody strife … They
are the aggressors in first breaking the peace … the onus of fault they cannot shake off.” By April 15,
news articles (mostly borrowed from New York papers) had even squeezed some advertising off of the
front page. But, if a change in the news approach was coming, it was still easy for the Enquirer and
McLean to fall back into vituperative habits. Fomenting scorn against its rival, the Times, the newspaper
raved: “As a specimen of malignant cowardice, dictated by the meanest and most contemptible of all
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feelings which govern humanity, it is not a little remarkable, even in that journal, whose monomaniacal
absurdities have of late been the theme of remark. The Times has teemed with paragraphs, for a
number of days, designed to excite a mob to assault the office of the Enquirer.”30
The Enquirer never was mobbed, but its defense of itself in later months reveals a change in the
nature of special correspondents and the value placed on them. By the time of Bull Run, in July, the tone
of “Cleveland,” its own “special” in Washington, D.C., has become workmanlike and brief. On July 21, his
dispatch consists almost entirely of short sentences, e.g.: “Several members of Congress were witnesses
of the conflict at Bull’s Run. They express the belief that the Federal loss in killed is not less than one
hundred. No fighting to day.” At the same time, a competitor newspaper, the Cincinnati Gazette
mounted its own attack on the Enquirer, claiming “It is a matter of common notoriety that the
‘Cleveland’ dispatches are made up in the Enquirer office, being usually a duplication of the regular
dispatches, with the addition of the spirit of the Enquirer.” To counter the Gazette’s attack, editor
McLean published a note from the Western Union chief operator in Cincinnati, J.F. Stevens, certifying
that the telegraphed articles actually came from Washington and Baltimore. Not only was information
from the field becoming more factual, but its legitimacy depended on the paper’s ability to prove that it
came from a verifiable correspondent on the ground, rather than from exchanges. The imagined
community of the Cincinnati Enquirer’s world had expanded to include a presence on the actual
battlefields of the war.31
Like the New York Tribune, the Cincinnati Enquirer’s front page became devoted to news text
instead of ads in 1862. By June, the paper’s telegraphic news column had moved from an inside page to
occupy the right-hand columns of the front page; by September, telegraphic news occupied two full
front-page columns of a new seven-column layout. Similarly, other papers that had begun the war with
front pages that mixed advertisements and various types of news listings, such as the Chicago Tribune
30
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and the Detroit Free Press, tended to increase the prominence of news. While choices could sometimes
seem eclectic—the Detroit Free Press during the Battle of Gettysburg chose to run a three-column
literary piece on its front page—they reflected a gradual change of the newspaper from a business
entity to an information one. Wilbur F. Storey, mentioned above in connection with the Detroit Free
Press, would come to be praised for having the vision to overhaul the Chicago Times during the war.
Though the paper was deplored in much of the North for Storey’s Copperhead leanings, and was several
times suppressed for what were termed its editor’s “ravings,” Storey by 1861 had decided that
technology and immediacy were the hallmarks of a modern paper. He invested $21,000 in the paper,
which had never been profitable under its former owner, Cyrus McCormick. By the time of Storey’s
death in 1884 the Chicago Times was estimated to be worth $1.5 million. In an obituary, the New York
Times wrote “Mr. Storey … started on the theory, then new to Chicago, that a newspaper must contain
news, at whatever cost or consequence. The Times soon became known for its enterprise, dreaded for
its bittersweet personalities, and condemned for immorality, but it was read, and gained steadily in
circulation and advertising patronage.”

32

If newspapers changed during the Civil War, so did the nature of the reporters. Prior to the war’s
outbreak, only very limited efforts at independence and objectivity had existed for the press corps in
their coverage. The efforts of the 1840s in covering the Mexican War were carried out on a largely
partisan basis, with a combination of “letter writers” from the ranks boosting the merits of particular
officers or Army units, “special correspondents” writing for a penny a line to the political bent of their
newspapers, and the earliest “war correspondents” attempting to interpret tactics and strategy (often
with an emphasis on the eventual electability of commanding officers in the campaign). While the penny
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press had led to the development of self-described neutral or independent newspapers, it was at the
midpoint of the Civil War that correspondents themselves began to see the need for personal
independence and for the creation of space between themselves and their subject matter.
The problem was that the Civil War had called an entirely new kind of journalism into being, one
more immediately connected to events actually in progress, requiring a new approach to the handling of
what would in the later 20th century be called “breaking” news. The initial response to these challenges
had been mixed, and many of the men (and a few women—at least three female Washington letterwriters forwarded news items to papers in New York and other cities) who initially responded as
“specials” were unsuited for the new, emerging field of work.33
“Candor compels the admission that as a class, the first installment of correspondents sent to
the armies deserved no high rank in public or official estimation,” Sylvanus Cadwallader wrote in his
autobiography. “At that time nearly all army correspondents were in bad odor at all army headquarters,
and were always secretly held to be a species of nuisance that needed abating.” Early reporters often
leeched off of the “mess” of a colonel or general, living comfortably in return for the favor of praising
such an officer in dispatches. Others, Cadwallader noted, actually sold their services for promoting an
officer’s career, literally naming a price for flattering prose that might lead to a step in pay grade for
their subject. Other early correspondents were boorish social misfits, or came straight from partisan
political sparring that led them to view all issues as a kind of gigantic political convention where
everything was negotiable. Some even acted like spies, hiding near officers’ tents to eavesdrop or
sneaking into closed military councils in order to glean information. Many war correspondents
demanded (and received) appointments as special aides to politically-sensitive generals; some received
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army rank without the corresponding obligation to obey orders or fulfill military duties, which lowered
them in the estimation of serving officers and enlisted men.34
The blame for such a system can be shared as much by political officers, such as Brigadier
General and onetime Pennsylvania governor John White Geary, who saw their wartime service as a
launching platform for future office. Michigan’s Gen. Alpheus Williams, writing from Sherman’s army,
said of Geary “We have had one division commander who, I judge, has kept a corner in the notes of
every correspondent in the army, besides keeping his staff busy at the same work. He claims [to have
done] pretty much everything.”35
Relationships between the press and the administration or military could be mutually beneficial,
and even rise to the level of what would later come to be called public relations. The closeness between
journalists and politicians in the pre-war years had left bonds that lasted. An interchange between
Lincoln’s secretary John Hay and New York Herald columnist Charles G. Halpine demonstrates that the
boundaries between newspapers, the military, and the White House were very permeable. Both Halpine
and Hay had worked as journalists before the war, Halpine for the New York Times and then as editor of
a reform magazine, the Leader, of New York. Halpine, a rising young officer on Gen. David Hunter’s staff
and eventually a brigadier general, continued to write from the ranks and had attacked the
administration regarding its handling of Admiral Samuel DuPont following an abortive naval campaign.
His main work was a regular humor column featured “Private Miles O’Reilly,” a broadly-drawn Irish
caricature. On November 18, 1863, Halpine wrote to Hay that “Private Miles is about to visit Washn. And
be introduced to the Prest., of whom for reelection (vide Herald passim) he is a warm and devoted
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supporter. Have you any annecdote [sic] you could give me of what *anybody* said about Miles? … Any
anecdote from the Presdt. if new would be worth its weight in gold … no matter what it may be, it can
be worked in. Anything like his ‘plowing around the stumps that couldn’t either be grubbed or burnt
out,’ with which I commenced my article on Jim Lane and the Kansas Missouri troubles some five or six
weeks ago.” Halpine promised political support for Lincoln from his character, and promised “Your note
shall be destroyed five minutes after its receipt: and no living soul shall know of its receipt.” Hay’s
response, which was not destroyed, was to say “Ever since I got your letter I have been skulking in the
shadow of the Tycoon, setting all sorts of dextrous [sic] traps for a joke, telling good stories myself to
draw him out and suborning Nicolay to aid in the foul conspiracy. But not a joke has flashed from the
Tycoonal thundercloud …I give you my word of honor if he says any good thing within a week to
faithfully report it to you.” Halpine eventually got his joke, a story about “The widow Zollicoffer’s
Darkey,” and Miles O’Reilly endorsed Lincoln, saying “There’s but one man who wears a Black Coat [as
opposed to military uniform] in the United States this blessed and holy day, that can be elected to that
office [President].”36
Cadwallader, joining the army of Ulysses Grant to cover the campaign against Vicksburg in 1863,
decided to take an innovative new approach as a correspondent. Instead of being with the army on
sufferance, or sharing some general’s halo and hospitality in order to earn a place with the ongoing
campaign, the reporter would insulate himself from command personalities by being self-sufficient and
even generous. This would also separate him from the thoroughly despised corps of correspondents
whose sloppy, inaccurate, ill-considered, or favoritist reporting had made them anathema. “In view of
this status of army correspondents, I resolved on an entirely new line of procedure,” wrote Cadwallader.
“I decided to procure my own outfit, to ride my own horses and pay my own expenses liberally rather
36
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than parsimoniously. That if the exigencies of the service required me to enter a military ‘mess,’ to pay
my full pro-rata share of all its expenses and to accept no hospitalities on any other conditions. I also
decided to make all calls at Regimental, Brigade and Division, Corps & Army headquarters rather formal
than otherwise at the outset; to make them brief, and never to allow them to interrupt official
business.”37
In adopting this approach, Cadwallader was unconsciously reaching a standard for journalism
that would not become common until the later 20th century. Described by contemporaries as “cold” or
“isolated,” he was instead behaving as a modern journalist might. His innovative tactics in the
journalistic world of 1863 brought him significant success at the time; Cadwallader was admired by army
officers and their staffs, was clued in to methods that allowed him to avoid both censorship and outright
bans of correspondents within the campaign against Vicksburg, and the unbiased reporting he
developed proved so reliable—and so far ahead of others—that Republican-oriented newspapers often
lifted his articles, verbatim, from the pages of the Democratic Chicago Times despite the Copperhead
tendencies of that paper’s editor, Wilbur F. Storey. Cadwallader became one of the few reporters
entirely trusted by Grant, and gained special access to that general’s extended military “family” as a
result.38
Cadwallader set a new standard for Civil War correspondents, showing how professionalism
could grow from one person’s new thinking in confronting a set of changing and unprecedented
demands. Like his employer, Storey, the reporter recognized that the value of independent news
reporting had come to outweigh the prior values of political loyalty or quid-pro-quo cronyism that
continued to provide the operating model for much of the newspaper business.
Whether others among the estimated 350 Northern war correspondents and 150 Southern ones
emulated Cadwallader’s methods or not, the nature of their news coverage changed significantly as the
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events of the war overcame them. Coverage of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, for example,
undertaken at the time as one of the most important and exciting events ever to affect the United
States, seems quaint in retrospect. The New York Times used a nine-item columnar headline to open its
story: “The First Gun Fired by Fourt Moultrie Against Fort Sumpter [sic].:/THE BOMBARDMENT
CONTINUED ALL DAY./Spirited Return from Major Anderson’s Guns./The Firing from Fort Sumpter
Ceased for the Night./Hostilities to Commence Again at Daylilght./The Correspondence which Preceded
the Bombardment./The Demand for a Surrender and Major Anderson’s Refusal./THE RELIEF FLEET OFF
THE HARBOR./How the News is Recieved [sic] in Washington.” Despite the over-wrought headline, after
several lines of drama, the news story itself revealed that “Not a casualty has yet happened to any of the
forces.”39
That editors were becoming aware of new challenges, though, is seen in the Richmond Enquirer’s entry
for July 19, in which it passed along the news that Northern military officials were now censoring the
telegraph. The Enquirer listed it as a propaganda move. “The obvious meaning and intent of the order
[by Gen. Winfield Scott and Secretary of War Simon Cameron] is to prevent the transmission, by
telegraph, of any intelligence not favorable to the Yankee cause,” it editorialized. Yet the Enquirer itself
lacked the connectivity to get on-the-scene reports from the vicinity of Bull Run, and would be badly
behind on reporting the actual July 21 battle there, running only an official letter from Jefferson Davis on
July 23 along with a general description of the Bull Run landscape (“a pellucid mountain rivulet of small
size in summer”). It would not be until the July 26th edition that the Enquirer could describe the
Confederate victory in “The severest battle that was ever fought in this country.” Without many details
to go on, the Virginia paper ran a story from “an officer of our army” describing a (now known to be
apocryphal) bowie-knife-only charge made by Arkansans against a Northern unit that “fairly screamed
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with terror, and fled in the utmost consternation. They were nearly exterminated.” In New York, the
Tribune showed the perils of too much confidence in quickly transmitted information. Its July 22
headlines began with “A Great Battle Fought./Splendid Union Victory./The Rebels Routed.” The next
day, as the scope of the Union defeat became clear, its July 23 news headlines read: “A Terrible
Blunder,” and the article that followed read in part “Whoever ordered the attack with 20,000 men, upon
thrice that number, in a strongly intrenched position, protected by numerous masked batteries, after
long marching, exposure, and deprivation of rations, is greatly to blame.” Other Northern newspapers,
especially the New York Times, would blame the Tribune’s “on to Richmond” campaign for the failure,
citing “popular clamor promoted by certain reckless journals.”40
By the time of the great battles of 1862, the reporting and the newspaper treatment of events
were much more factual and restrained. Of Antietam, for example, the Tribune’s correspondent
conservatively wrote: “The greatest battle of the war has been fought to-day, lasting from daylight till
dark, and closing without decisive result … Two hundred thousand men have fought with the utmost
determination on both sides. Neither can claim a complete victory …” 41
As the scope and complexity of the Civil War’s geographic reach began to emerge, editors
realized that readers needed more than just words in order to be able to comprehend events. In 1861,
the New York Times could publish what it referred to as “Pen-Photographs of Charleston and the
Charlestonians,” text descriptions of events going on in a city that few New Yorkers had ever seen or
visited. To understand campaigns such as those of the Seven Days around Richmond, or Antietam in
Maryland, took more than just words. This was especially true because of the simultaneous broadening
of the American experience – hundreds of thousands of soldiers, with all the ancillary travelers needed
to support armies, were occupying regions they would never ordinarily have reached in their lives – and
40
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the peculiar isolation that was forced onto people both at home and at the front. While armies moved,
the lives of the soldiers and officers in them were absolutely restricted. The presence of armies,
meanwhile, also limited civilian experiences. In the weeks leading up to Antietam, for example, rural
communities in the path of either army would suddenly and without warning find themselves subject to
days of watching troops pass through, often losing their property or worse to the unexpected horde of
men. As Kathleen Ernst has written, “Most people cringed” at the uncertainty of

campaigns

washing over or through their communities, “for by now war-weary rural residents knew exactly what
any campaign might bring.” Depending on the occupying army, union loyalists or confederate
sympathizers might find themselves subject to travel restrictions and impassible picket lines. The war
brought a desperate need to understand the landscape. For those in the cities far from the war,
visualizing a complex battle or campaign’s various stages was a near impossibility. 42
The appearance of large map graphics, with summarizing cutlines, was a newspaper innovation
aimed at resolving these multiple needs. While illustrated weekly newspapers such as Frank Leslie’s had
long been using engravings to add decorative art to stories, the process took significant time and, for the
most part, was accomplished largely by having a predictable format for the printed pages from issue to
issue, with illustrations occupying standard sizes and positions. Translating the technology to the daily
paper took not just ability, but imagination; it required a new vision that stretched the news format
horizontally, removing the columnar format of the daily paper and drawing new relationships between
disparate items on the page. While initial efforts were relatively crude, such as a wood-block print run
early in the war by the New York Times to explain the battle of Ball’s Bluff, later efforts showed
significant sophistication. The New York Herald was particularly good at this.
Southern papers, largely dependent on Northern and foreign sources for the hardware and
materials that made the revolution in graphic display possible, were mostly unable to follow the
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example. Not only were they limited on technology, but the South’s relatively higher demand on its
manpower for army needs took a disproportionate number of printers away from newspaper
employment. In Richmond, for instance, several editors complained that they had lost 80 percent of
their printers to army enlistment. Though many Southern publications innovated by remaking the front
page as a news section, their ability to follow other aspects of the Northern modernizing was limited.
“Our newspapers have felt the martial influence as strongly as other things … They have never had so
much variety as now …; they are of all sizes and colors, and sometimes contain four pages, and
sometimes two. They are short enough for a pocket handkerchief one day, and big enough for a
tablecloth another. They assume as many hues as Niagara in the sunshine, and are by turns blue, yellow,
green, red, purple, grey, and common brown packing paper,” wrote editors of the Memphis Appeal in
1862. Southern papers were also hindered both by government clampdowns on information and by
social pressure to report “news” that supported Southern triumphalism. Writes Yael Sternhell, “[I]n the
wartime South, what should have been a moment of triumph for modern communication turned into an
extravaganza of misinformation. News transmitted over the wires was often incomprehensible; train
travelers spread stories that were blatantly wrong; newspapers functioned as rumour mills; and war
correspondents admitted that they had no idea what they were doing.” The reporting of Gettysburg, for
example, did not reach Richmond until July 8, when the Enquirer ran a special dispatch headlined “Gen.
Meade Reported Killed—McClellan in Command” and that discussed the Rebel army holding “a large
number of prisoners.”43
Northern papers did not make uniform advances into new forms; even the most innovative
wavered between formats, retreating into older style strictly columnar formats until the next major
event strained their ability to stay abreast of developments. Yet, having adventured into graphical
43
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territory, papers like the Tribune were ready to bring out large-scale informative maps and articles for
future campaigns, running several—including one that occupied two-thirds of a page—in 1864 at the
onset of Grant’s Overland Campaign with the Battle of the Wilderness. The subject was simply too
difficult to explain in words alone, and forced the papers to innovate.
It was a more disciplined press that did so, as well; while there was plenty of speculation as to
the Army of the Potomac’s likely moves in the weeks leading up to the final plunge across the Rapidan,
news editors in the North had tacitly agreed to avoid mention of troop movements. It was an agreement
they stuck to; on May 3, the Tribune could run an article it picked up from the Washington Republican
saying “We feel authorized to state, since it cannot now afford information to the enemy, that the Army
of the Potomac has advanced toward Richmond, and the struggle for the possession of the Rebel capital
has begun.”
The importance of the newspaper, its coverage methods, and the impact of its seemingly small
innovations cannot be lightly dismissed. As the public interface for a growing new electric
communications network, the newspaper was the place where people came to grips with an evergrowing matrix of information. It took the virtual, such as battlefields hundreds of miles away, or camps
and marches in territory no reader had ever visited, and made it real. To do so, the press often had to
innovate—as with detached, independent correspondents or large-scale graphics—and some of their
innovations foreshadowed a 20th century future. The papers of the time are a reflection of the shared
imaginations of the communities they served, and of the changes to those communities. Their reflection
gives a glimpse of a readership that both needed and wanted more serious information, a maturing
news taste that may have come in part from the war itself. While some innovations were actively sought
out, others were forced onto editors unable to cope with the events of the day, or a day. Perhaps no
example is more poignant than that of the Richmond Enquirer on Sept. 23, 1862, which removed all
normal material from its front page to make room for a special report. Though its editorial on page three
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said “The condition of our army…is excellent, and the spirits of the troops, flushed with victory, high and
warm,” and claimed that the reports in the Northern newspapers were lies, the front page was shocking.
Under its usual front-page “flag” were only the words “Tuesday Morning,” and then “Casualties,”
followed by column after column of names from Lee’s campaign into Maryland. The pages serve as a
stark reminder that what the press of the 1860s dealt with was not a game; that for all of its quaintness,
infighting, self-aggrandizing, floridness, fictions, and propagandizing, its message could—and did—alter
lives.
While newspapers did not shed their character as politically partisan organs, the war itself
changed the expectations of readers. By war’s end, telegraphic news reports were expected rather than
exotic, and what constituted news had to be timely in order to be valued. Moreover, the readership
base now included hundreds of thousands of people who had traveled to remote areas of the country,
experienced regional cultures first-hand, and whose appetite for novelty was tempered with knowledge.
Editors could shape an approach to presentation of the news, but the day in which they owned the
information and could dispense it at their own pace had passed by. Communication historian Brian
Winston argues that invention, prototyping, and introduction of a technology does not bring diffusion
until a larger social need appears Technology had been poised for a demand that had not yet
materialized in the late antebellum period. War provided the social actuating force that built the
demand and accelerated adoption of new ways of doing business. The growing interconnectedness of
the country, including the transcontinental Pacific telegraph (1861) and the transcontinental railroad (in
1869), meant that news coverage itself had to move to a systems approach. The front pages of changed
newspapers are the markers of that revolution.44
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CHAPTER 3 MEDIA FRAMING OF A SOCIAL CRISIS
On July 25, 1863, Union Army private Chauncey H. Cooke wrote to his Wisconsin parents from
the shade of a “big cypress tree on the banks of the Yazoo River.” Part of Grant’s army that had captured
Vicksburg, Cooke was convalescing from malarial fever. He was only too aware that twenty three other
men in the 25th Wisconsin had died of various fevers in the past month, but this sickly private in the
hinterlands of Mississippi had another thing on his mind: “Of course you have heard … of the riot of the
mob in New York City and the burning of negro asylums and school houses. That mob uprising looked
bad for the North. It was a Democratic crowd in sympathy with the South [he assured his mother].”1
Cooke spoke with a chatty certainty about the events despite having no personal knowledge of
them. His letter shows that the young soldier had not just been informed of news events in New York
City, but also had been told how to frame the New York Draft Riots of July 13-16, 1863. The newspapers
informed him of how the riots should be characterized. In this, they showed themselves to be taking on
a form of work that communication scholars had envisioned as only applying to the modern press, with
its experience of twentieth century factors of propaganda, commercial public relations, and corporate
agenda-setting.
Framing is a postmodern theoretical term for the work that media does to characterize a story
in such a way that a news consumer, like Chauncey Cooke, automatically understands the story in tropes
that, themselves, convey particular prepared meanings. Communication scholar Mary S. Mander writes
“For example, a film or a song may move us in ways that cannot be described in words” by playing on
these pre-set meanings.2 It has been considered an advanced skill and, as such, has not been widely
used to analyze historical early news. This chapter focuses on the immediate news coverage of a crisis,
the New York City Draft Riots of 1863, as an issue of media framing in which the same kind of modern
work done today on terrorism, politics, or warfare, was done in 1863 by a growing cadre of professional
1
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journalists. By framing the reporting of the draft riots in specific ways, such as events caused by outside
agitators, by political enemies, or by “other” groups within the city including immigrants, New York
newspapers established meaning for their readers out of the inchoate events in the city. These
meanings were beyond the intent and motives of the mob itself. They also articulated the story for
particular political advantages of hidden communities and individuals that sought to gain power during
the uncertain years of the Civil War. The powerful identification by news leaders of a sub-human “other”
being responsible for the Draft Riots, rather than ordinary New Yorkers themselves, created an
important model that prevented the riots from becoming a major part of the national narrative of the
Civil War. Recognition of this work allows us to say that the press was gaining in authority and in
arbitrating citizenship criteria, not just sensationalizing an emergent event.
As a soldier detached from his regiment due to illness, Cooke could not have been instructed
about the riots by his regular officers or those associated with the military chain of command, even if
such “orders of the day” had been issued (none have been noted relative to the draft riots in order
books held at the National Archives). Cooke most likely got his information from newspapers brought to
the army camp or hospital. The increasing reach, power, and immediacy of the national press meant
that the news arrived framed in a way so that Chauncey Cooke could reassure the folks at home within
ten days of the height of the riots.
Looking at the immediate coverage of the draft and the draft riots in newspapers of the time
shows how editors used reporting to set audience perception not just of the events, but of the nature of
the draft riots and the agents involved. The story radiated from New York and though it was amended
regionally and sectionally to fit different media approaches, the New York interpretation of the story
held sway. Within New York, there were many narratives regarding the riots, narratives that agreed on
key events but disagreed widely on causes and results of those events. Editors sparred over the question
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of who had justice on their side at many different points in the riot. They also fought one another in
print over the virtues of their different approaches to coverage of the events even as the riots unfolded.3
The riots in New York City represented a crisis during the Civil War and an enormous challenge
to the Lincoln administration. The city played an outsized role in the national conflict, serving as the
center for news distribution, commerce, manufacturing, and finance. It also provided tens of thousands
of soldiers in service. Yet the city also was “strongly racist, hostile to the abolition of slavery and to any
real freedom for black Americans,” according to scholar Edward K. Spann. That racism, he further
argued, played into the hands of anti-administration Democrats, who fomented ethnic hatred between
immigrants and blacks for political advantage.4 Repeated defeats of the Army of the Potomac at the
hands of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had demoralized the war’s supporters. Members of
the Lincoln administration had believed that the early July military victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg
finally had turned the tables on Northern war doubters, who had been clamoring for an end to combat
and tacit repeal of black emancipation. The draft riots set the administration back on the defensive. If
the riots were a genuinely spontaneous uprising of the people, then they could be used as a tool to
repudiate the legitimacy of Lincoln’s presidency. But if the riots could be blamed on Democrats and
Copperhead schemers, then the administration’s power would be safeguarded.5
The riots involved the major New York newspapers and their personnel directly. Horace
Greeley’s New York Tribune, raided by rioters, stockpiled weapons and barricaded its doors against
rioters, as did the New York Times and the New York Post. Mob violence also affected the lives and
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safety of reporters and editors in the metropolis. The mere suspicion that an individual in the crowd of
rioters might be a reporter could lead to a severe beating, if not worse. In several cases, newspaper
articles noted that quoted speeches came from the reporter’s memory, because note-taking was too
dangerous. This personal involvement in a breaking news event led to emotional framing of the story,
with some reporters and editors using articles to work through the fear and anger inspired by the mob
violence.6
Framing, with agenda setting and content analysis, is a modern tool of communication theory.
Communications scholar Robert M. Entman identifies frames as “information processing schemata”
that, through “repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other … render one basic
interpretation more readily discernable, comprehensible, and memorable than others.”7 Others, such
as media effects analyst Dietram A. Scheufele, have called framing the “social construction of reality.”8
Such construction can lead to an easy formulaic presentation for readers, one that determines who is
“good” or “bad” by the way they are characterized in print or artwork. Journalist practitioners of the
1860s who often saw themselves as partisans, would not have consciously considered framing as an
important part of their work. Nevertheless, the continuing emergence of a national news structure and
network during the time of the Civil War led to a new situation. Audience groups that transcended
narrow local political party focus increasingly relied on journalistic framing to understand how national
news events fit within their public or domestic lives. As the pace of news delivery grew speedier
Americans found new relevance in news stories from beyond their local ambit because framing
techniques helped them integrate the news comfortably.
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In the case of the draft riots, newspaper readers were carefully instructed that fault and
responsibility lay with the “Other,” whether immigrants, laborers, abolitionists, Democrats, Republicans,
or minorities. This characterization happened not only in the selection of events for the news narrative,
but in the choice of language and the placement of events in stories and headlines. This language and
approach helped newspapers frame the draft riots in ways that gave sense and purpose to the events
while exonerating loyal readers of responsibility for the outbreak. Historian Iver Bernstein has remarked
that the New York riots are one of the few American events that goes un-owned; that their negative
connotation makes them unusable for heritage purposes. Neither the urban gentry, the labor
movement, trade unions, political and military leaders, or the victims of the riot, could find redeeming
values in the event itself, and the Northern victory in the war made New York’s intransigence an
unacceptable recollection. “What gradually ensued was an instance not of what historians call collective
memory but rather of collective amnesia,” writes Bernstein.9
As one example, the illustrated newspapers Harper’s Weekly and Frank Leslie’s Illustrated
Newspaper differed significantly in editorial positions and coverage of the draft riots. Martin Kuhn has
written that “Harper’s played down the riots and limited coverage to a two-page spread depicting apelike, Irish rioters committing acts of violence. Leslie’s carried considerably more coverage, depicting less
chaotic ‘rioters’ and used riot illustrations on its cover.” 10 Harpers, with its background as an illustrated
literary periodical, served a readership that was conservative and established; Leslie’s, with its origins in
P.T. Barnum’s empire, was an edgier publication that reached across ethnic boundaries and had a
stronger interest in its graphics than in its political voice.
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The Riots in History
Historians of the draft riots have shifted focus over the years from early efforts to identify perpetrators
and chronicle incidents to more recent scholarship identifying larger issues. The early history of the draft
riots concentrated primarily on Irish immigrant ignorance and violence, and on the attack by the Irish on
African Americans. This emphasis on despised minorities was joined by subtexts on Copperhead plots
and Confederate intervention. Early writers failed to challenge the conspiracy trail left by some of the
most frightened participants, who saw the riot as part of a larger plot within the North to overthrow the
government.
Mid-twentieth century historians appear to have made a more structural attempt to identify the
New York draft riots with the Pennsylvania campaign of Gen. Robert E. Lee. They have elevated the riots
to an intentional part of Confederate strategy at the so-called “high water mark” of the war. They cite,
also, popular reaction to the massive casualties suffered by the North at Gettysburg. While not rejecting
the arguments that Irish immigrant minorities enacted the riots, and that race played a central role,
these historians deemphasize the importance of the New York riots and spread reaction to the draft
across the entire North. Hunter Dupree and Leslie Fishel, Jr., offer one such example from the 1960s in
an article that admits the ferocity of the New York riots, but also explains that “Demonstrations against
the Enrollment Act occurred all over the North after May 25 [1863], when enlisting officers began their
work.”11
Recent histories have approached the draft riots much more as an issue of labor, racial politics
and policies, and reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation and Black freedom. Bernstein combines all
of these in pointing out that the New York riots were the most deadly to occur in America because of
the strong racial hatred they expressed over the perceived effects of the proclamation. Barnet Schecter
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writes that “To fulfill this promise of freedom, Union forces would not only have to win on the
battlefield but take over the South and implement a social revolution.” Democrats, they argue, assured
their working-class constituents would mean that free blacks would soon come North to replace them at
their jobs.12 Others, such as James W. Geary, have put the riots in perspective as part of 19 th century
society’s overall reaction to the draft, the first time in a century that Americans had been tapped for
compulsory military service. Geary writes that “Any conscription system influences all sectors of a
society; its impact is not confined solely to political and military decisions.”13 For many Americans the
implication was a chilling imposition of federal power over state and local control. Comfortable
certainties were threatened, including local autonomy.
The draft certainly affected Northern society broadly. The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1863,
established the fundamental working structure for the military draft. It led at once to charges that
forced civilian service was unconstitutional, and several state judicial opinions sided with public opinion
against the draft. In passing the act, Congress added an exemption clause by which a man whose name
was chosen for the draft could pay $300 to be exempted. Laborers and farmers, generally low-paid, held
that this unfairly favored the rich and made the on-going war into a poor man’s fight.
The Enrollment Act further created a powerful new military presence in civil centers in the form
of the Provost Marshal’s office. The office sent military officers with quasi-legal authority to enforce the
draft and run its mechanisms in cities and towns. In Detroit, newspaper publication of passage of the
Enrollment Act led to a violent anti-negro riot that sprang from labor strikers already worried about
black competition for jobs. The rioters burned the city’s black enclave, killed at least two blacks, and
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injured many more. The riot was only put down when regular troops arrived on the night of March
sixth.14
When enrollment officers began the national draft process in late May, many Northern
communities rose up against the measure. “Miners in Pennsylvania, and men, women, and children in
Holmes County, Ohio, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Boston, reacted violently against the
legislation,” say Dupree and Fishel.15 Several enrollment officials were murdered in the course of their
duties, especially in Western states such as Wisconsin. Across the northern states, anti-draft feelings ran
high among skilled trades, whose special skills had previously made them exempt from call-up for state
militia. Under the Militia Act of July 17, 1862, they had included miners, firefighters, and railroad
workers. All had powerful associative roots and were capable of taking independent and violent action.
In New York City, the weeks leading up to the draft created grave tensions that were recognized
only after the mob violence had broken out. Lee’s invasion of the North led to frantic requests from the
administration in Washington to forward state troops to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Democratic
New York Governor Horatio Seymour had responded by sending as many of the city regiments as
possible for three months’ service. Beginning in June, roughly 12,000 troops were sent to Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, as fast as they could be armed. The combined force of state militia and returned veteran
units stripped the city of its most experienced military assets. It left only the city’s roughly 1,500
Metropolitan police to maintain civil order, and a few hundred soldiers whose responsibilities were
limited to guarding fortifications and federal arsenals.16
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Victories by Federal armies at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the first days of July emboldened
draft officials to begin the New York City draft quickly, believing that a public mood of optimism would
support the process. More than 1,200 names were drawn on Saturday, July 11, in a ceremony held with
little warning at the provost marshal’s offices in the Twenty-second Ward of the city’s Ninth District. The
New York Herald wrote that the people were “thunderstruck” by the draft. They had assumed the draft
would bypass the city, which had already sent some 50,000 troops to the army. Not only had the citizens
of New York received scant warning of the draft, but government officials including Mayor George
Opdyke, a Republican, and Democratic state governor Horatio Seymour had not been kept informed of
where and when the process would begin. When the Sunday papers came off the presses, most New
Yorkers were unprepared for the extensive list of drafted men’s names that they found there.17
The reaction among working class people unlikely to afford an exemption was severe. When
demonstrations against the draft turned to violence, city officials found that they were unprepared.
They had few resources to use against the disorder. Loosely organized crowds rapidly shifted from
organized protest to a wave of arson, looting, and violence that lasted for days. There were especially
harsh attacks on the city’s black population, dozens of whom were killed in brutal ways. Order was not
restored until regiments of regular soldiers arrived from the Pennsylvania battlefields. The troops
ultimately resorted to shooting, bayoneting, and firing artillery into crowds in order to quell the riots.
The official death toll of some 120 to 150 named individuals was disputed at the time by authorities,
who estimated the count at more than 1,100;18 but the nature of the riots, the type of public
information kept at the time, and the extent of the damage to the city made an accurate total almost
impossible to determine. In the aftermath of the riots, New York faced a monumental task of restoring
17
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blocks of burnt-out buildings. Street railway lines and Metropolitan police telegraph systems, which
both had been a target of the rioters, needed to be rebuilt. The damage to the city’s psyche was more
profound. If the mob had taken control once, it might rise up again at any time. Such a loss of control
inspired deep fear, which led to a search to place blame.
The News Framing
Newspapers in the city initially had framed the draft story as one of loyalty and patriotism
among residents who may have disliked the draft, but who were willing to go along with it in support of
the Union. They had no expectation of a full-blown riot. An editorial in the New York Herald said: “It is
now understood that the draft is to be carried out immediately. Indeed, it has already commenced. See
our news columns of this morning. The people of the North are evidently determined to submit quietly
to the conscription, as they are anxious to aid the government.”19 Reporters and editors saw their
primary duty as one of explaining the workings of the draft. The Herald reported that a quota of men
would be drawn from each city ward and that the process would be by “wheel of fortune.” Names of all
the draft eligible men were written on slips of paper that were tightly rolled and rubber banded. “The lot
thus prepared will be placed in a revolving wheel on a high platform and drawn out by the Provost
Marshal, or some person by him designated, one by one, at each revolution of the wheel,” wrote the
Herald.20
Warnings that significant draft resistance might occur were countered with calm reassurance.
The Tribune opined on Monday, July 12, that “Many stories have been circulated to the effect that
bands, gangs and companies have been organized here and there with the intention of resisting the
draft, and that the members are armed and drilled, hold secret meetings and so forth; but from all that
we can learn no such organizations exist, and even if they did they will amount to nothing.”21
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The New York Herald, a day ahead of the Tribune in its draft coverage, described the orderly
process of the draft. The first name drawn in the Twenty-second Ward was that of William Jones, of
Forty-ninth Street near Tenth Avenue. “The crowd at this announcement gave a suppressed murmur,
which was the only display worthy of note at the time,” wrote the unnamed Herald reporter. By 4 p.m.
of the first day, 1,236 names had been drawn for the particular ward, with another 264 remaining to be
filled. Articles and editorials early on Monday, July 13, congratulated the city on its patriotic response to
the draft. “The good feeling that has everywhere marked the first drawings under the conscription
should not be lost upon the government. A few weeks back it shrank from putting the set in force. It
apprehended, and with reason, that it would be met with a determined resistance,” wrote James
Gordon Bennett in the anti-administration Herald. He warned against faint-heartedness in prosecuting
the war to its end and praised the victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. “These two great victories
inspired the first hope that the administration had waked up to its responsibilities, and that it was
becoming earnest in its efforts to put an end to the war … now [the draft] is being carried out with a
degree of tranquillity [sic] and order that shows that it was not from want of patriotism, but despair of
the sincerity and capacity of the administration, that it ever met with opposition.”22
Reporters initially saw the idea of draft resistance as a source for ethnic humor. One bought
several rounds of drinks for what he described as “hard working Irishmen” and reported their opinions
based on broad ethnic humor: “Three ‘Bourbons’ in” said that if the draft officials were in Cork they
would have been beaten, while “Four ‘Brandies’ and two ‘Gin Cocktails’” warned “Let them come on and
I will resist the whole draft myself.”23 This reporting fell into the kind of broad dialect and ethnic
expectations popularized by “humorous” writers such as Columnist Charles G. Halpine, whose
adventures of “Private Miles O’Reilly” showed the Irish to be hard-drinking buffoons. The same kind of
characterization had been used since 1843 with blacks as the butt of minstrel show humor, especially
22
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the interplay between “Mr. Tambo,” “Mr. Bones,” and “Mr. Interlocutor.”24 By using this broad
stereotypical approach the reporter was indicating that those opposing the draft were not dangerous,
serious, or powerful.
Violence broke out just as those articles framing popular reaction to the draft as a peaceful,
jocular resignation reached the street. A crowd fomented in part by the “Black Joke” volunteer fire
company, which had one of its formerly protected members drawn in the first day’s lottery, smashed
the ninth district draft office, destroyed its paperwork, and burned the building it occupied.25 From
there, the growing crowds moved on to loot and then burn several private residences. They beat,
maimed, and killed public officials, tore up street railways, and cut down the telegraph wires that
connected city police precincts and public buildings.26
Newspapers quickly re-framed the draft story. Recognizing the out-of-control violence, they
sought a narrative to explain the violence in ways that remained congruent with their editorial and
political positions. In nearly every case, news outlets chose to frame the outbreak as work of the
“Other.” What constituted the “other” widely varied. For Democratic news outlets, the culprits were
administration men, “black Republican” abolitionists, and deluded people who supported them. They
were using the mob as a foil to allow Lincoln’s henchmen to impose martial law on the city. For
Republican editors, especially Horace Greeley, the “Other” included Confederate plotters intent on
burning New York to the ground and mobilizing ethnic groups, particularly the Irish, to do the dirty work.
At both extremes, however, the cause and purpose of the riots were seen as coming from outside the
social fabric of New York. Outsider framing allowed the newspapers to present their readers the story of
the riots without requiring the readers to admit any responsibility for the rioters.
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Newspapers outside of the New York metropolitan area largely relied on text lifted from copies
of the city papers. Their framing of the story was achieved largely through editorial introductions or in
free-standing editorials. Southern newspapers began reporting on the draft riots after July 18, when
copies of the New York journals were made available to them by prisoner exchange officers and others
able to travel through the battle lines. The Richmond Dispatch wrote hopefully that, “This grand
movement in New York is but the precursor of a series of similar outbreaks.” The editors lauded the
rioters as northern peace Democrats, previously despised by Confederate hotbloods, but now redeemed
by raising “the red battle flag [that] now waves in New York over streets wet with the gore of Lincoln’s
hated minions.” Two days later, the Dispatch told its readers to remain optimistic, because the draft
riots proved Lincoln might soon run short of soldiers. Playing on northern personal weakness, as against
southern determination, the Dispatch denigrated the personal commitment northerners had to the war.
“The masses are violently opposed—not to the war itself—but to serving in the war themselves. They
are very willing to have their neighbors shot at, but they have no fancy for having their own bodies
converted into targets by an act of Congress,” the editors wrote of potential draftees.27 The South had
its own draft evasion problem, but southerners might be heartened if they thought the north lacked the
will to continue raising manpower.
The Richmond Enquirer, using similar copy from New York dailies, told its readers they could
expect to see more such riots in the near future. The newspaper applauded, “The temporary success of
this first movement must stimulate to further efforts; and the experience thus gained will be most
useful. Money can be extorted, and that in any quantity, from the frightened capitalists and propertyholders. . . . But they still must organize better for the next campaign.” The Enquirer did not see any
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signs of a Confederate effort behind the riots, but its editors were ready to suggest the Confederacy
provide helpful suggestions, at the least, for the next riot.28
Southern journalists urged their readers to revel in the northern discomfiture caused by the
riots. The war begun by the south had largely been fought on southern territory and the riots
represented the first time that major property destruction had visited a northern city. The violence also
took away the self-righteous superiority of the abolitionists who had claimed to speak for all of the
north. Rioters served southern enmity toward their perceived northern persecutors and struck blows by
proxy against enemies the south was unable to reach directly.
In Charleston, writers at the Charleston Daily Courier extolled the draft riots. “[W]e consider
those outbreaks as the most important signs that have yet appeared on the face of the times. We derive
abundant encouragement from these open and successful manifestations of hostility to the draft. They
are worth as much to us as a signal victory,” the newspaper printed on its front page on July 21. Using
copy borrowed from the New York Morning Express, the Herald, and the Post, the Charleston editors
urged their readers to gloat over the Northern discomfiture. “The discord gratifies us greatly. We cannot
sack their cities. They will do it themselves,” they said.29
Confederate newspapers were not the only ones who relied on New York stories to cover the
draft riots. News that came in over the telegraph was chiefly a dispassionate summary of arrests made,
buildings burned, and fatalities suffered. The Cincinnati Enquirer, a strongly Democratic newspaper,
found itself having to defend against charges in New York copy used by competitor papers that the
Democrats had started the riots. “This riot is a reaction. We shall find its true cause when we discover
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against what it reacts. It reacts against some sort of pressure or restraint. The only agency that could
press or restrain has been the Administration and its party,” the editors explained.30
The pace and terminology of draft riot coverage in the press clearly shows a difference in
approach as reporters and editors sought to make the riots comprehensible. At Bennett’s Herald,
which—while fiercely anti-black—prided itself on holding the middle ground, the word, “riot,” was not
introduced until after July 15. Until that time, phrases like “serious disturbance” and “popular tumult”
were used. Bennett’s reporters wrote that the disturbance was caused by “obnoxious individuals” and
“insurgents,” rather than a berserk mob. Instead of rioters, the Herald used terms like: “The crowd,”
“The great throng,” “The people,” “United bodies of men,” “Men of the crowd,” “Several bodies of
men,” “Persons,” “The citizens,” and “Women (as in “A large number of women made at the police,
pelting them with stones).31
The Herald explained the crowd’s origins and initial actions as a logical progression. The gathering of
the first day consisted of men moving through manufacturing districts, entering each shop or factory,
and compelling owners to close up shop while recruiting the workers to join the crowd headed toward
the draft office. Herald editorials implied that working men could be forgiven for taking out their rage at
an unjust process by destroying the implements of the draft, although it was unfortunate that they were
then led on to excesses, partly fueled by the consumption of liquor. The worst excesses could be pinned
squarely on unwanted lower-class elements that had joined the crowd. The Herald sought to explain
30
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rioters’ animus with short, personalized stories. Their scant detail most likely makes them apocryphal. In
one article, a uniformed “Major Green” was accosted by a “stableman,” who said he would shoot him.
“What for?” asked the Major. ‘For bringing a black fellow from Virginia to make him equal with me,” the
reporter wrote.32 This unlikely dialogue spoke directly to prejudiced concerns already expressed by
working class men over the emancipation proclamation.
Although it began using the term, “riot,” on July 16, the Herald still editorialized that the draft riots
were an unusual event and did not characterize actual New York City values. Masses might be carried to
excess, but at root the peaceful citizens were still in control. Rioters were temporarily “Other” and did
not represent any real New York concerns:

We still trust, however, that the love of order, which never failed to allay popular tumult
in this city, will prevail over the sporadic excitement which, for the time, disturbs the
usual peacefulness of our metropolis ... Wisdom, moderation and the voice of reason
may allay a spirit nursed by a presumed sense of wrong, and fostered by success and the
flood of passion, which always carries the masses to excesses which are to be, and will,
no doubt, be hereafter, deplored equally by those who inflict the suffering and by those
who suffer.33
By contrast, Greeley’s Tribune termed the events of July 1863 a riot almost at once. It had little
hesitation in labeling the crowd with pejoratives. The Tribune’s wrath can be partly explained because,
as an abolitionist leader, editor Greely was the target of personalized animosity and hatred. The
Tribune’s building was invaded, and the first floor partly demolished, by the mobs late on the first day of
the draft riots. Rescued by police who had to charge several times to force back the mob, the Tribune
staff was seriously shaken by the experience. They kept their building fortified for the remainder of the
week with stockpiles of rifles, ammunition, hand grenades, bombs, and artillery. The weaponry was
provided to the newspaper from sympathetic officers at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
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For the Tribune, rioters “loot and steal,” even taking dresses and personal property from a
woman in labor; they are “perfectly frenzied with liquor” and “roam about in every direction attacking
people miscellaneously,” they “clamor like demons” or yell, hoot, scream, and roar “like a crowd of
human animals possessed by devils.” In describing the crowd, the Tribune’s often-used terms included:
“Rioters,” “Assaulting party,” “Mob (and mobbed),” “Infuriated throng ready for any outrage,”
“Insensate mob,” “Lawless mob,” “Howling, drunken mob,” “Yelling pirates,” “Fellow-ruffians,”
“Garroters,” and “The rebels.”
Even those among the crowd who were only spectators, or who were not engaged in violence,
were “Others” to Greeley’s Tribune. It referred to them as “a few of the less evil-disposed” or as
“hundreds who were too cowardly to assist the work of demolition.”34 Unlike the Herald, the Tribune
offered little rationale for the mob’s actions. Instead, it published inflammatory and unverifiable short
articles meant to demonstrate how barbaric the rioters were. One story about the killing of a little girl
reported: “One of the brutes [looting the negro orphan asylum] threw a chair out of one of the upper
windows, and killed a little white girl who was trying to save some articles of value that were strewed on
the ground.” In another article, an unnamed Frenchman, robbed by rioters after he told them he was
“for the Union,” was allegedly told by bystanders after the robbery that he should have said he was a
“Democratic Catholic.” “He states that a number of his acquaintances whose names he gives us, have
been robbed in the same way, and some have been released on giving the answer recommended.”35 The
idea of a reporter interviewing French people who had escaped mob violence after giving the
“Democratic Catholic” answer is absurd on its face; this was a coded story meant to elicit a politicoemotional response.
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The Tribune’s approach to its coverage strongly smacked of what later would be termed
“propaganda.” Its rhetoric was meant more to stir fear and resentment than to simply inform. While
some young girls were listed among riot casualties, no other newspapers reported such a death at the
Orphan Asylum. Greely’s ruffled editors, working amid stands of loaded rifles and stacks of hand
grenades in a building already targeted by the crowd, found the opportunity to retaliate for the sacking
of their office by labeling rioters as brutes who violated all human conventions far too tempting. Other
newspapers, though, were similarly unbalanced and quick to lash out. Manton Marble’s New York
World, for example, was quick to defend Copperheads by preemptively blaming the Lincoln
administration. Always ready to hate the English, the Herald on July 19 blamed the draft riots on recent
speeches made by the British parliament.36
While the Tribune railed against Irish instigators directly, few other papers during the riot
blamed a particular ethnic group for causing the disturbance. Even without specific mention, the names
of reported rioters and much of the dialogue used pointed at New York’s extensive Irish community as
primary culprits behind the mayhem. Thirty-eight out of a list of seventy-six known casualties published
by the Herald on July 21 were listed as Irish in origin, although these names included both rioters and
defenders. Illustrations and articles published after the riots made it clear that much of the blame fell on
Irish people. Germans, New York’s other predominant immigrant laboring group, were mentioned as
both victims and perpetrators during coverage of the riots. The Tribune dismissed the Germans as
ineffective rioters and warned of them as riot leaders in a July 16 entry: “Within the boundaries of 14th
street to Division street, East of Bowery, in “Klein-Deutschland’ the whole population was out of doors,
witnessing the proceedings of a mob in whose acts they took no part except a few abused and misled
Copperheads … The connecting link between the rioters and the Teutons of this district was visible by
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men on horseback, who appeared from time to time giving orders to their co-traitors by whispering into
the ears of selected [it] ones what next to do.”37
Little Germany was a convenient target for secondary worry about the “Other,” but Germans
had not demonstrated the same disturbing demand for civic power and equality of opportunity that the
Irish had done. By raising the specter of “Teutons” in league with riot leaders, though, Greely and other
editors could reserve the Germans for later scapegoating. Their loyalty was a concern. German
regiments had recently failed to hold positions during the first day’s fighting at Gettysburg, and
politically appointed German generals had also failed to bottle up Confederate troops in the
Shenandoah Valley.
Newspapers largely deplored violence leveled against blacks as they described the day-to-day
events of the riots. The black population of New York City was relatively small, estimated at just over
12,500 in 1860, less than two percent of the city population of 800,000. The small African-American
presence was further diffused because blacks did not cluster in any one residential area.38 Apart from
Irish resentment against blacks who competed for low-skilled laboring jobs, the small impact that local
blacks made on the greater New York community limited direct resentment against them. This allowed
newspapers to hold them up as innocent sufferers at the hands of rioters. Special impact was given to
news coverage of attacks on the Negro orphanage (run by white philanthropists) and on black women.
Blacks, however, were rarely identified by name and almost never by surname. They were, instead,
presented as nameless victims incapable of defending or controlling themselves. Reporting of their
helplessness in the face of riot violence was stereotypical of white expectations that blacks were hapless
and unintelligent. They are depicted almost as vermin to be chased. According to the New York World,
Wherever a negro came in sight he was pursued, and if caught was beaten till the crowd
was satisfied. Some managed to escape by superior speed, running about the streets in
the most perfectly terrified manner, shouting ‘murder’ and ‘mercy.’ … One of the crowd
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said “I don’t know that the niggers themselves is responsible for this here trouble, but
by God, there is a war about ‘em, damn ‘em, and we’ll pound ‘em. It’s the abolitionists
that have been pushing matters eternally, and we won’t stop it. We’ll pound the God
damn abolitionists as well as the niggers.39
The World’s blaming the violence on unpopular abolitionists through the voice of “one in the
crowd” is one more example of the “Other” defined by a reporter. In another reference, the New York
Herald implied that blacks were unable to retain their sanity under the riot pressures. A “powerfully
built colored man,” who sought shelter at a facility guarded by volunteer troops, was described as: “[I]n
a terrible state of excitement, in fact, perfectly crazy with fear ... and aroused the whole neighborhood
with his unearthly shrieks and yells.” Although the man was described as having a bleeding head wound,
which in white victims usually led to sympathetic news treatment, the story instead ran under the
heading, “A Negro goes Crazy.”40
The World and other newspapers also remarked on the presence of women among the mob
both as a sign of the depravity of the rioters and as a symbol of the victimhood of the populace within
the frenzy of the riots. In an article titled, “Females among the Rioters,” the World reported: “There
were also a large number of women and even young girls, who not only seemed to sympathise [sic] with
the rioters, but some carried sticks, and others loaded themselves with plunder, which they carried
away, cheering the mob, and inciting them to further acts of the same nature.” Men reporting from the
established Victorian power structure could not accept that ordinary women would join a riot. The
power of making the decision to riot was beyond female capacity and did not fit expectations of
women’s proper role, even of women whose men might be part of a criminal element. Faced with this
conundrum, journalists tried to assign proper roles to women. In some publications, debased women
cheered on the mob; but in others, more conventionally representative women provided a rationale for
some of the crowd’s actions. The Herald, reporting the beating death of Col. Henry F. O’Brien, partly
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explained the violence by stating that O’Brien had shot his pistol at random into the crowd, killing both a
woman and the baby she held to her breast. In reality, the colonel had cocked his pistol to scare the
crowd, and an accidental shot from it ricocheted from the pavement and struck the woman on her knee.
Earlier, however, O’Brien had ordered troops under his command to fire over the heads of the mob, and
that firing killed seven spectators, two of them children. The mob “had marked him for revenge” and
used the excuse of the injured woman to beat him to death.41
By framing the New York riots to make sense of them for particular groups of readers, the
newspapers carried out a form of print warfare with each other to attack the positions taken by
competitors. The Herald, in an editorial titled, “The Niggerhead and Copperhead Organs on the Riots,”
wrote that “The Tribune, Times and Post are abusing the copperheads as the cause of all this trouble,
and the World, News and Express are equally certain that the niggerheads provoked the disturbance,
and are thus the originators of the riots. There is a great deal of truth in each of these charges.” The
New York Times complained that the Herald had dignified the rioters by referred to them as “people” in
some of its news articles. This violated an apparent consensus that the rioters had to be seen as outside
the pale of humanity itself. Stung, the Herald swatted back at the Times for seeking its own advantage
from the event: “These mischievous papers all scandalously attempt to make political capital out of the
riots before the rioters are fairly suppressed, and accuse each other of the faults for which all of them
are more or less responsible,” judged the Herald.42
The military draft that created the crisis of the New York Draft Riots quickly became a peripheral
issue to the history of the war itself. Draftees proved to be some of the least reliable soldiers, and the
armies spent untold time and effort simply policing their mischief without gaining combat effectiveness.
New York adopted various political and social schemes, including a vast political slush fund to pay
enlistment exemptions and bounties which made a mockery of the draft. Eventually, fewer than 4,000
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draftees from New York City served, out of more than 80,000 names identified by the draft. Historians
later identified the Draft Riots as race riots, though that is not what participants at the time thought
about them.43
Knowing that the news of the day was framed with particular meanings and slants to encourage
a group of readers, we can seek out the meanings people of the time were persuaded to attach to the
draft riots and other events. We can examine what actions those meanings were meant to inspire, and
interpret the justice behind various presentations of the story.
We don’t know what newspaper or newspapers Chauncey Cook read near Vicksburg, but it is
clear from his letter home that whichever publication it was must have been a Republican newspaper,
possibly the Tribune, which was popular within the Union army for its pro-administration stance.
Whatever the newspaper was, its framing the story as one of Democrats plotting on behalf of
Confederates, in alliance with shadowy “others,” made sense of an otherwise incoherent event for the
soldier on a distant battlefield. Diverse interpretations must have reached other soldiers and civilians far
from the city. But it is clear that newspapers had developed the power to frame significant events for a
wide body of readers. Confederate publications, even as they borrowed liberal portions of New York
coverage, attempted to frame the riots in a different light for their readers. They selected the parts of
the story most friendly to Southern interests, but also instructing readers on how to approach the
events. Northern newspapers wrestled with their own interpretations of the Draft Riots, but also with
one another, taking each another to task for their coverage and framing choices.
This shows nineteenth century newspapers adapting to a world where information flew almost
instantaneously to remote corners of the nation. In making this adaptation, editorialists and reporters of
the day imagined a vast audience and wielded a modern tool – framing – and used it effectively to
characterize protean forces. Their quick creation of an “other” population and their definition of it as a
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sub-human group may be the reason for what Bernstein observed, that the Draft Riots have no modern
historical heritage ownership. News coverage so successfully alienated the riots and the rioters that the
event had no legs to stand on, unlike the “Lost Cause” narrative of the far more violent and destructive
overall Southern rebellion. Communication scholar Mander claims that framing attempts to answer the
question “What is the relationship between the media and the social order in times of social conflict?”
Whether the details of their reporting were correct or not may be less important than the created
meaning the newspapers imparted, a consensus about relative truth.44
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CHAPTER 4 NEWS BY LIGHTNING – THE TELEGRAPH AND NETWORKING
The speed of communication networks at the beginning of the nineteenth century consisted of
foot-paced transit on roads and pathways connecting communities, the horse-paced beats between
distant news centers, or the courses of sailing ships between ports. In all cases the messages being
carried were physical objects requiring hand-to-hand distribution and the speed they moved at was
limited by natural or biological limits – a ship could sail only so fast and depended on favorable winds, a
man could walk only so fast and carry so much. Overland news took fifty days to travel from East to
West coasts of the U.S., while ordinary sailing ships generally took one hundred and fifty days to swing
below the horn and make the long voyage past South and Central America to reach California. By the
late nineteenth century a new kind of news network had been constructed in which information flowed
at high speed and were little affected by natural obstacles. 1 Messages could move across mountains at
the persistent speed of steam railways; they could move against winds, tides, and river currents, on
steamships. After 1844 they could exist in the electrical “ether” of the telegraph until they arrived at
their destination, which often was the office of the metropolitan newspaper itself. The speed and
volume of news was no longer limited to narrow biological parameters, and the new networks created
new concepts of time and of timeliness.2 Adjusting to this network effect fundamentally changed the
nature of news; it created an unseen national audience and it took away much local control of the news.
The new networks destabilized what had been a comfortable and parochial approach by editors and
reporters to their readers and advertisers. It made newspapers accountable to a far-flung community
1
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they could only guess at, but whose individuals often demanded diligent service, and it gave new power
to the classified and business advertiser over the old form of political party subsidy that once funded
papers.3 The startling effect of the telegraph caused change that was unprecedented until the arrival of
broadcast media and then the Internet in the twentieth century. Communication historian Richard R.
John warns against characterizing the telegraph as a “Victorian Internet,” and he is right to do so. Recent
research on so-called “infectious” stories of the nineteenth century being conducted at Northeastern
University in Boston shows that an internet-like effect was created between newspapers which traded
and reprinted hundreds of stories repeatedly.4 The modern Internet directly connects many to many,
operates autonomously and globally, and access to it is readily available for individuals. By contrast, the
telegraph required manual operation, sent one message one way at one time, was limited in distance,
and was prohibitively expensive for ordinary people to use. “During its first sixty-five years it remained a
specialty service for an exclusive clientele, and not until 1910 would it be recast as a mass service for the
entire population,” John writes. Yet the popular image of the telegraph was one of democratization of
information, national ownership of the benefits of the technology, and pride in its development as a
uniquely American triumph. Even with its limitations, the telegraph created a true network effect. How
did this come to be? One must look to the newspapers for the answer.5
The change and modernization of news was heavily influenced by development of a web of
communication. Introduction of the electromagnetic telegraph in the early 1840s led to a boom in
constructing telegraph lines that mirrored earlier speculative enthusiasm for canals and railroads.
Communication scholar Brian Winston argues that the social purpose that led to telegraph development
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in Europe was to serve the railroads with operational information. In America, though, telegraph
construction outstripped railroad construction and its initial social driver was distribution of business
information and news.6 Easily built compared to the capital-intensive transportation systems, the
telegraph web that developed soon began creating its own momentum. While it was emphatically not
the equivalent of the Internet with its World Wide Web of today, the popular image of the telegraph as
a democratic medium persisted because of the close relationship between the new network and the
news. If an Illinois farmer or a New York City drayman felt ownership in the glories of the telegraph, it
was because they saw its effects in the columns of telegraphic news they received through their local
paper. The newspaper democratized the telegraph; only the newspapers, in association with one
another, had the power to enforce discounted telegraph rates and had the money to pay those same
rates in order to bring a mass of information to consumers. At the same time, the telegraph challenged
the newspaper by opening its parochial boundaries and forcing reporters, editors, and publishers to
respond to broad expectations regarding the form of news and its intended function. The network effect
of the telegraph became a powerful force for professionalization of the news, while the telegraph itself
became a symbol of newspaper modernity. The Detroit Free Press in 1850 shows this in a wide column
headlined “BY TELEGRAPH” and carrying a sub-headline “Reported for the Detroit Daily Free Press by
O’Reilly’s Line.” The article includes a list of Washington governmental action, including Senate
appointments, as well as district-by-district Boston-based returns on the Maine election. Detroit readers
could be as well-informed as their Boston counterparts on the same day, and the Free Press made
availability of the latest national news a banner event. The article also listed the location of the
telegraph itself, “Office just below the Michigan Exchange, Jefferson Avenue.”7
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James Gordon Bennett’s New York Herald was an early and outspoken news enthusiast for the
potential of the new technology, adopting two different logos in quick succession in the 1840s that were
meant to tie its news to the new electrical medium, shown as a bolt of lightning energizing a single
strand of wire on poles. The first version of this logo showed the wire arcing over existing technologies,
including a steamboat, a steam locomotive, and a horseman carrying express dispatches. That evidently
was not forceful enough for the Herald, which later adjusted the artwork to show the wire prevailing
over skeletons of horses and remnants of crashed railroad equipment. Other newspapers satisfied
themselves with somewhat more sedate column headers or artwork, often showing a telegraph key, a
line of telegraph posts, or artistic type advertising “news by telegraph.” The message, that the
newspaper was allied with the telegraph, which would supersede all other rapid methods of
communication, promised immediacy to news that was still largely gathered, transported, and
distributed by hand.8
The growing telegraph network created a connected national identity. Telegraph historian
Robert Luther Thompson credits the telegraph, along with the railroad, with “fostering the feeling of
nationality” in the post-Mexican War years. Literary essayist Peter West relies on historical newspaper
evidence to say that the telegraph introduced an entirely new national way of thinking. “American
commentators suddenly were able to imagine the entire nation sitting around an imaginary table, in a
realm of informational purity and linguistic transparency,” West writes, citing an 1845 article in the
Albany Weekly Herald in which the editor notes that prior to the telegraph, Americans could not
conceive of knowing what events were “transpiring in a distant city—40, 100, or 500 miles off.” For
West, the telegraph empowered new voices to be what he terms “arbiters of reality,” deciding what
version of the news should hold authority.9
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Nothing excited Victorian-era Americans so much as the evidence of progress, with its
affirmation of their cleverness and America’s national exceptionalism. This was particularly evident in
invention, adoption of new technology, and the scale of technological enterprises. The telegraph as an
innovation and as a fundamental change agent in society fit this progressive appetite perfectly; almost
from its 1840s origin the technology became a general metaphor for advancement. Nineteenth century
writers realized that development of the telegraph essentially changed society.10 The unnamed author
of an 1870s essay on the telegraph wrote: “The telegraph serves to unite peoples, and thus to awaken a
larger human sympathy. It is one of the reconstructive forces in society . . . as such an engine of
progress, the telegraph is worthy of the profoundest consideration in its moral as well as physical
influences.”11
This high-minded and romantic view of the telegraph ignored the often-sordid business
dealings, patent fights, and investment chicanery that underlay the establishment of the nation’s
networks. It also dealt with the technology as something that could be adopted by society to further
specific goals (reconstruction, progress, and morality) without considering that the telegraph more
readily offered itself to less worthy aims, such as manipulating stock market movements through socalled “bucket shops.” The telegraph would fundamentally change society itself, but it also offered new
leverage for an emerging class of capitalists whose market manipulation concentrated control of the
national economy in the hands of just a few hundred individuals. Historian David Hochfelder writes that
“The line of technological development the telegraph sparked and the social changes it wrought proved
as significant to the human experience as the invention of writing in the ancient world and the printing
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press revolution of early modern Europe.”12 For Hochfelder, the telegraph shows the synthetic effect
that arises when a new technology fundamentally alters the lives of its users.
The inventors and developers of the early telegraph knew that the technology would generate
enormous changes. Samuel Finley Breese Morse, who gained primary patents for the telegraph’s
fundamental operating technology and application, intentionally surrounded the introduction of the
technology with an aura of mystery and even holiness. The famous “What hath God wrought?” message
was largely staged as what would today be called a public relations event. It was a grand unveiling
before legislators who had funded the $30,000 project and editors who would promote it. Letters and
notes in 1844 between Morse, in Washington, D.C., and his chief assistant, Alfred Vail, building the line
toward Baltimore, show that the telegraph was repeatedly tested at nine, fourteen, and twenty-two
miles from the capital. Morse noted hours of “correspondence” had been conducted over the line as it
was built. Vail wrote to Morse specifying exactly how many “cups” of battery were needed to move the
magnet adequately to send a signal (44 cups at 14 miles; with only 36 cups, the signal was too weak). A
playful letter sent to Morse in his special telegraphic code and deciphered by Morse shows that the dotdash communication system was already robust. Weeks before the May 24 formal demonstration,
Morse had already lined up an audience including newspaper editors. “I had the pleasure this morning
of seeing two of my friends (Editors of the Baltimore American) Mssrs Dobbin & Rose who are highly
pleased with all they have heard of the Electro Magnetic Telegraph and will take great pleasure in being
present,” wrote Henry G. Rogers to Morse on April second. This was hardly the approach of an inventor
fearful that his fragile system might not function. The major worry for Morse in the project was not
whether the telegraph would work, but an unexpected demand from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad for
payment for locating telegraph poles along the right-of-way, an expense which Morse hadn’t budgeted.
From its earliest start, the telegraph as an innovation was clothed in mythical splendor in order to be
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viewed as a groundbreaking and powerful new medium. Its practical workings involved letters
complaining about the price of the acids and metals needed to form the batteries, the tight-fistedness of
officials disbursing the money Congress had reluctantly voted, and the difficulties of finding and
transporting construction materials. 13
Newspaper leaders were the earliest participants in construction of the telegraph and adoption
of its innovative possibilities. Francis Ormond Jonathan Smith (known as F.O.J. and called “Fog”) was
editor of the Maine Farmer, but went into business with Morse to supply the lead pipe for the first miles
of telegraph constructed in Washington. Smith eventually controlled the telegraph network of New
England. William Swain, owner of the Philadelphia Public Ledger, was one of the earliest and largest
investors in building the original Magnetic Telegraph Company line connecting New York to Baltimore
and Washington in 1846. Telegraph historian Robert Luther Thompson explains that Swain was “an early
convert” to the telegraph, and that the publisher also expected that rapid communication would be
needed to cover the increasing tensions between the United States and Mexico.14 Use by the Press, and
at subsidized rates for the public service the Press provided, was as much in the minds of early network
proponents as the more prosaic conveyance of commercial and business information that most thought
would be its major use. The network was conceived as a democratic and egalitarian institution, as well.
The articles of association of the Magnetic, the first telegraph company in America, contained language
that showed understanding that the new technology required some sort of practical access rule. Former
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Postmaster-General Amos Kendall, organizer and eventual president of the Magnetic company,
established that the telegraph would “be opened alike to all men . . . and the first to come shall be first
served,” and that except for emergencies no customer was to have more than 15 minutes’ use of the
line at one time. Thompson writes, “So fundamental did its framers consider the principle of impartiality
in telegraph operation that they rephrased it in two different sections of the bulky body of rules called
‘Office Regulations.”15
While early adoption of open-access rules set a fundamental operating protocol for what would
soon become a burgeoning network of telegraph lines, early adopters of the technology did not
conceive of the telegraph as an open system. Their focus was on profitability on traffic across individual
lines, not on a new information economy as a whole. For many of them the telegraph was simply a stock
investment scheme.16 What made building of the early telegraph network into a complicated business
transaction was not so much a rush to implement and improve the technology, but instead a race to
secure ownership of the Morse patents in order to dominate business in regional areas. Morse had
patented not only the sending concept of electrical signals transmitted over a wire, but five years later
also patented the magnetic receiving apparatus used to convert the arriving signals into an accessible
message. He then sold his patent rights, rather than rights to license his technology, to a hierarchy of
investors who themselves became patentees who jointly split fees paid by users of the Morse patents.
Almost before there was a practical linkage of any telegraph lines, there was a business structure
envisioning control of any network that could be developed. These overlapping patents, each of which
was later extended by special acts of Congress, gave the Morse patentees enormous control over
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approval and construction of telegraph lines. Morse may not have been the most talented or diligent
inventor of telegraphic equipment, but his shrewd business practices, self-promotion, and dogged
investment in legal defense of his patents gave a small group control of much of the telegraph’s
expansion.17
The telegraph was two things at the same time; on the one hand it was an amazing
demonstration of American creativity and an obvious change-agent for national life, and on the other it
was an industry with stringent barriers to access from its inception. Business historian Alfred Chandler
used the rise of railroads as his model for the creation of complex business management, but the
creation and consolidation of the telegraph industry presaged the massive growth that led railroads to
adopt divisional structures and to create functional departments – the telegraph was the first truly
national big business. Historian and archivist Paul Israel writes that the telegraph also created a new
world of its own: “Telegraphy also stood at the center of another major transition in American society -the emergence of corporate capitalism and its reorganization of technology research and
development.”18 Inventors flocked to create telegraph improvements while investors sought ways to
bypass the restrictive Morse patents, and an entirely new class of technology workers emerged to
operate the arcane system. The Press would need to navigate this new and costly world with business
caution, but the sudden achievement of near-instantaneous communication demanded their immediate
and intense involvement.
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Telegraphic Diffusion
How did the telegraph diffuse so rapidly, forming the basis for a national network within a
decade of its earliest introduction? Sociologist Everett Rogers created the field in the study of how
innovative concepts and technology diffuse throughout a society. In general, Rogers identified five
groups of adopters and a typical bell-shaped curve that describes the progress of adoption. Innovators
by themselves represent a very small portion of the diffusion; early adopters, on the other hand,
typically represent a large enough sample size that their intervention makes a technology “take off,”
generally twelve to twenty percent of a population becoming interested or involved with that
technology or its effects. The “early majority” in Rogers’ terminology represents the greatest period of
growth for an innovation, when a large swath of a population has determined that an innovative
technology is useful enough that they incorporate it into their lives, and the “late majority” are those
who tend to wait cautiously to see an innovation proved out before they will adopt it. “Laggards” are
those who tend to resist an innovation even when the majority of the population have begun regularly
using it, though the reasons for lagging may be quite diverse.19
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Figure 1: Diffusion of Innovation, Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Diffusionofideas.PNG

In the case of the telegraph, Rogers’ theory works for the social acceptability of the technology
and its promulgation as a form of joint property, in much the same manner that the Internet of today is
viewed as a social possession. The debates of 2014-15 over ‘net neutrality’ and universal Internet access
could as easily have fired the minds of the mid-nineteenth century as they do today’s so-called
“netizens” who demonstrate passionate commitment to a form of public ownership of technical
possibility. The telegraph as a harbinger of newness crops up repeatedly in other, more plausible,
dialogues of its time. One telegraph agent recalled hiding his “key” (sending device) under a table while
taking telegraph orders from clients, telling the credulous senders that they should hurry outside and
watch the wire sharply in order to see their words pass by. Verifiable accounts of weddings by proxy
occurring over the telegraph became a staple item of interest in the news. At the 1861 Civil War battle
of Rich Mountain, Confederate prisoners being escorted back through Union lines were overheard to
wonderingly say “Look, there’s the telegraph!” on seeing a military field operator tapping his key. In the
latter case, the telegraph assuaged some of the sting of captivity by pointing out the up-to-the-minute
nature of the conflict they were serving in, and may have helped explain their defeat by an otherwise
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despised foe. Within fifteen years of its first practical demonstration, then, the idea of the telegraph had
“diffused” to the extent that only laggards were left doubting its national impact.
But it was neither the ability to send one message point-to-point that caused diffusion of the
telegraph innovation, nor was it the efficiency of the technology itself. Wolff makes the point that the
early telegraph of the 1840s and 1850s was significantly less reliable and more expensive than the
improved service of the economical U.S. Post Office, and that even the speed of telegraph messages
could be agonizingly slow as they were handed off between different lines for forwarding, a process that
sometimes took days. Early messages were also expensive to send, with ten words costing up to $2.50
to send if the distance was long, a cost that was unaffordable to most people.20 Government pressure in
favor of the telegraph was almost non-existent; unenthusiastic about spending on internal
improvements, Congress also doubted the constitutionality of government involvement in anything
other than Postal mail for distributing communications. This effectively limited early government
investment to the $30,000 offered to build Morse’s demonstration line between Washington, D.C., and
Baltimore. Subsidies for other telegraph lines were limited, and no guarantees of any volume of
government message traffic were offered. A movement to create a “postal telegraph” that would
operate uniformly under government control was often discussed but never implemented, as investor
and business interests lobbied hard against it.
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Why did the telegraph expand so rapidly, then? It was the vision of entrepreneurs seeking to
both network and monopolize the emerging telegraph that dominated the practical diffusion of the
innovation. Henry David Thoreau’s remark in his book Walden that Maine and Texas might not have
much to say to one another, though linked by telegraph, was entirely beside the point; the value of
pushing the early telegraph was in developing a commanding position to profit from future
communication across a national network. Only a few of the more than thirty telegraph firms in business
by 1855 were making money for their owners, though millions of words were flowing over more than
twenty-three thousand miles of wire by that time.21 Thompson has described this time of line-building as
an “era of methodless enthusiasm,” but former postmaster general Kendall had a clear vision of a single
system controlled by the Morse patent, with New York City as the hub and “great arteries radiating to
the south, to the north, and to the west.”22
The battle between builders of the early lines, fought both in the market and in the courts, was
not particularly productive. Indeed, in some cases the term “battle” was literal, with line installers
tearing down the wires of rival companies in order to physically enforce ownership of rights-of-way or to
limit connections between areas promised exclusively to one Morse patentee or another.23 Differing
philosophies relating to the telegraph were put to both physical and legal tests; on the one hand,
innovators such as Henry O’Rielly believed in broad democratic implementation of the technology and
pushed for expansive public access with a wink and a nod to patent limitations. O’Rielly’s “People’s Line”
from the Ohio country to New Orleans won public sympathy with its rapid construction, and was ready
by 1848 to transmit messages at least as far south as Nashville, Tennessee. But O’Rielly’s effort was
stopped cold by Morse investors such as F.O.J. Smith and Amos Kendall, who saw value not in rapid
construction of telegraph lines or improved operation of them, but in safeguarding monopoly rights
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through subtle legalities. Kendall lobbied for legislation in Tennessee and Kentucky that emerged as
amendments to otherwise innocuous-seeming state bills, amendments that established inviolable
rights-of-way that crossed the O’Rielly line or that required any prospective telegraph operator to gain
permission from new state boards governing “internal improvements.” At the same time, Morse
patentees launched lawsuits claiming violation of patent rights based on the telegraphic equipment
being used. O’Rielly’s reliance on the “Columbian” telegraph sender and receiver to bypass the Morse
claims was overthrown when a Kentucky circuit court granted Morse patentees an injunction that stated
that the Columbian was simply a close copy of existing Morse technology. Enforcement of the Morse
patents led to seizure of the People’s Telegraph by Kentucky sheriffs in November, 1848 – a time when
O’Rielly, having extended too much of his cash in line-building, was deeply involved in trying to escape
personal bankruptcy.24
The brutal business fights over telegraph construction did not stain the public image of the
telegraph. To those not using it, the telegraph itself appeared to be a metaphor for American
development and ingenuity. Coverage of new technological developments in communication became a
mainstay of newspaper columns and scientific and social magazine articles. The telegraph appeared in
popular songs, essays, speeches, and artwork depicting national values and describing moral progress
long before its actual utility touched the majority of the population, much in the way that the twentieth
century imagination of travel in outer space far outstripped even early twenty-first century technological
capabilities. The telegraph operator himself became a new social subject, sometimes referred to as a
“knight of the wire.” Operators were usually young men, often electrical or mechanical tinkerers, who
had special knowledge of the mysterious “electric fluid” or “ether” that drove the arcane technology
and who could communicate in the special code of the telegraph. The operator was put in a unique
social position in which he encoded or decoded crucial personal information. British telegraph theorist
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Charles Walker wrote in 1850 that: “The letter-carrier knows not the joys or sorrows of which he is the
bearer; far otherwise with the telegraph, we are taken into the confidence of the public and are made
conscious of the tidings we convey.” Walker went on to note that the public vote of confidence could be
seen in the burgeoning business the telegraph carried.25
Others viewed the technology as purifying communication by stripping out not just time and
distance, but interpretive middle-men who might mar or delay information. The wires became a
connective cloud that brought citizens together. In 1852, when suggestions were made that the national
capital should be moved to a more-central location, the New York Herald editorialized that such a move
was unnecessary because of the advent of telegraphic connectivity.26 Telegraphy had created a virtual
central capital that could be “visited” by any connected person. Though telegraph company leaders
estimated as late as 1890 that only two percent of the population ever actually used the telegraph for
personal communication, its use by the media made it seem much more ubiquitous. This was in part due
to the work of the New York Associated Press and ancillary press associations affiliated with it. Editors
and publishers who created the press associations developed a connectivity model that centralized the
gathering of remote information in particular nodes – New York City was the most important – and then
used a broadcast method to send a mutually-agreed digest of “standard” news out over telegraph lines
at a particular time to every corresponding member of the association. This digest of 1,000 to 3,000
words came over the “A” line of every telegraph section and its information was transcribed, forwarded,
or re-sent by the most skillful operators within individual telegraph offices. Becoming such an operator
led to higher pay and great social status within the industry. Much of the news was commercial and
25
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related to commodity prices, shipping, foreign market conditions, and political events affecting business,
and so it had immediacy and precedence. Telegraph offices were generally located close to newspaper
printers’ offices, if not within the newspaper building itself, and in cities such as New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia the larger newspapers might connect four or more telegraph lines directly to their
newsroom so that bulletins could arrive immediately.27
Effects of the Civil War
Telegraph lines were already extensive and featured complex interconnection by 1860, but
telegraphic news remained a special and marketable commodity until wartime pressures led to a public
hunger for the latest news of any event or battle. “The civil war, from 1861 to 1865, developed the
fullest resources of American newspaper enterprise. No expense was spared in the use of the telegraph,
sending of special correspondents to every point, and the employment of messengers and horses in
gathering details from every corner and seat of the war,” wrote Horace Greeley in his “Great Industries”
review of the newspaper business. 28 One of the most important aspects of the telegraph was creation
of an extensively networked communication structure operating quickly compared to all previous
technology. Like today’s Internet, this networking depended on a high-bandwidth backbone for
communication operating through fast acting network nodes in order to distribute information smoothly
and efficiently.
The war demonstrated a major network difference between the industrial North, with its
concentrated cities, and the less-populous South. Before the war, most telegraph lines serving the South
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depended from Northern metropolises, generally running on a north-south axis and concentrating along
the Atlantic coast or down the major river channels, especially the Mississippi valley.
In the North, however, strong trunk lines had developed running east-west as well as northsouth. This was partly due to the convenience of running telegraph wires along railroad right-of-way
easements, which were far more numerous and extensive in Northern states. There was also a business
drive to launch the telegraph across country before railroads were extensively constructed in the
Midwest, however, using roadways or simply cutting through the wilderness in advance of rail
construction. The flow of commerce and the creation of Western business centers in places such as
Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, drew the telegraph. Begun with the east-west linkage of the Erie Canal
in 1825, Northern connectivity was continued with further canal and especially railroad construction
that linked major trade points and created a hub-to-hub commercial transfer network.
Southern commercial rail links, in the meantime, remained largely aimed at transport of
agricultural produce to water shipping points and even when connecting city centers such railroads
often were discontinuous due either to gauge mismatch (the width between rails was not fully
standardized in the United States until the end of the nineteenth century) or lack of business harmony.29
Most telegraph lines in the South used the natural easement of water routes, following the Atlantic
coast, the Mississippi River, and other major rivers, few of which offered east-west connections. The
antebellum telegraph installation heavily favored the North. An 1853 map of telegraph lines and stations
in the U.S. and Canada shows the extensive vascularity of telegraph lines north of the Ohio, while just
two trunk lines traverse the South, each headed to New Orleans by different routes. Cartographer
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Charles B. Barr noted that of 40,000 miles of telegraph in the world, 27,000 were in the United States,
most operated under the Morse or the competing House telegraph patents. With secession, Southern
networks became truncated point-to-point structures with limited interchange, while Northern
networks tapped robust nodes that created extensive interconnection. While each telegraph office
represented a break in the line and required a repeater to forward on the signal, by the 1860s operators
were professional enough and discipline developed enough to allow for rapid handoff of messages. A
“first class” operator was one who could send or receive at thirty-five words per minute for two to three
hours at a time. The effect was not unlike an extended assembly line with each unit passed from station
to station.30
The major telegraph companies doing business at the outbreak of the Civil War were The
American Telegraph Company, with lines along the Atlantic Coast; the Southwestern Telegraph
Company, with lines from Louisville, KY, south to New Orleans; the Illinois & Mississippi Company, which
operated through Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri; and Western Union, which dominated much of the
telegraph business in the northeast and the states of the old Northwest Territory. These companies
formed a cartel known as the “Six Nations Alliance,” each with exclusive assigned territory. After the
beginning of the war, the portion of the American Telegraph Company that was cut off became the
Southern Telegraph Company (alternately known as the Confederate Telegraph Company), and was
operated by a major stockholder placed in charge by the company’s original Northern management with
the directive to preserve as much of the telegraph business as possible during the war. The same held
true for the Southwestern, whose treasurer took over as president of all the lines south of Kentucky. The
two truncated Southern companies spent much of the war fighting for control of one another; the
splitting of the American company weakened it significantly in its own fight to avoid consolidation with
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Western Union. Though they did brisk business, payment was in Confederate dollars and increasing
operating costs as well as scarcity of hardware and materials limited the companies to maintenance of
lines rather than expansion. Wartime control of the telegraph also differed within the two sections of
the country. While both nationalized the telegraph system, Northern interests continued to extend the
commercial telegraph, including a transcontinental line, while Southern civil overseers strongly limited
the telegraph as a strategic military tool and presided over an ever-diminishing set of telegraphic offices
and operators as territory was lost. By the end of the war, “the telegraphs of the Confederacy . . . for
lack of funds, of help, but most of all, of material had become almost useless,” wrote nineteenth century
telegraph historian Plum. 31
The result can be seen in the timing and quality of information in news outlets North and South,
with Southern newspapers generally trailing those of the North during the Civil War and printing lesstimely information based on limited telegraphic input. The wartime effect would linger; by 1870 there
were more than 180,000 miles of public telegraph operating in the nation, as well as several thousand
miles of private telegraph, but the bandwidth remained concentrated in northern states.32
The war itself also threw the new transcontinental telegraph into Northern hands, further
bolstering the networked North, when its originally planned eastern terminus at St. Louis came under
Confederate sway. A hastily improvised line across Iowa gave the Pacific Telegraph interconnection to
Chicago, instead, bolstering that city’s interchange and making it a vital node for transcontinental
business. The impact of being “on the network” was shown when the improvised Iowa connection
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included Des Moines in its route.33 The editor of the Des Moines Register wrote that the telegraph had
brought benefits similar to those of rivers and railroads.
Ever since Adam was an infant, the City of Des Moines, or the site where it is located,
has been cut off from the exterior world. We have had no Railroads. We have had no
telegraph. We have been excluded from the activities of commerce. Situated midway
between the two great rivers of the continent, without anything but coaches and stage
roads to connect us with the rest of mankind, our condition has not been the most
pleasant in the world. To-day our situation is immensely improved. We have the
privilege of reading the latest dispatches in our own paper. The lightning and telegraph
company have at length made us even with the Mississippi cities.34
Newspapers, meanwhile, found themselves scrambling to keep up with wartime news
demands. “Papers which prior to the war had printed no more than two or three columns of telegraph
news a day were soon printing two or three pages,” Thompson wrote.35 The statement is over-broad, as
few newspapers at the time printed more than four or six pages in total, but the sentiment is borne out
by surveying metropolitan papers which did, indeed, expand their telegraphic coverage dramatically at
the same time that their page count rose to eight or more pages.
Events related to the war itself shaped telegraph ownership and business practices, effectively
ending the independence of the members of the competing regional monopolies in place before the war
and eventually handing business dominance to the Western Union Company. “The immediate effect of
the war was to swamp all of the lines with business,” wrote telegraph historian Thompson, but noted
that the business glut masked the war’s decisiveness in telegraph business consolidation.36
The unique pattern of quasi-private federalization imposed on the telegraph during the Civil War
provided an interesting and far-reaching answer to calls that had grown for government intervention in
33
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the network business. Though Congress was grudgingly willing to promote railroad and telegraph
extension to undeveloped regions of the West through land grants, attempts to create a Postal
telegraph such as that of Great Britain were routinely quashed. Leaving development to private interests
not only pleased investors in those interests, but was a sop to those in government who viewed internal
improvements as dangerous ground. This state of affairs was rudely interrupted by secession of the
Southern states: Overnight, it became clear that the Federal government had a significant security
interest in regulating and even operating the telegraph. Telegraph lines between Washington, D.C., and
other Northern centers remained live and connected to Southern operators who were eager to listen in
on national tactics and strategy. The loyalty of operators in Maryland was suspect and the wires were
used by Confederate sympathizers to attempt to disrupt Northern railway operations, especially after
the April, 1861, loss of Harpers Ferry, Virginia, where railroad and telegraph networks converged
between Washington, D.C., and the North. Secretary of War Simon Cameron called in business associate
Tom Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, to try to make sense of what to do about the telegraph. Scott,
in turn, assigned Andrew Carnegie to the task of organizing a provisional military telegraph service, and
Carnegie brought four young operators from the railroad to Washington, D.C., to do so. One of them,
David Homer Bates, helped set up the War Department telegraph office that later became one of
Abraham Lincoln’s primary places to go “for news.” Lincoln’s reliance on the web of telegraph
communications to bring him instant information of wartime events made him the first chief executive
to use twenty-four hour connectivity as a part of his office. Bates, in a diary entry in 1863, noted that
Lincoln’s message to congress included “compliments [to] the military telegraph very highly indeed. He
says none have surpassed and few equaled the diligence and faithfulness of the telegraph operators.”
Lincoln had a lot to listen in on through his operator proxies – Bates calculated that 3,300 telegrams per
day were being sent over military wires, ranging from ten to 1,000 words. Often the information came
from news reporters, as when the first reliable information about the Battle of the Wilderness came
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from a New York Tribune correspondent who reached the telegraph at Union Mills, Virginia, on May 6,
1864. 37
From the start the operation was primarily one imposed upon the military by civilian operatives
whose duty was owed to business. The initial actions governed only the military district around
Washington, D.C., but military authority over railroads and the telegraph spread organically as the
technologists took control of the overall systems with government backing.38
Edwin M. Stanton, successor to Cameron as Secretary of War, formalized national control of the
telegraph more solidly on February 26, 1862. Congress had granted the administration an act allowing
control of the railroads and the telegraph, and the Presidential order was issued to take full military
control of “all the telegraph lines in the United States,” and stipulating that any communications about
military maneuvers by telegraph were forbidden without permission of the War Department or generals
commanding in the field or in geographical departments. As part of the presidential order, newspapers
found to be publishing unauthorized information “will be excluded therafter from securing information
by telegraph or transmitting their papers by rail-road.” The order named Edwards S. Sanford military
supervisor of telegraphic messages throughout the U.S. and appointed Anson Stager as military
superintendent of all telegraph lines and offices. Sanford was president of the American Telegraph
Company, and used company funds to pay for the first six months of military telegraph construction and
operations. Stager was co-founder and first general superintendent of Western Union; he came from a
newspaper background in New York and had worked for Henry O’Rielly during the early telegraph linebuilding craze. Neither man had military experience (though Stager would receive brevet Brigadier
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General rank later in the war), but each represented corporate network building power. The final clause
of the document reveals the balance being struck: “This possession and control of the telegraph lines, is
not intended to interfere in any respect with the ordinary affairs of the companies, or with private
business.” Stanton, notoriously touchy about newspaper coverage of the administration and its armies,
could have his cake and eat it, too – newspapers could be shut out of telegraphic communications if
they misbehaved but business interests could continue to use the telegraph lines and run them for
commercial activities. In the meantime, USMT support could be used to subsidize the operations of
private telegraph companies at joint offices. Hochfelder notes as an example that 40 percent of the
salaries, rent, and cost of supplies at Cairo, Illinois, was paid by the government, and that military lines
and operators were made available gratis to handle commercial business during slack periods. “It is
quite plain that the companies profited enormously during the war,” he writes.39
The efforts cut across Army attempts to take control of its own telegraphy through innovations
by the newly-formed Signal Corps under Maj. Albert J. Meyer. An inventive and inquisitive military
surgeon, Meyer had conceived a passion for long-distance signaling while posted with remote garrisons
in the far West. In August, 1861, he gained permission from Simon Cameron to create the corps from
the ground up. He instituted a signaling service, devised equipment and cipher codes, and established a
training camp to teach officers and enlisted men how to use wig-wag signals by flag during the day and
using torches at night. His letters and reports reveal him as detail-oriented, brilliant, controlling, and
intolerant of either challenge to his methods or stupidity among his assistants. “It is contemplated that
every [commissioned] officer of the proposed corps should be a thorough telegraphist, practiced in the
use of both aerial and electric Signals, able to avail himself of either, and competent of himself to direct
the construction and to work the apparatus needed for either,” Meyer wrote. The intent to take over
electric military telegraphy was clear in a helpful draft Meyer wrote as an act to be adopted by Congress
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that detailed the organization, ranks to be held, and pay for the corps. Warrant officers in the corps
were to be “skillful telegraph operators.” He suggested an appropriation of $50,000 for “telegraphic
apparatus” (by which he meant both visual and electric equipment) and proposed a field telegraph to
accompany each Army division. In answer to a letter sent in June, the army’s adjutant general approved
$10,000 to buy “apparatus and equipment for moveable electric telegraph” in an endorsement to one of
Meyer’s letters.40
Meyer’s plan seems matter-of-fact to modern minds accustomed to a military that includes its
own logistics department, but to the civilian telegraph industry his “flying field telegraphs” were an
unpalatable challenge. First, the major chose to use a non-Morse telegraph technology, the “Beardslee”
system. The Beardslee device allowed the sender to use an alphabetic dial to tap out messages that
were received at the other end by an indicator that spelled them out for the recipient. The magneto-run
system had technical weaknesses and was far less powerful than the battery dependent Morse
electromagnetic lines, but its primary flaw was in appalling telegraphers such as Stager and Bates who
saw it as invading their turf and undercutting their expertise. Second, the Signal Corps telegraphers
would be members of the military and subject to the military chain of command and discipline, a feature
that Meyer thought would “secure for them a thousand advantages for cooperation with officers of the
army in the field.” To the administration, especially to Cameron’s successor Stanton, there were no
advantages to having telegraphists under the thumb of Army officers; rather, they wanted a network of
reliable operators whose responsibility was to the government rather than to generals. Finally, Meyer’s
system was envisioned for temporary deployment in the field with special telegraph wagons designed to
quickly lay down rubberized wire on temporary stakes and then, as the forces moved on, to pick it up
again. While no direct evidence has been found showing any promises made to businessmen, leaders of
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Western Union and the American telegraph companies were certainly not interested in equipping the
military with its own isolated communication system that would bypass their own lines and leave no
infrastructure behind for connection.41
Though Meyer succeeded in creating and equipping an effective signal corps including multiple
“flying telegraph” units, by early 1863 he recognized that he was in trouble and that his telegraphic
efforts were in danger of being pinched off. Cameron’s ouster in early 1862 had taken away his primary
administration support, and Meyer thought he saw a plot by Stanton’s supporters in the U.S. Military
Telegraph, whom he referred to as “interested and designing men outside the Corps.” The organization
of the Signal Corps as an entity outside the direct chain of command and promotion – as an
experimental specialty unit it borrowed officers and men from other regiments, brigades, and divisions –
gave him little structural clout. In November, 1863, Meyer sent a round-robin letter to commanders he
had worked with, asking them to write letters defending the Signal Corps as the efficient and logical
home for the military telegraph. He intended to use the letters to directly lobby Congress to preserve
the telegraph. The round-robin letter read:
I have the honor to apply for an expression of your opinion in regard to the rapidity with
which the temporary Field Telegraph lines of the Signal Corps have been run out when
required during the operations of this Army, the success with which they have been
worked, and whether they are not a valuable auxiliary to the proper equipment of the
Signal Corps.42

The commanders obliged with a shower of correspondence that reads like a Civil War Who’s
Who: Generals George B. McClellan, Ambrose E. Burnside, E.D. Keyes, John Sedgwick, George G. Meade,
Jonathan C. Robinson, William H. French, G. K. Warren, Alfred Pleasanton, and others responded
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warmly. Unfortunately for Meyer most of the letters missed the point; the generals praised the Signal
Corps to the skies but failed to specify its telegraph lines and telegraph operations. It’s doubtful whether
even a Congress bolstered by approving letters from generals would have prevailed over Stanton’s
intent to control the national telegraph system, which he referred to as his “right arm,” but the
campaign reveals that an intelligent observer saw a sinister civilian purpose in preferring the USMT over
the army’s own Signal Corps. Meyer’s command of the Signal Corps would end in November, 1863,
when he enraged Anson Stager by publically advertising for telegraph operators to enlist in the corps.
Stanton dismissed Meyer from leading the Signal Corps and ordered that all field telegraphs be turned
over to the USMT, finishing the military’s first attempt to challenge private network dominance.43
Meyer’s worries over the “interested and designing men” were borne out in the aftermath of
the Civil War. The USMT built fifteen thousand miles of telegraph lines at a cost estimated at between
$2.6 and $3.3 million between May, 1861, and June, 1865. An order from Stanton on December 1, 1865,
not only restored original commercial lines to private ownership by February, 1866, but also gave USMT
constructed lines to whichever Morse patent holder had control of a particular area. “This was in
consideration of the relinquishment by the telegraph companies of ‘all claims against the United States
for the use of their patent,’ for use of their lines preceding their final restoration, and for all losses
sustained by said companies by the exclusion of commercial business,” wrote Plum in 1882.44
Extension of the national network under government sponsorship and the firm lodging of its
control in the hands of private business were among the major effects of the Civil War, but the war also
43
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had an immense impact on news use of the telegraph and on the content of that news. The volume of
telegraphic news due to the war grew so precipitously that telegraph companies regretted the discounts
they had offered to the press. Edward Sanford wrote to the Western Associated Press to complain that
newspapers were abusing the business arrangement. Contracts had been made in 1861 for a daily
bulletin of twenty-five hundred words of Western news sent to East Coast papers, but “After the war
commenced, your messages for the East often exceeded that limit. We were assured that the Eastern
papers were making no money, and therefore permitted an excess of business without making extra
charge.” Now, in 1864, the demand had risen to ten thousand words per day, and newspapers insisted
the telegraph offices stay open all night. Sanford despaired that the American Telegraph Company “was
really incurring eight times the expense contemplated when we made the arrangement.” The
telegraphers were dropping from the strain and news transmissions were jamming the wires during
peak business times. “The men will give out from physical inability to do the work. Either the number of
words and hours must be lessened, or we must be paid enough to enable us to give a compensation to
the operators,” Sanford write, suggesting that the American would charge extra for anything more than
three thousand words per day. Clearly, newspapers during the war had come to treat the telegraph as a
major pipeline, one that was expected to handle almost any flow of information.45
The network fundamentally changed the material flowing over the telegraph, as well, as
telegraph historian Hochfelder explains. The relatively high cost of telegraphy empowered news
associations over individual newspapers, giving the associations increased control over the form of news
and how it should be presented. “The matter-of-fact style and inverted-pyramid structure of the modern
news story originated with telegraphic newsgathering and reached a level of maturity during the Civil
War,” he writes. Hochfelder also notes that the frequency of telegraphic service and its creation of
“evolving” news stories through incremental reporting developed a new consumer expectation. “News-
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hungry crowds routinely gathered at hotels, newspaper offices, and telegraph offices to keep up with
the latest on major news stories,” and a new expectation emerged that the network would bring details
as they occurred rather than an analysis of the news.46
Stanton, in his urge to control and harness transmission of the news, also managed to change
reporting. In April, 1863, he authorized Gen. Joseph Hooker to issue General Order No. 48 to require
correspondents “to publish their communications over their own signatures.” Prior to the order most
reporting was done anonymously under pen names such as “Agate” (Whitelaw Reid) or “Invisible Green”
(William G. Crippen). Allowing a reporter to sign his actual initials was reserved for notable figures of
national prominence, such as Horace Greeley or Bayard Taylor. Now, by federal order, ordinary
reporters became visible to their audiences through bylines. Newspaper editors were far from delighted,
but the business change led to widespread recognition for the best reporters. Journalism professor
David Mindich, meanwhile, has argued that Stanton also created the “inverted pyramid” reporting style.
Stanton’s style in daily press releases titled “War Diary” pushed factual information to the top of his
telegrams and letters, and the Secretary of War’s pronouncements were often printed verbatim. “While
not always written in descending order of importance, Stanton’s daily dispatch was never chronological,
and was always terse,” writes Mindich. No other reporter showed such a style during the war, but the
inverted pyramid came to rule the news by the 1890s.47
The power and authority of the telegraphic transmission of news was revealed in another
incident during the war, one that led the administration to suppress at least two New York City
newspapers, including the New York World, notorious for its editor’s “Copperhead” Southern
sympathies and its anti-administration Democratic leaning. Two enterprising minor journalists
recognized that presidential announcements about the military draft had moved the stock market in the
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past. They fabricated a news bulletin purporting that Lincoln had called for thousands of new soldiers,
made it look as though it had come to New York by telegraph, and included it in what looked like the
late-night packet of telegraphic news that was carried by messenger to the various city papers. The
forged bulletin was accepted by compositors who had no reason to doubt its authenticity and who
quickly set it into type for early morning editions. Frantic telegrams from Washington denying the truth
of the presidential order reached most papers in time to stop the presses, but Stanton sent soldiers to
occupy the World’s office and suppressed the publication for several days. The perpetrators of the fraud
were quickly detected and their attempt to rig the stock market failed, but the audacious use of the
symbols of the new reporting network – the telegraph, the Associated Press, and special couriers –
showed that advances in speed and connectivity brought unanticipated vulnerabilities as well as
benefits.48
Postwar Network Consolidation
The Civil War years accelerated the telegraph and rail networks into early maturity. Before the
war, rapid communication had seemed to be an expensive luxury, but by the end of the war telegraph
use was acknowledged in the news business as a necessary (if expensive) commodity. More than two
thousand telegraphers and electricians came out of the war with practical experience and dynamic ideas
for new applications in communication technology. These operators and their civilian counterparts
formed the nucleus of an emerging white collar business that relied on skilled technologists who were
not involved in manual labor, creating what social historian Edward Gabler has referred to as a “new
lower middle-class.” It was a class that had a central identity, but was composed of individuals who may
have known one another only within the network of telegraph lines. For hundreds of reporters and
editors the ability to send and receive up-to-the-minute dispatches had become commonplace, with
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many of them also claiming the title of “practical telegrapher.” Millions of readers were accustomed to
receiving far-flung reports through columns delivered by telegraphic news agencies. The experience
with massive military organization and involvement in the USMT, meanwhile, gave telegraph business
leaders such as Stager a model to use in running a gigantic and consolidated business. 49
The news agency monopoly of the Associated Press buttressed telegraphic consolidation when
Western Union swallowed the American Telegraph Company and the United States Telegraph Company
in 1866, forming a $40 million corporation that operated more than 76,000 miles of telegraph line.
Contracts that kept the cost of sending news bulletins low also included non-compete clauses that
prohibited AP member newspapers from using other telegraph services to send or receive news, or from
creating their own network. The contracts also contained agreements against criticism of Western Union
or discussion of its business practices. Business historian Joshua Wolff notes that Western Union
became “the first American private corporation to monopolize a national industry,” and it did so partly
by working hand in glove with the Associated Press to ensure that it controlled the flow of news. The
relationship was so close that the AP main office was located within the Western Union building by the
mid-1870s. Attempts in 1866 to introduce a bill to create a national postal telegraph system were
rebuffed. “Western Union engaged in a deeper systematic corruption, manipulating both the press and
the political system, destroying competition and resisting efforts to democratize the telegraph through
regulation or the creation of a public telegraph,” Wolff writes. But with the exception of a few leading
publishers, James Gordon Bennett among them, most in the news business seemed to view this
dominance and corruption as a win-win situation. “Because news dispatches on the wires could be
‘dropped’ at many stations at little expense per station, the telegraph news business offered virtually
unlimited economies of scale,” Wolff argues. A large number of small telegraph companies charging

49

Edward Gabler, The American Telegrapher: A Social History, 1860-1900 (New Brunswick, VT: Rutgurs, 1988), p. 4.
Telegraphers recognized one another by their “fist,” that is, their sending style and speed, and often formed
working relationships with one another over hundreds of miles, 80-82.

112
varying rates and working at different levels of efficiency from one another would remove the benefit of
an efficient national network and might even push newspapers back into more dependence on the
cumbersome postal exchange system. Editors found nothing incongruous in the 1883 statement of
Western Union president Norvin Green that “most complaints [against WU] are by people who never
use it and never would at any price except in case of death.”50
There was always a certain amount of churn at the margins of the monopolistic Western Union
business, just as there was with news agency challenges to the AP. Independent telegraph companies
such as New York’s Bankers & Brokers line or the Franklin Telegraph Company attempted to carve out
specialty markets for themselves to serve particular interests. Combined, they never carried more than
ten percent of the nation’s telegraph business. The independents were also created as foils for
investors, often fraudulent corporations that demonstrated some modest operations, sold stock to
credulous buyers, and then folded. Bennett, capitalizing on the national Telegraph Act of 1866 that
forced open rights-of-way along railroads and roadways, aided a combination of smaller telegraph
companies to form an independent network across New England and initiated a news service across
them. His 1868 move was not so much a journalistic one to provide content as it was a defensive
business reaction against what he thought were machinations to have the government buy Western
Union’s telegraph lines at an inflated price of $60 million. Bennett’s actions led to removal of the Herald
from the AP, a move that accidentally guaranteed long-term competition to the dominant news
agency.51
These business dealings were opaque to most consumers of the news who saw in the increasing
web of telegraph wires stretching overhead in cities or paralleling railroad tracks and roadways simply a
sign of progress. For all of its innovative effect on communication the telegraph remained fundamentally
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the same as Morse’s original demonstration project, a line between two places requiring an operator on
each end. A single line could carry twenty-five to fifty words per minute; line length was limited to
between three to five hundred miles before either an operator or automatic repeater was necessary to
boost the signal strength by transferring a message to the next segment. Each station required hundreds
of battery cells, with attendants mixing the dangerous chemicals that gave the electrolytic charge; all of
the equipment had to be constantly adjusted to account for weather conditions and normal wear and
tear. More communication volume required more lines and more operators, a labor-intensive market,
and much of the invention that surrounded the telegraph was aimed more at either protecting or
circumventing the original Morse patents. When J.B. Stearns developed a prototype machine in 1868
that would send a message each way, simultaneously, on a single telegraph wire, a process known as
“duplexing,” Western Union hired a young inventor to create as many variations of the machine as he
could. WU officials didn’t deploy any of the 17 duplexers that Thomas Alva Edison came up with – they
simply wanted to protect themselves from any conceivable competition in the market. The 1874
invention of Quadruplexing technology emerged quickly only because Edison unethically sold the
technology he developed with Western Union money to financier Jay Gould, who was launching a stock
scheme to gain control of the company.52
All of the technological limitations, inventions, and convoluted ownership schemes paled,
though, by comparison with the vast public acceptance of the innovation. By 1875 the utility of the
network itself had far outstripped public interest in the minutiae of the technology that drove it. “How
thought is transmitted over a long stretch of wire is an unanswered problem to the majority of those
who daily patronize the telegraph companies,” wrote a reporter in the literary journal The Friend in
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September of that year. Even though telegraph company officials would testify to Congress that fewer
than 2 percent of the U.S. population personally used the telegraph, their proxy, the newspaper, led
most people to feel ownership in the system’s effects. Where an earlier national audience claimed that
their news was sent at the speed of lightning, Americans of the 1880s could be much more practical.
“The current of the wire does not travel at anything like the speed of lightning, vis. 228,000 miles per
second. The resistance of the wire reduces its rate to a small fraction,” reported the Saturday Evening
Post in an update of world telegraph technology. Whatever the speed, it was enough to change the
news.53
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CHAPTER 5 EXAMINING NEWSPAPER COVERAGE – IMMIGRATION
The networks that supported the newspapers quickly became vital to the business of news, but
they also changed the nature of news itself. The press during the time period of roughly 1850 through
1890 was not simply marking time, but was engaged in a professional transformation toward what
would later be described as the “Full News” independent press of the twentieth century.1 An
increasingly sophisticated understanding of important national issues, and more technical competence
in reporting on them, should be evident in changes in news coverage over this time period. Focusing on
a single major issue, Immigration, this idea was tested and significant results were found indicating that
newspapers were indeed changing the nature of their content during the studied period. Content
analysis of several full-text searchable newspapers, and of a variety of slightly less-accessible national
newspapers, reveals this increasing sophistication and shows that the increasingly-networked press was
accomplishing important self-imposed work as the Civil War years were left behind.
The national population was growing rapidly and civic life became more extended and complex
over the course of the nineteenth century.2 Newspapers, which had started the period primarily as
politically-supported ventures, used new technology, speedier distribution mechanisms, and new
business approaches to their audience to exploit an increasing appetite for information. They evolved
new methods of identifying, reporting, and displaying the news in order to position themselves as
trusted intermediaries conveying facts. These results can be seen by focusing less on the overall
appearance of newspapers, which remained typographically dense and (to our eyes) relatively
unappealing, and instead looking closely at how they worded their stories. Immigration, a national and
local issue of significant interest, offers an excellent window into this changing world.
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In examining the way the press covered one complicated subject of national importance over
time, the evolution of the press can be seen to be more intentional and less formulaic than has been
represented.3 Far from being a social organ with a nativist knee-jerk reaction against aliens, the press
moved toward objectivity, or at least toward complexity of coverage that gave some balance to its
stories. Its terminology remained earthy and its portrayals were unapologetically racist, but underlying
those factors one sees an emerging broadening viewpoint based on data and factual input. The positivist
historical view of newspapers holds that objectivity is the key feature of news, and that its ultimate
stage of evolution was the modern, detached, and professionalized journalism of the late twentieth
century. That advanced press was described by sociologist Gaye Tuchman as bound by a “fetishism of
facts,” a model that prevailed until the recent introduction of electronic social media and its challenge to
the notion that a professional press was normative or even necessary.4
The Study
To identify the extent of newspaper change over this time, quantitative content analysis of
stories involving immigration and its attendant complications was conducted. The analysis allows for a
statistical look at various hypotheses, framed as research questions, and uses data gathered from a
significant sampling of texts that are then sorted through a coding process. Results of that coding are
analyzed for statistical significance and any significant results may then be used to characterize the
overall nature of the texts.
Researchers examining contemporary news media have shown that newspapers create a highlylimited set of shorthand choices used to characterize immigrants that then leads audiences to adopt
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See, for example, Robert W. McChesney and Ben Scott, “Introduction,” The Brass Check:A Study of American
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those characterizations as an immigrant classification method.5 Researchers have also found that media
coverage of ethnic minorities is generally overwhelmingly negatively biased and that consumers tend to
adopt stereotypic attitudes presented by news media. As it is unlikely that consumers of the past were
significantly more sophisticated than news consumes of today, generalizing from modern audience
reactions to the behavior of a past audience in response to news stimulus seems logical. Thus, media
effects such as concepts that news media help establish out-group and in-group identities should
translate back in time. This effect is particularly strong among less-educated news consumers.6 In the
case of the nineteenth century, low levels of education and literacy, even in metropolitan centers,
meant that for many news consumers the day’s paper read aloud by a friend or relative may have been
their only window into immigrant issues.
With that power to set agendas and frame issues in mind, research questions for this analysis
were these:
RQ1: Does newspaper coverage of immigration issues change over time in America prior to the early
1890s?
RQ2: Is the change negative (against immigrants/immigration) or positive (more accepting of
immigrants)?
RQ3: Did newspapers create coded interpretations of immigrants for readers?
RQ4: To what extent do news articles show an attempt to define citizenship?
Two separate sets of data were secured as part of this content analysis. Each was a
nonprobability purposive sampling of American newspapers in order to seek references to immigrants,
emigrants, and the movement of people to or from an area where they made an impact that was of
5

Daphna Lemish, “The Whore and the Other: Israeli Images of Female Immigrants from the Former U.S.S.R,”
Gender and Society 14 (2000), 333-349; Hajo Boomgarden, News and Ethnic Prejudice: Threat Framing of
Immigrants and its Impact on Anti-immigration Sentiments, paper presented at the annual meeting of the
International Communication Association, Dresden, Germany, June, 2006.
6
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118
interest. The first concentrating on 1852, 1862, 1872, and 1882, and the second spanned decade
intervals from 1840 to 1890. Roughly 4,000 articles were identified in each of the initial searches. The
first data set was winnowed to a total of eighty-six useful articles, while the second totaled 192.7
Articles were stored as .pdf files and coders worked directly from either the electronic file or a
printout of the article. Each article was identified with a number for tracking purposes, and articles were
stored in a Microsoft Excel database for later processing. Inter-coder reliability was tested using Cohen’s
Kappa, with results for each variable ranging from “fair” to highs of “almost perfect.” Two coders
evaluated the initial set of articles while the later set was self-coded; however, coding reliability was
checked in that case using a sample of twenty articles coded by two people.8
The codebook used ten variables to analyze each article. They were: Story identification
number; Apparent story origin; Newspaper publishing the story; Coverage type; Characterization of
coverage (positive/negative); Characterization of immigrants (where they came from); Primary
presentation of immigrants (ethnic or national identity); Story intent (from warning about immigrants to
urging assistance to them); Citizenship approach; and Context of story (crime, social, etc.).
Responses to the variables listed in the codebooks were tested for statistical significance using
chi-square tests and setting 0.05 as a cutoff.9 From the first data set, significant results were found
(p=0.001) that answered RQ3, whether newspaper articles created a coded interpretation of immigrants
7

The first data set, accessed in 2012-13, relied on the ProQuest historical full-text New York Times. The second,
accessed in 2015, included the ProQuest historical full-text Chicago Tribune, Detroit Free Press, New York Times,
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(Iris* OR Germa*) OR (Chin* OR Ital*)”. Other modifiers included Eur*, Asia*, Brit*, Pol*, Mex*, Jap*. Most
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8
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9
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119
for readers. Analysis of “coverage type” against “story intent” suggests that news articles were indeed
written in a way to give readers an easy way to classify (stereotype) immigrants. Comparison of
“characterization of coverage” against “context of story” suggests that the type of an immigrant article,
such as crime, social issues, or political issues, strongly determines the characterization of immigrant
roles presented to the reader.
The first data set was too small to achieve statistically significant results with relation to the
other RQs, but the second data set found strong significance (p=0.000002) for results between the
coverage type of a story (whether it was simple or complex) and the apparent story intent (warning of
immigrants, predicting immigrant behaviors or listing their actions, or supporting or urging assistance to
immigrants). Since the number of complex stories increases between 1850 and 1890, this suggests that
the answer to RQ1 is positive and that newspaper coverage of immigration does change over the study
period. A comparison of the characterization of articles against their context (crime, labor, political,
social issues, or no particular context) also achieved statistical significance (p=0.00003). This further
bolsters the positive answer to RQ1.
Comparing the primary presentation of immigrants (their native background) with
characterization of coverage also reached statistical significance (p=0.0014). This supports the idea
expressed in RQ2 that newspapers did show change over time in presenting immigrants in positive or
negative lights. Charts presented later in this chapter that were created using this favorability data will
show individual immigrant groups and their presentation during the study time period.
Results were not statistically significant (p=0.55) for analysis of citizenship approaches suggested
in RQ4. Though many articles in the study did show an attempt to define citizenship roles, and will be
discussed as interesting artifacts, their numbers were too small to qualify the category as a major aspect
of news coverage during the selected study period.
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Appearing in the News
Articles on immigration effects were a growing part of the nation’s newspaper system after the
early 1840s, when the flow of European immigrants into the country’s opening heartland was facilitated
by increasingly efficient railways and full utilization of transportation assets including steam navigation
on rivers, lakes, and canals, and surface transportation on postal stage roads. This ongoing act of
peopling the nation by borrowing from abroad led to significant tensions within society, and those
tensions were reflected in newspaper coverage of the issue.10 Historian Robert H. Wiebe writes that
anti-alien sentiment was a key factor in what he calls the “crisis in the communities” that dotted
America as isolated islands of culture in the late nineteenth century. Referring to “swarms of sexually
potent immigrants” as a perennially mentioned danger, Wiebe writes of antialien forces as being
“protean” and powerful. “They abused the immigrant in rising crescendo after the middle of the decade.
Mixing contempt with fear, natives pictured the newcomers as dispirited breeders of poverty, crime,
and political corruption, and simultaneously as peculiarly powerful subversives whose foreign ideologies
were undermining American society,” Weibe explains, while noting that the immigrants did not need to
be physically present in a community for such sentiments to be publically expressed.11 Weibe worked
from many sources, including speeches, private papers, and association publications, and one would
expect to find the shrill tone he suggests reflected extensively in newspapers of the day. Instead,
sampling of newspapers of the time finds a somewhat bemused press attempting to explain immigrants
and reactions to them in fairly balanced terms. The national news dialogue did grow more somber by
the 1890s, but seems to contain little of the hostility implied of antialienists. The importance of this is
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not to undercut Weibe’s assertions – actions such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 show antipathy
toward immigrant groups – but to assert that the press was different than the general public or casuists
in particular movements. In a world of “island communities” the newspapers were connected by
networks of wire, rails, and postal exchanges, and reported on immigrants with an unexpected amount
of balance and positivism.
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Figure 2: Immigration Intent v. Coverage Character and Type

An example can be seen in an 1869 article on the Chinese in America written by Joseph Medill. Writing
from San Francisco, the former Chicago Tribune managing editor and co-owner sought to calm
politically-based fears over Chinese immigration – fears that were being raised by Irish labor operatives
on the West Coast. “The Celtic hostility to the Chinese is founded on their admirable qualities as
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Source data from 2015 content analysis. All figures are based on average percentages of coded answers to three
variables. Coverage type includes simple, intermediate, and complex (maximum 3); Char of Cov includes positive,
negative, and neutral (maximum 3); Average of Intent includes warns of immigrants/urges action against, lists
immigrant action, predicts immigrant effects/supports calm, and urges assistance to immigrants (maximum 4). The
falloff in 1890, coupled with increasing complexity of stories, shows an activist press pursuing agendas against
immigrants (Chinese, European paupers).

122
laborers,” explained Medill in an article that appeared in the Tribune on August sixth. He urged calm
over Chinese immigrants, writing that they would never want to vote, did not intend to own property,
and only intended to stay in America while earning money for a “fortune” to take home to China.13
While often expressing fear of immigrant allegiance to old-world political values or power (particularly
Catholic religious power), though, some newspaper figures like editorial cartoonist Thomas Nast also
campaigned for immigrant assimilation, if not complete equality of immigrants or tolerance of their
cultures.14
Medill’s attempt to explain exactly how certain immigrants ought to be understood
illustrates an evolutionary change that the daily press experienced in the nineteenth century. Mark
Wahlgren Summers has claimed that the time between the end of the Civil War and the 1880s was an
uncomfortable one of growth and division between the newsmen and the politicians who had counted
on strict support from a political party press. While “professionalism came haltingly,” new journalists in
the post-war years created new rules in reporting, editing, and distribution of the news, including the
independence of editors.15 Like Medill, other news writers increasingly chose to make stories involving
immigration into political lessons or explanations for citizenship behaviors. They also chose to frame
stories in ways that expanded understanding of how citizenship rights and privileges were playing out
among the new immigrant communities and in interaction with existing Americans. That these stories
were shared and borrowed widely is shown by attributions given at the time of publishing – New
Orleans credited San Francisco, Chicago gave credit to Philadelphia, and Detroit borrowed from New
York. The idea that this was national knowledge and that distant sources could be relied upon was made
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clear. The network effect could lead to ludicrous results, with the same immigrant ship apparently
bursting into flames and sinking in the Caribbean multiple times over several months (as editors found
space for the initial story to run), but in general the effect meant that a serious and complex article
about a local phenomenon of immigration might become a generalized national issue. This increasingly
took newspapers away from toeing a strictly local party line in politics, and increased their role as
conservators of social responsibility in a broad national sense.16
The longitudinal study shows that the press continued a trend toward complex coverage of
immigration issues and immigrants themselves. This purposive sampling is admittedly limited, but within
its limitations it does offer evidence that newspapers were doing a different kind of “work” by the end
of the study period than they were at the beginning, and this “work” indicates a changed self-appointed
role and responsibility within society.17
To a modern audience accustomed to a closely-policed border and stringent immigration caps,
the wide-open nature of immigration to the U.S. in the mid-nineteenth century is difficult to
comprehend. Americans of the time saw immigration as the key to both national growth and to
accumulating the “operatives” needed to labor in factories, the settlers to continue continental
expansion, and craft specialists who could bring particular industrial skills. The availability of land in the
U.S. provided a draw for immigrants, and a series of European economic, political, and crop disasters
pushed tens of thousands to emigrate from Western countries, particularly the Irish potato crop failures
beginning in 1845.
Immigration, immigrants, and their effects on citizenship were major components of news
coverage, from the nativism of the 1840s and 50s, through Progressivism in the later nineteenth
16
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century. The female journalist Nellie Bly’s first plan to break into print in 1887 was to voyage to Europe
in order to travel back to America incognito as an immigrant in steerage, reporting on immigrant
thoughts and the process of reaching the U.S.18 The immigrant community was often presented as a
dangerous outside influence as seen in routine crime reporting as well as reporting of crises such as
labor battles over the Erie Canal, the New York City Draft Riots of 1863, and the railroad strike of 1877.
In Medill’s case, cited earlier, the writer was clearly partisan but also attempted to explain a
complex issue and to recommend a particular approach to that issue. Democrats had found an issue
that resonated with California voters (and, by implication, might spread to the rest of the nation) and
were spreading fear that a wave of Chinese immigration would overwhelm American laborers. On a long
swing through the West, Medill had seen something different. Chinese coming to the United States were
frugal, industrious, and ingenious, he wrote, “[T]ruly a strange reason for the enmity evinced in
California toward them . . . . As they do good work for low wages, and keep sober, they are persecuted,
maligned and barbarously treated,” he wrote. The most reassuring thing about the Chinese, according to
Medill’s article, was their lack of interest in acquiring American citizenship. Estimating that the average
Chinese immigrant’s intended to spend no more than twenty years in the United States, Medill
calculated that the total number of “Chinamen” in the U.S. could never be more than twenty times the
annual immigration because there was no natural increase in the Chinese population. “They never bring
their wives and families with them,” he stated. Political leaders of the Irish immigrant community were
raising a false argument when they claimed that Chinese immigrants sought citizenship privileges,
including the right to vote, Medill explained. The nearly 40,000 Chinese already on the West Coast
would never vote, and this made them ideal immigrants.19
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The complexity of this kind of news coverage is significant when compared to the nativist
themes claimed by Wiebe and present in many immigrant stories found in earlier nineteenth century
stories. A sampling from the New York Times in September, 1852, reveals immigrant mentions primarily
in crime and accident stories. Overall, Irish immigrants figure prominently as perpetrators of crime,
while Germans follow as victims, but immigrant behaviors are generally paired with tragedy of some
kind. Of 25 articles analyzed in the 2012 study, four involve Irish murderers and two German ones, while
three involve immigrants as victims of fires or other accidents.20 Examples include the story of Frederick
Krantz, “the German who killed the Negro Thomas Miles . . . was under the influence of liquor, affording
another sad commentary on the destructiveness of the rum traffic.” Another article concerns a
destructive arson fire that burned “the upper stories of these building [which] were occupied by several
hundred persons – estimated as high as five hundred – mostly poor Germans and Irish, who lost their
all.”21 Other short items included a story from a Buffalo paper about a German man whose seven
children had died of disease that summer, a story from Ohio about General Scott meeting with an Irish
delegation, and a single prophetic sentence under the headline “Irish Items” stating that the British ship
Ganges had landed 244 Irish passengers who confirmed the failure of the potato crop and who
predicted a “great tide” of emigration to America.
Yet an editorial reprinted from the Milwaukee Sentinel in the same year stands out, again
dealing with the long-range issue of Chinese immigration. Stating that some 28,000 Chinese were
already in California, the editorialist welcomed their immigration as a positive good:
[T]he overflowing population of China, when once the wall that has cooped them in at
home is broken down -- will pour over the kindly Pacific seas, to a country so full of
attraction for them. I have before hinted, I believe, in one of my letters that possibly in
20
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this new element of our population may be found the substitute for what is now its
worst element – Slavery.22
The editorialist also suggested that bringing Chinese immigrants to America would be an
effective alternative to sending Christian missionaries to China. “It can only result in good,” he
concluded. Two other stories detailed Chinese immigration in a positive light, one noting the
appointment of an American as commissioner for Chinese emigration and the other briefly describing
Chinese “villages” of up to 1,500 people being established in the California gold fields.
Statistical stories published in the New York Times in 1852 showed a generally positive approach
to immigrants and immigration. An article borrowed from the Alta Californian exulted that immigration
from overseas was expected to bring 82,000 people to the state through San Francisco, while another
40,000 or more were expected to arrive overland. The Times itself matter-of-factly listed the August
arrival of more than 36,500 immigrants, the majority from England, in 397 vessels.23
The overall nature of the coverage itself was conversational, opinionated, and informal.
Immigrants may have been represented as fallible, but immigration in general was good, whether from
Europe or Asia. The newspaper often showed itself intimately in touch with its readers. In one example,
the Times undertook a story correction for an article that had identified an immigrant criminal offender
named Joseph Eldridge as a confidence trickster known as “Black Joe.” The editor stated: “The man
called ‘Black Joe’ was another person entirely . . . We make this statement on the authority, and at the
request, of Mr.Eldridge himself,” in a paragraph led by a small pointing hand symbol.24
By 1882, a vastly changed New York Times is evident when it comes to immigration coverage. In
prior decades statistical reporting had been limited either to day-to-day steamship arrival
announcements or end-of-decade census statements regarding foreign-born population. Now longer
22
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and more analytical stories appeared, typified by an 1883 piece headlined “European Passenger Traffic:
Number of persons landed at this port by each steamship line for 1882” that not only chronicled arrivals
but estimated business practices of the immigrant shipping companies.25
At the individual story level, more complex articles and themes are evident. In a story titled
“Railroads at Castle Garden,” the newspaper’s reporter writes of testimony in the Senate investigation
of how immigrants were exploited on their arrival in the United States. Steamship companies which had
guaranteed at least two days of support to arriving immigrants instead were offloading bewildered
passengers within hours of their arrival at New York, sometimes at 2 a.m.. Meanwhile, steamship
pursers in collusion with railroad companies sold tickets at enormously inflated prices to the bewildered
new arrivals. Castle Garden was the primary processing point for immigrants before the Ellis Island
facility was opened in 1892. The landing point served as a location for edgy capitalism, and writers
wanted to see reform there in order to help immigrants avoid scams. “In the Castle Garden rotunda, the
railroad companies had the monopoly of the sale of tickets . . . . If immigrants who had tickets West
were taken directly from the steamers to the railroads, and did not go to Castle Garden at all, it would
save them much time and money,” the article stated.26 This extended kind of article with a social
approach to immigration shows significant attention to assimilating immigrants and protecting them – a
far cry from fearing them as criminals or societal threats.
Other coverage, especially from Southern newspapers, showed concern or interest for the
overall movement of immigrants through the nation. The New Orleans Daily Picayune in 1850 chronicled
the number of emigrants passing Laramie, counting even their horses, mules, oxen, and sheep. The
Cincinnati Commercial Advertiser in 1870 discussed a “steady tide of emigration” flowing from the North
into the South, with to Texas with its booming export economy in cattle, wool, and hides. The Chicago
Inter-Ocean in 1880 reported on Black migration from Alabama to Kansas, explaining that an ongoing
25
26
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three-year exodus was draining labor from the South because of better opportunities in the West,
where “They were gradually acquiring farms of their own, paying for the land in installments.” The New
Orleans Democrat urged British shipping interests to send the enormous Great Eastern to visit the port
in 1880, exclaiming that immigrants would find New Orleans her natural American port because the
developing West was “bound [to New Orleans] with links of steel.”

From demographic articles enumerating draft animals and the flow of people that were
common in the earlier part of the century newspaper writers and editors moved to more analytical and
developmental work. The Philadelphia Inquirer in 1870 analyzed the Franco-Prussian war as a positive
good for America in an article titled “The Effects of Immigration” in which the writer noted that
European mismanagement of its population was the arrival of “human freight, and they are discharged
upon our wharves – such invoices of muscle, heart, brain, industry, perseverance and ambition to
succeed as were never crowded into a country before.” The Vicksburg Daily Commercial in 1880 extolled
the plans of Thomas Hughes and his English associates in establishing the utopian settlement of Rugby in
East Tennessee, but warned that if “the enterprise is to be governed on charity principles, it will fail; if
on the co-operative plan it will not work unless clear-headed, practical business men are at the head of
the control.” (The Commercial was right, and the original gentlemen-farmers had mostly moved away by
1878). In these and other stories the writers of the later nineteenth century showed an eclecticism and
an interest that outstripped narrow coverage expectations of immigration.
Content analysis found that newspaper articles in the period corresponded to modern practices
in creating a coded interpretation of immigrants for readers.27 The statistical correlation of these
stereotypes was strong and the evidence shows sophisticated use of created immigrant identity to move
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stories forward by counting on the reader’s expectations to fill in information that otherwise would have
needed significant news explanation. This coding could be seen in terminology, such as the use of
“Celestial” or “Mongolian” for Chinese, or in behavioral traits – the “lager-drinking” German is an
example. In the 2012-13 study, some sixty percent of news stories fell into the “simple” category, and
within that category news stories were overwhelmingly shown to support wariness of negative
immigrant behaviors (e.g. murder, theft, carriers of disease). When coverage was “complex,” on the
other hand, the story intention generally either warned of overall immigration effects (voting strength
or patterns, resistance to temperance movements) or supported calm about immigrants (e.g. Germans
holding ethnic festivals, the Chinese not forming a permanent culture within the U.S., and the like).
Use of immigrant identifiers in news stories offers a glimpse of gradual societal change in
acceptance of particular immigrant groups. While the nature of coverage of immigrant groups remained
relatively stable during the period, new immigrant groups represented new threats. Irish immigrants
predominated in negative stories, especially criminal stories, until the 1880s. They were then supplanted
by Germans as the immigrant group with threatening behaviors. The Germans, in turn, were followed by
consistent warning that Italians and Chinese were a new threat. In 1852, the Irish comprised 42 percent
of negative immigrant references in the Times; by 1882, they represented only 11 percent of the
category. Negative references to Italians and Chinese combined to form 28 percent of such coverage,
while German negative stereotyping, at 32 percent, was falling from a high of nearly 50 percent in the
previous decade. Newspapers echoed but also led the national turn from treating immigration as a
positive good to a dubious and even threatening force that needed stringent controls in the late
nineteenth century. Framing of immigrants as sometimes hapless, often-dangerous, participants in the
civil environment was a constant in coverage, though the particular group of immigrants exhibiting such
behavior gradually changed. The violent Irishman of the earliest coverage faded, to be replaced by
German and, later, by Italian offenders characterized by their frequent use of knives and “razors”
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against one another. These stereotypes were resorted to as a form of journalistic shorthand. By using
such a trope, the audience was invited to fill in expected details, saving the writer the space or time that
would have been needed to make criminal incidents individual.
The 2015 data extended and affirmed this trend in reporting immigrant identity, as the
following charts show.
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Figure 3: Intent, Character and Type - Foreign Immigrants
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This and the following charts are based on averages of variables from the 2015 content analysis. As complexity
of stories increases (blue), general favorability toward immigrants declines (red) and positive versus negativity of
content (green) skews toward negativity.
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Figure 4: Intent, Character and Type - Domestic Emigrants

Figure 5: Intent, Character and Type - Irish
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Figure 6: Intent, Character and Type - German

Figure 7: Intent, Character and Type - Italian
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Figure 8: Intent, Character and Type - Other European

Figure 9: Intent, Character and Type - Chinese
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Figure 10: Intent, Character and Type - Religious Groups

Some surprising anomalies crop up in later decades, as when the Times virtually defended
Chinese presence in the United States in 1882. It could be expected that negative stereotyping of
Chinese immigrants would be natural in the year that the Exclusionary Act was passed by Congress, but
the Times had taken a strong editorial stance against the bill itself based on opposition to the
Democratic Irish leaders of the exclusionary movement. While the paper was not pro-Chinese
immigrant, its reporters and editors made strenuous efforts to pin responsibility for the act onto corrupt
Democratic politicians. In doing so, the newspaper issued several stories that called action against the
Chinese into question and presented a balanced view of Chinese presence in the U.S.
The 1880s shift away from immigration incidents (such as a crime or a single event) and toward
continuing stories of significant interest to readers presages the twentieth century interest in the
feature story and the second- and third-day continuing coverage that readers expect. Immigrant
coverage themes developed along several lines, but by far the most prominent was the campaign to
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characterize immigration from Europe as the dumping of “pauper labor” on American shores. In a
remarkable Times story in February, 1884, borrowed from a Pennsylvania paper, immigrants themselves
are held harmless but the practice of dumping them in the United States is excoriated.
During the past few years the influx of what has generally been termed “the pauper
labor of Europe” has been steady. While the Chinese were uppermost in the thoughts of
those who were interested in the question, this so-called pauper labor escaped general
attention. But as the Chinese have gone the champions of home industry, or number
one, have cast their eyes over the continent in search of other evils in need of
eradication, and finally their glances have rested on “the pauper labor of Europe.” It is
alleged to be a scourge which should not be tolerated by any well-regulated
government.29

Immigrants themselves in the story were represented as harmless to America, industrious,
thrifty, and willing to make ends meet by taking in boarders and cooking for groups of workers. The text
reflects amusement over unpronounceable names and discusses the often-cruel ways that storekeepers
or mine bosses invented joke names for them that the immigrants unknowingly adopted. While rarely
attacking immigrants, the stories developed rapidly as a nationalistic response to perceptions of unfair
treatment. The theme of pauper labor soon became one of particular nations, especially England, using
unchecked immigration to America as a convenient mechanism for getting rid of not only the poor, but
other undesirables including criminals and mentally defective people. By 1887, the Times was running
headlines that warned about England “assisting” wholesale immigration to America: “Not a Home for
Paupers: England’s Mendicants Must Stay Away.”30 Others were jumping on the immigrant exclusion
bandwagon, as well. The Dallas Morning News urged expulsion of Chinese students still lingering in
North America, and the Omaha Morning World-Herald trumpeted creation of a new political party
whose aims included restriction of “pauper immigration.” This turn to the negative in the later
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nineteenth century seems to show a borrowing of nativist issues and the forming of public opinion
against immigrant populations.31
These extended stories appeared at a time when newspapers and journals were proliferating in
number, and when existing newspapers were increasing the number of pages they printed for each
issue. Historian Alan Trachtenberg has claimed that the media became part of the “incorporation” of
America by creating audiences who no longer needed direct experience of the world, but who could
become consumers of images and sentiments produced by others. The textual march of the news
business toward more thematic, extended, and interpretive stories and away from the short episodic
coverage of earlier decades supports this concept, though it is not clear whether consumers of the news
felt more involved or less involved in daily life due to the print information they received.32
The extensive introduction of halftone illustrations in the late 1880s led mass communications
in a new and sensationalistic direction at the turn of the century. This turn to sensationalism occurred
with the rise of a new flash press, epitomized by the New York Journal, one that gained much of its news
sustainability through extravagant spending, relentless self-promotion, and “scoops” involving misdeeds
of public people or governmental stumbles. The rise of this Yellow Journalism, which can be dated from
1896, used the fruits of late-century developments including the rise of the human interest story, the
introduction of pictorial dailies meant to be read by increasingly available public lamplight in the
evening, and the formalization of new techniques such as the “interview” story and the celebrity
feature.33 By the turn of the century, the mechanically reproduced image represented a fundamental
new era in journalism, but one that depended for its foundation on the gradual, fundamental changes
that had occurred during the latter half of the nineteenth century (see Appendix I for an example of a
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halftone-intensive immigration story). These changes can be observed in the coverage of a single issue,
immigration, but were undoubtedly equally represented in other story categories.

Coverage of the larger subject of immigration reveals a significant increase in complexity of
coverage and concern for the citizenship implications of the massive, unchecked influx of foreigners to
America. Here, newspapers appointed themselves to explain what immigration meant and how its
effects should be interpreted. From Medill’s early efforts to soothe readers on the subject of Chinese
immigration, to national and even international coverage of Seward’s 1862 call for more European
immigrants, to the New York Times late-century characterization of the need for stringent exclusionary
laws and regulations for those who might be diseased, politically dangerous, or unwanted based on
race, news organizations created an intermediary, explanatory, position between government and the
man in the street. From this platform they instructed a response to a significant national issue by
localizing, simplifying, and formalizing the issue, framing ideas in a way that invited individuals to feel at
least informed if not empowered. Moving from the informality of letter-writers (who might want to
solve slavery by importing Chinese workers) and miscellaneous columns of items borrowed from here
and there, newspapers hardened up a particular style and narrative method that cloaked coverage of
the issue with authority – the authority of news.
This pattern of development shows that the changes that followed the creation of information
networks and fast communication were not just changes of newspaper volume, circulation increases.
Newspapers were not simply adding a megaphone to their existing processes or patterns of coverage –
instead, they were fundamentally changing the nature of news and what constituted news. The changes
in communication were fundamental to reporting, presentation, and framing of events in a manner that
made the newspaper a national civic representative. It became a source with the authority to interpret
to major issues, and it was a player that safeguarded its position with increasing professionalism that
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would lead, gradually, to the quest for objectivity that marked the core of media growth in the
twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 6 SHIFTING THE POWER CENTER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
In 1892 there was a seismic shift in American newsgathering and distribution. The center of the
national Associated Press was moved from New York to Chicago. The move was made against the will of
Eastern news magnates, and was possible not so much by the burgeoning size of the Western city (soon
to become America’s second-largest by population) as it was by the increasingly skillful use of electric
communication networks. Enterprising Western journalists saw that the news appetites of their
communities were under-served by an Eastern press feed dominated by New York. These
entrepreneurial news leaders also recognized that the highly complex and increasingly stable telegraphic
networks displaced existing powers and authority within newsmaking, allowing for a daring gamble that
the physical location of a news center did not matter so much as its access to telegraph nodes. They saw
that news was a commodity, and that its power came from the far-flung sources on the network rather
than from any concentration in a particular metropolis. The nature of an associated press created a
community of news that was non-partisan, immediate, and lean, because partisan opinion would not
apply and could not be sold to the diverse community of editors and publishers who made up the
association. The takeover of the Associated Press by a brash group of outsiders represents the ultimate
maturing of the nineteenth century newspaper as a networked and robust modernizing entity.
Victor Lawson was a key person in this Western success, and he represented the innovative and
restless type of manager or editor that had been created in this news evolution. Lawson understood the
networked environment as both a newsgathering and a business tool. The actions that Lawson took as
Executive Director of the Western Associated Press showed professional use of virtuality – that is, that
the power of news associations was network dependent rather than location-specific – and a keen
appreciation of news as a commodity that had universal value. News leaders headed by Lawson
orchestrated the creation of a new, national, Associated Press and disfranchised Eastern power brokers
who had dominated for-profit sale of the news. The effort replaced them with a coalition dedicated to
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distribution of factual and opinion-free news developed by reporters and editors who hewed to a
national standard. This assumption of the national news function could only have happened with the
maturing of professional newsgathering, the awareness of public interest and citizenship value to the
process of newsmaking, and fluency in high-speed distribution of the news commodity. The story of that
extended event is told primarily from outgoing correspondence, telegrams, and minutes of meetings
copied in bound books marked “Associated Press” and held in the Victor Lawson papers at Chicago’s
Newberry Library. In these records Lawson refers to the event as a “war” and adopts the intimate term
“Our friends, the enemy” to describe the incumbent opposition. The phrase demonstrates that leaders
of the national press knew they were inextricably interconnected even when factions were battling for
control of news flow.1
In the early 1870s Lawson was the co-publisher of an ethnic newspaper, the Skandinavian,
which flourished in the years immediately following the Civil War. With John Anderson, Lawson put out
a profitable weekly whose circulation depended largely on the U.S. Mail and whose composing and
printing was performed on the third floor and in the basement of a Chicago office at 123 Fifth Avenue.2

1
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2
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The building also housed the composing room for the Morning Courier newspaper, an unaffiliated
printing business that made its money by buying early morning copies of other Chicago papers,
plagiarizing their lead articles, and issuing a later-morning edition of the copied stories. Into this
gregarious mix came a new paper begun by Melville Elijah Stone, Percy Meggie, and William L.
Daugherty. The three men invested $6,000 in 1875 to start the Chicago Daily News. Their first typesetter
and compositor, Andrew Blainey Adair, later reminisced that the operation leased a 21-by-21 foot space
at the back of the fourth floor of the Fifth Avenue venue, and that the newspaper’s major possessions
were 150 pounds of minion-sized type, another 150 pounds of agate-sized type, and fifteen fonts of
display head letters. Printing was done on a drum cylinder press, one side at a time, and the papers
were hand-folded and sent out in bundles of ten or twenty in the hands of newsboys whose cry was
“The daily nous, wan cent.”3
The fledgling Daily News faced stiff competition in the rapidly growing young city. The great
Chicago Fire of 1871 had leveled more than buildings – it fundamentally reshuffled business structures
and the pathways of property and wealth on the shores of Lake Michigan, giving established firms a
chance to reinvent themselves and giving upstarts, such as the proprietors of the Daily News, a chance
to insert themselves into new city patterns. Competition was fierce in the rebuilding city, however, and
while Chicago remained an optimistic place to do business, the international economic Panic of 1873
also led to a financial downturn that lasted until 1879 and further challenged emerging businesses

3
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including the Daily News.4 In difficulty, and running the Daily News at a $300 per week deficit, the three
original investors in the new newspaper reached out for business and financial assistance by making
new investor Victor Lawson business manager for the operation in 1876.
Lawson was dynamic and energetic. Recipients of Victor Lawson’s business letters could
envision something much grander than an operation of 300 pounds of type and a back-attic office.
Writing to a Pittsburg company that sought a discount to place a large advertisement in the paper,
Lawson was adamant that only the prices printed on the newspaper’s rate card would apply. “These are
the rates we charge any and all advertisers. We do not cut them. Our circulation is now 40,000 daily.” In
reality, the newspaper had just passed 20,000 in circulation, and had broken even for the first time only
in late 1877, but Lawson had found a taste for doing business battle on behalf of his newspapers. In
response to one advertiser who demanded a discount he pugnaciously responded “The insolence of
your proposition can only be compared with its stupidity. Did it ever occur to you that possibly we made
our own rates?” he wrote, concluding that any further communications “will receive no attention.”5
Lawson could be nurturing, though, when it came to increasing business. In a May letter to news agents
in Ottawa, Illinois, Lawson promised generous support for a “combination” paper. Combinations were
papers that were partially printed, leaving open pages for a local publication to add their own printed
copy. “We always share the expense of starting the ‘Combination’ by furnishing a liberal number of
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papers free,” wrote Lawson, continuing to gently explain that the Ottawa request exceeded the
numbers normally furnished by 5,000 copies. “But we shall be willing to supply you with that number
free and you may use them in a week or a month, as you prefer,” he wrote, adding that the Daily News
would happily supply up to 5,000 handbills to advertise the new combination. The offer was generous,
as papers supplied to clients normally brought in 66⅔ cents per 100, a promotional sacrifice of nearly
$35.6
In June, 1878, Lawson leveraged his assets even more to buy the News its future. The Chicago
Post had gone bankrupt and ceased publication in May, and Lawson’s business connections had brought
him word of a bargain. In a letter prominently marked “Confidential” and written in haste to “Friend
Johnson,” he urgently requested a loan in order to buy up the assets of the failed newspaper in order to
incorporate them into the Daily News. At stake was the property of the newspaper, which Lawson
considered to be mostly trash. “We get a press like other 4 cylinder and some materials and fixtures
which can cost probably realize, all told, a $5,000 outlay.” Far more valuable, though, was the Post’s
franchise for the Western Associated Press. Lawson set the creditors’ likely price of the franchise at
$10,000, but its real value was inestimable. By 1879, an Associated Press franchise in Chicago was worth
more than $100,000, but Lawson did not cite a specific dollar value in his letter. “The possession . . .
would be of great value inas much [sic] as we should then have the whole field of evening journalism
secured against any future competition and thence have only one paper – the Journal – to divide
business with. It is a golden opportunity beyond a doubt,” he wrote in haste. Lawson also outlined the
Daily News’s business situation, claiming the paper was making more than $1,550 a month and expected
to see a profit of $15,000 over the next twelve months, but noting that constantly adding to the paper’s
circulation was an expensive proposition. Friend Johnson or another financier must have come through,
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though there is no correspondence directly showing it, because the Post press franchise and its Hoe
rotary press were added to the Daily News operation.7
The evening news position was critical to the Daily News expanding its regional circulation.
While later twentieth century papers increasingly viewed the evening paper as a weak competitor in a
time of radio and television news cycles, in the nineteenth century evening city papers had unique
advantages. Not only were they able to incorporate news and prices from the morning business cycle
and overnight information from police and city departments, but the timing of their printing made them
the freshest news available for suburban and rural consumers dependent on a news drop from the
railways. Morning news from the city would be stale evening news by the time it reached remote
readers. Lawson, in a letter to a news distributor in Bourbon, Illinois, noted that the physical timetable
of distribution meant that trains leaving the city late in the afternoon could not reach far-flung
distribution points until late at night. “I think the best plan would be to send the 5 o’clock edition which
reaches Bourbon at 3.25 a.m., thus enabling you to get later news and get it the first thing in the
morning. This is the only thing we can do owing to the way the trains run,” he wrote.8
More crucial to the Daily News, though, was inclusion its franchise with the Associated Press,
which instantly made the paper a member of the Western Associated Press (WAP). That regional
organization, which had been conceived of in 1862 at an Indianapolis convention of Western newspaper
editors, was created as a collective foil to the expense and high-handedness of the original New York
Associated Press (NYAP). The NYAP had its beginnings in the 1840s with the formation of cartels to
consolidate shipping and commercial news gathered far off the coast and brought to the metropolis by
fast schooner. This focus on gaining early market prices from European sources morphed during the
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Mexican War of 1846 into an association of four New York newspapers for the gathering and
dissemination of wartime news.
On Oct. 12, 1856, seven news organizations joined forces to create the “General News
Association of the City of New York” that merged the Harbor News Association in with existing
Telegraphic associations, with: “All property in boats, furniture, or other articles belonging to either of
the other associations being hereby transferred and conveyed to this Association, and all rules and
regulations of the former associations being annulled.” The organizing members included Hale and
Gerard Hallock, of the Journal of Commerce, J. and E. Brooks, of The Express, James Gordon Bennett, of
The Herald, Moses S. Beach, of The Sun, Horace Greeley and McElrath, of The Tribune, J.W. Webb, of the
Courier and Inquirer, and Raymond Wesley and Company, of The Times. The covenant they signed
restricted any new members of the association to those that could be agreed upon unanimously by the
existing members, “. . . but the news obtained may be sold to other parties, for the general benefit of
the Association, on the vote of six-sevenths of its members.” Growing up with the development of the
telegraph itself, explained in an earlier chapter, the NYAP was able to negotiate favorable press rates
and to regulate news sent over the wires. 9
The telegraph itself was special enough to deserve capitalization whenever it was mentioned in
the 1856 document, setting aside “Telegraphic” news from all other news. Any member getting regular
telegraph dispatches from a correspondent, or receiving special news over the telegraph, was required
9
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to inform the other members and allow them to use the same material. Any member could order a
special report to be sent to them by telegraph, but, again, they needed to offer that report to all the
other members. News reports from “conventions, political meetings, trials, executions, public dinners,
sporting intelligence,” and state legislative sessions were exceptions to the sharing rules. News coming
from Washington, D.C., and from New York’s state capital at Albany, could also remain exclusive to an
individual paper without violating the association’s agreement.10
The NYAP initially benefited from a close alliance with one major telegraph firm, the American
Telegraph Company., and its links to Atlantic Coast news. The city’s importance as a commercial and
governmental hub, meanwhile, along with its early telegraph connections, made it the natural
metropolis from which news would flow to the nation. As telegraph consolidation occurred and Western
Union dominance of the network arose, however, the NYAP found itself at odds with newspapers in the
interior of the country which did not have franchises with the exclusive association. These newspapers,
restricted from obtaining the comparatively inexpensive wire news budgets sent by the NYAP and yet
connected to the telegraphic grid, clamored for a government takeover of the telegraph system or, at
the very least, a cap to be set on telegraph rates. The National Telegraph Act of 1866 proved a halfmeasure in this direction though it did allow for government use of the wires to transmit commercial
information, primarily weather, at advantageous rates. When Congress investigated the telegraph
business in 1879 as a result of complaints of a monopoly, it incidentally revealed the hidden power of
the Associated Press. The press monopoly seemed to outweigh the dangers of a telegraph
communication monopoly, especially when it was revealed in testimony that newspapers were
forbidden to criticize the NYAP or to mention its business methods publicly.
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This Congressional revelation gave power to a movement that had already been developing
competing press associations, epitomized by the Western Associated Press.11 Facing the cumulative
power of the NYAP after the close of the Civil War, editors of papers remote from the metropolis
organized their own regional wire services. Western editors and publishers representing some 33
newspapers organized themselves in Indianapolis in 1862 to discuss their mutual need for negotiating
power, and for more and better telegraphic news at lower prices. While formal incorporation would not
come until 1866, when WAP governing documents were filed in Michigan, an 1864 joint agreement
between a committee representing this Western Associated Press and the NYAP shows the burden the
papers of the interior faced. To create and receive their own 2,000 word report each day directly from
New York would cost “fifty per cent. more and supply a less quantity of news than was received under
the old arrangement; while to increase the quantity to the point desired by some of the papers, would
run the price greatly beyond the means of a portion of the publishers.” The temporary answer to this
cost challenge was to establish two classes of telegraphic news feed. In an eight-point contract, the
Cincinnati-based committee recommended a 2,000 word general news report from Buffalo for papers
that did not want to pay more. For those willing to spend more, a special news report, also of 2,000
words, would be available directly from New York City. The circular noted that if eleven papers chose
the new report, their cost would be $182 more per month, compared to an individual cost of some $520
for “special” reports of the same number of words “transmitted a much shorter distance.” The Western
men hired T.W. Knox, listed as an “experienced correspondent,” to assemble the special report, with his
$2,500 salary to be divided between the papers receiving the report. Two classes of news were
11
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established in this way, dividing papers in the hinterland into greater and lesser entities based on ability
to pay for decisions made about the news network itself.12
The Western Associated Press (WAP) was formally incorporated in 1866 by editors who had
gained new skills and proved their own independent abilities during the Civil War and who found
subscriptions to New York-based news both expensive and irrelevant to their local subscribers. The daily
NYAP telegraphic report would contain a worldwide listing of shipwrecks of New York-based vessels, or
city commercial news about local warehouse conditions that was useless to Ohio River valley farmers.
Internal squabbles between the NYAP member newspapers also distracted from providing a vibrant
national report. A battle between the New York Herald and other NYAP members over the Herald’s
attempt to achieve a news monopoly occupied the press association in a fight over who would fund the
gathering and transmission of news over the newly-completed Atlantic Cable. The conflict was
sidestepped by the entrepreneurial businessman Daniel H. Craig, who realized that the post-war rise of
the monopolistic Western Union telegraphic power weakened the NYAP and made it vulnerable to
competition. Craig had been an early and creative competitor in distribution of European news arriving
in America by ship. His enterprise and his regular beating of the efforts of domestic reporters by
innovative methods including the use of carrier pigeons, private yachts, chartered commercial vessels,
and finesse of early telegraphic rules that came perilously close to criminality, led the NYAP to hire him
as its general agent (business manager). Within a few years, Craig saw opportunity and set out to create
a parallel and unaffiliated national commercial news service that would bypass the NYAP. The NYAP
believed it held a monopoly on news; Craig knew the news itself was valueless without a monopoly on
transmission. To participate in this new network, launched in 1866, NYAP member papers would need to
violate a contract clause that forbade them to subscribe to any other news service, but militant Western
editors facing a 25 percent cost increase for NYAP services were ready to do more than that. Murat
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Halstead, of the Cincinnati Commercial, and Horace White, of the Chicago Tribune, were delegated by
the Western association members to go to New York to try to negotiate a new arrangement; when the
NYAP refused to budge, the Western Associated Press fully embraced Craig’s new telegraphic news
feed. Historian Peter R. Knights explained in a deeply focused 1965 monograph that the first “press war”
showed WAP leaders that they held significant power to influence the news, but the two competing
news services overtaxed the ability of telegraph lines to carry their extensive reports. The Western
Union Company imposed a truce, and within a year, the NYAP made concessions to the Western
customers, Craig was out of the picture, and Western papers were back on the overall AP news feed.
The press war of 1866 had empowered owners and editors of papers on the periphery to think of
themselves as the equals of those in the metropolis of New York City, though, and a lengthy on-again,
off-again “war” between Eastern and Western news interests was launched.13
Just as membership in the NYAP had been crucial for major players in the East, a seat at the
table in the Western Associated Press was critical for the business success of any newspaper operation
with plans to be a major player in the West, where Chicago dominated as a network hub. Regional news
associations collected the news of their area and forwarded it to the NYAP; in making concessions to the
WAP, the overall Associated Press ceded business control of its membership to the regional associations.
This made the regionals the interface to the required telegraphic subscription to a national cable news
feed. Papers still relying on the postal exchange system, with its antebellum practices, found themselves
rendered irrelevant in the face of the speed and content carried by telegraph. At the same time,
obtaining membership in any of the associations was difficult and subject to strict competitive limits. In
the national Associated Press, in the later nineteenth century, a four-fifths vote was required to allow a
new membership. A new supplicant for membership might be voted down based on proximity to a
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competitor (often within a 50 mile limit, though 150 miles was considered too close in some cases) or
for being in competition within either the morning or evening publication cycle. 14
Victor Lawson’s business acumen and relentless energy no doubt helped WAP members select
Lawson to head the Executive Committee in 1881 at a time when the Western Associated Press was
again flexing its muscle against what it saw as Eastern domination. For the next three years Lawson
would work closely with fellow committee members Charles W. Knapp, of the St. Louis Republic, and
Frederick Driscoll (always referred to as “Colonel”), of the Saint Paul Pioneer-Press, making decisions and
steering strategy for the 57-member WAP. Correspondence shows him focusing on tactical operating
matters for the regional press association and on larger strategic, national, concerns of the
newsgatherers. Minutes of the January, 1892, meeting of the executive committee demonstrate a heavy
focus on the telegraph and on what seem to be isolated local matters. Driscoll, Knapp, and Lawson
discussed a new franchise for an unnamed paper in Devil’s Lake, North Dakota, valuing it at $1,500, and
agreed to establish an afternoon “pony” report for the Rockford, Illinois, Gazette at the rate of $25 per
month over and above normal telegraph tolls, with an extra $8 per month for an early morning report.15
The committee members also had to deal with apparent espionage or flagrant violation of the
Western association’s rules. An independent telegraph office in Kansas City, located across the street
from the Kansas City Star, may have been staffed by an unscrupulous operator, or the operator may
have allowed the Star’s reporters to loiter and overhear the news. Western editors worried that the
association’s reports that they paid for were ending up in the wrong hands. A petition to the WAP
demanded that the AP office be moved to the main Western Union telegraph company facility and that
14
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a Western Union operator take over the business of the Star office. The committeemen instructed
William Henry Smith, general manager, who managed both the NYAP and the WAP as well as their joint
business operation, to “secure the absolute separation of the lines and operating offices of the
Associated Press from any other Press Association, as far as may be necessary to prevent the report of
this Association from being overheard, or surreptitiously obtained.”16
The Western Associated Press had already attempted once to attack the New York AP in a news
war that commenced in 1882. The attempt was engendered through Western Union’s warm relationship
with the WAP and was led by William Henry Smith, whose business control of telegraphic
communication for newspapers was extensive and dated back to the early Morse franchise battles along
the East Coast. Coupled with the investments and political infighting of investor Jay Gould, the attempt
by the WAP took the NYAP by surprise, but the latter association was strong enough and took action
timely enough to create a news “peace” that would hold through the rest of the decade. During this
time New York leaders again sank into a form of self-interested myopia, while many of the original
spirits who had guided the NYAP to its monopolistic dominance left their newspaper roles, died, or
moved on to other business. Relatively unremarked in the wake of the peace agreement was the rise of
a new news service, the United Press (unrelated to the later United Press International of the twentieth
century).17
William L. Laffan was the management force behind the United Press. Originally an art critic and
then a railroad investor, Laffan earned his way into Charles A. Dana’s good graces (enemies said by
naming a locomotive after Dana) and became manager of the New York Sun. Cited by a gossip columnist
as a man who was roundly disliked for his “Yankee Shrewdness,” Laffan at the Sun took over an informal
special news service that had been started in 1882 by managing editor Chester Lord and others at the
paper and soon converted it into a strong, national news source. His motive was not lofty – Laffan
16
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wanted the cash being generated by the special service to go into his Sun accounts, rather than to the
men who founded the news special service. Dana would serve as the titular United Press president, with
Laffan as vice president and its true head, Walter P. Phillips as its general manager, and John R. Walsh as
treasurer.18
As the New York Associated Press looked inwardly, believing in its inherent dominance of news
based on its position at the commercial center of the United States, it tended to either ignore discontent
on the periphery or to use heavy-handed tactics by which remote news organizations paid the fare for
information that could only have been useful in New York City and environs. Meanwhile, the tendrils of
the cheaper United Press network, also New York-centric, crept further into the Eastern Seaboard, the
near West, and the South to papers not affiliated with the NYAP. Leaders of the Western Associated
Press, keenly interested in their own wellbeing, resented the high-handed actions of the New Yorkers
and chose to take independent action. The Westerners first overt act took place quietly in 1891 when
they incorporated a dummy corporation in Illinois on August 20 under the name of The Associated
Press. The purpose of the corporation, which would later prove to be a legal weakness, was to: “Buy,
gather and accumulate information and news; to vend, supply, distribute and publish the same; to
purchase, erect, lease, operate and sell telegraph and telephone lines and other means of transmitting
news; to publish periodicals; to make and deal in periodicals and other goods, wares and
merchandise.”19
The corporation was capitalized with $30,000 for three hundred shares of stock, 98 of them in
the hands of Azel F. Hatch, the brother-in-law of the WAP’s attorney, and one each in the names of
Vernon S. Barnes (Walsh’s private secretary) and Charles Huntoon, presumed by Lawson to be an
18
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employee of either Walsh or Scott. The three men met and elected themselves “directors” to fulfil the
legal requirements set by Illinois, and then quietly disappeared from the public record. “Of course the
purpose is to have the stock properly transferred to the newspapers who enter the Association, and the
board of directors of course will resign and make way for a bona fide board,” wrote Lawson to Knapp
the next autumn.20
With its business backed up by a safe haven for continuity, the WAP executive committeemen
could enter into the tough steps they expected to take to remove NYAP dominance over their
telegraphic news reporting. The joint operating contract with the New York players was due to expire on
January 1, 1893. Lawson and his companions were careful to make friendly noises within the joint
executive committee of the two wire services, but were also firm with the NYAP when it began showing
signs of preparing, itself, to thwart any upcoming split. When the NYAP began calling itself “The”
Associated Press and attempted to develop its own news agents in the Midwest, for instance, Lawson
reminded the joint executive committee of contract language specifically prohibiting the New Yorkers
from doing either the naming or the news sourcing within WAP territory.21
The Westerners also had to take care of the ticklish matter of William Henry Smith, business
agent for both the New York Associated Press and for the Western Associated Press. Smith was
gregarious, a great networker, and considered one of the most powerful news executives in America
when it came to press associations and the telegraph. Historian Blondheim cites a San Francisco Post
reference to Smith as a person who could make executives crawl, make men and women famous, and
one who “has got the attentive ear of more men and women than any other man in the country.”22
Referred to by the WAP executive directors as “William Henry,” Smith was both indispensable
and a tremendous weak point when it came to their intentions regarding the NYAP. Smith knew
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everybody, which meant that he also knew exactly where to retail the intimate business the WAP was
attempting to undertake. An independent operator by nature, he was famously fickle in his business
methods, and also touchy about his personal honor. Only Smith had the contacts and the bonhomie to
carry out the next step that Lawson, Knapp, and Driscoll intended – sewing up a quiet joint agreement
with the Southern Associated Press. Fortunately for Lawson et al, Smith’s weakness for flattery and eye
for the main chance gave them leverage. Despite strict rules to the contrary in his AP contracts, Smith, at
the formation of the United Press, had accepted a gift of several thousand dollars’ worth of UP stock.
Neither the gift nor more than $6,000 in dividends from the stock had been declared to either the joint
AP executive committee or the WAP executive committee. Smith’s transgression was brought forward in
WAP minutes as a committee assignment to force the agent to disgorge both the stock and the dividend
cash to the Western Associated Press as required in the WAP bylaws.23
The move to hook and silence Smith nearly blew up in the WAP executive directors’ face. Smith
had just resigned as Treasurer of the joint operation after twenty-one years holding both titles, and was
removed also as Treasurer of the WAP. A telegram about the removal and Smith’s shock at the WAP
insistence regarding his UP stock made the New York board suspicious. Solomon S. Carvalho, manager of
the New York World, was all for organizing a book audit of Smith’s NYAP accounts, which would have
revealed the Western situation. Lawson covered quickly, wiring William L. Davis personally at the New
York World to explain that WAP dealings with Smith were simply a matter of the Western board
selecting a new treasurer and ordering an expert accountant to check Smith’s records as part of the
handoff. “That has now happily been bridged over for the time being at least,” Lawson wrote Smith in a
letter marked “confidential” and which closed with the hope that none of the activity would affect
Smith’s “personal relations” with the association or its members. Lawson also complimented Smith on

23

“Minutes of WAP BOARD Jan 4, 5, 6, 1892,” Lawson MS, Box 2, Folder 4, p. 24, No. 25

155
his acquisition of the Indianapolis News, where the business agent apparently intended to install his son,
Delavan, as editorial manager. Smith had joined the ranks of Western AP publishers.24
There still remained a personal confrontation before Smith was finally disempowered by the
Western men. William Henry, stung at the WAP Board decision, had failed to follow through on initial
promises to hand over the stock and the dividends. Lawson and Nixon, taking advantage of attendance
at the joint executive board meeting in early May in New York, set up a meeting the following Monday
at Smith’s invitation. “Mr. Smith began by claiming that the resolution of the Executive Committee
under which Mr. Nixon and I were acting could only be construed as a reflection on his honor, etc., etc.,”
Lawson wrote. Smith had consulted privately with senior journalists, including Whitelaw Reid and Henry
Watterson, all of whom told him that he was being insulted. “He finally announced that he was still
willing to help the Western Associated Press in the great undertaking opening before it, but that respect
must be paid to his feelings, and people mustn’t persist in stepping on his corns, etc., etc., etc.” Lawson
continued, obviously unimpressed with William Henry’s honor. Nixon and Lawson palliated Smith by
explaining that there was nothing new or dishonoring in the WAP demand; Smith had previously said
that he would turn in his U.P. stock on several occasions, and now the Board was simply insisting that he
do so. “There was no demand in the resolution other than a demand that he should complete a
performance which he himself had voluntarily assumed.” Smith then told the surprised men that he no
longer had the stock shares, that he had turned them back to the United Press and could not produce
them. Smith was willing to pay the dividend money back into the WAP treasury, but only on his own
terms and in a way that would leave no record. The meeting took a significant amount of time, and the
two WAP representatives were put to the test to both conciliate Smith to keep him working with them,
and to be firm enough with him to prevent him from throwing his weight around. Smith, chastened, was
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a far different creature than William Henry Smith, power broker, and the WAP wanted to keep him
chastened.25
Creation of Exclusive Link between Western AP and Southern AP
At the end of the meeting, Smith showed the WAP men a letter signed by a large committee of
Southern papers. The letter showed that Southern editors were ready to let Smith negotiate for their
interests when it came to press associations. “The impression made on my mind at the time was that
Mr. Smith really has the inside track with these southern people, and that so long as he pretends to
work with us on the general plan outlined, and so long as we have confidence enough in his
representations to work with him, we shall be compelled to credit him with good faith and act
accordingly,” wrote Lawson. The general plan included bringing the Southern Associated Press into
alignment with the WAP both in order to cut off New York news domination of the South and to limit
the territorial claims of the United Press. If the U.P. could be limited to a territory stretching from
Virginia north, and from the Eastern seacoast to the Allegheny Mountains, then the Western service
could dominate the rapidly developing portion of the nation all the way to the Pacific. There was even
hope of turning the New York State Associated Press and the New England Associated Press into allies,
further extending WAP control. It was an alliance with the Southern organization that was most
important, though, and Smith held the keys to that alliance. In the same letter, Lawson revealed that the
intention of the WAP was to sever relations with the NYAP, but to keep the matter quiet. The two
executive committees would conduct negotiations with one another “touching relations after January
next,” but the negotiations would be delayed and protracted. National political conventions would
occupy June, and then the vacation excuse, “which is always of universal application,” would take up
25
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July, August, and September. “In October we can begin the work of negotiation and it will then be easy
enough to bridge the thing along until the first of January, when, in the language of William Henry
Smith, ‘two or three sharp orders (on his part) will settle the whole thing,” Lawson assured. Regardless
of formal meeting minutes or polite business correspondence indicating hopes for a continued
relationship, by May of 1892 the Western plan to separate was extensively detailed, at least in the
minds of the three-man Executive Committee.26
Lawson had laid out the general plan in an un-dated memorandum titled “Re-organization of the
W.A.P.” The document would serve as the basis of later formal letters to key individuals, but in its initial
form it shows Lawson’s orderly mind at work, totting up possible advantages and disadvantages in a
numbered list. The reorganization held no place for the New York Associated Press, but was predicated
on consolidating power and reducing expenses in dealing with the continuing presence of the United
Press. Freeing WAP members from the “extra assessment” they were paying to the U.P. for daily news
bulletins was crucial; in many cases where the U.P. network overlay the WAP’s Western Union service,
newspapers were essentially paying bribes to keep their “territory” exclusive by receiving redundant
news reports. Under a single header, Lawson listed the germs of four separate plans. The first was
“combination with 3 other associations,” while the second was “renewed alliance with New York” and
the third was listed simply as “Independent.” The fourth option, which would absorb a year’s worth of
time and frustration, was “Combination with U.P.” Under the latter option Lawson and his Executive
Committee friends intended activation of the new, national, Associated Press corporation, which would
then run the Western Associated Press until that entity’s charter expired at the end of 1893. The
corporate action, then, was predicated on two business expirations that would happen roughly one year
apart: the end of the ten-year “peace” operating agreement with the NYAP, followed by the end of the
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WAP and

its absorption of its business by the new entity, The Associated Press [referred to

subsequently as the AP].27
Under the heading “Advantages” Lawson listed eight points. While the first was establishment
of mutual financial interest, and another was the annual saving of $42,000 currently paid to the NYAP,
the key points were contained in items numbered 2, 3, and 6. The first two of those points were that the
W.A.P would secure absolute possession of its own news territory from Eastern influences, and that the
NAP would have the undisputed right (Lawson underlined the word) to gather and sell news everywhere
except in the U.P.’s diminished Eastern territory. A bolder vision was revealed In point number six:
“Combination makes practicable ENFORCEMENT [sic] of rules and regulations for government of the
business of news gathering and distribution throughout the country.” Compared to that lofty vision the
two disadvantages Lawson listed seemed minor – one was that the daily NAP telegraphic report might
be received undeservedly by some U.P. networked papers still operating in the old WAP territory, and
the other was that the U.P. would get a stock boost from the deal that would make a few men rich,
while any financial gain for the WAP would be diluted among many participants.
Work to cement the relationship with the Southern Associated Press continued throughout mid1892. Covering Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, the Southern association was larger and more powerful than either the New
York AP or the New England AP. It reached territory that demanded more telegraphic news than it
generated, but it was a territory that could be lucrative to its own members if they might remove tolls
they paid to both the New York AP and the United Press. Southern publishers were also interested in
fixing a number of network weaknesses in addition to saving money. Lines leading to New Orleans had
been disrupted by imposition of a low-speed cutoff to serve Vicksburg, where rural operators not only
slowed the news flow but also interrupted it repeatedly with business and personal messages. In a case
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that eventually had to be arbitrated, the Crescent City publications claimed they only received half the
news they paid for. New Orleans’ discomfiture over the arrangement was falling on deaf ears, and
several other city newspapers had similar complaints. Meanwhile the financially troubled Memphis
Appeal-Avalanche perplexed the news network. Its proprietor W.A. Collier retained personal bargaining
power within news associations and conducted constant warfare against New York interests, which
made him useful to the WAP, but the insolvent newspaper was years behind on paying its assessments
for news received, an unaddressed situation that weakened enforcement power against other papers
that might try to dodge payment. Several of the Southern editors were also prominent voices in the
national dialogue concerning journalism, among them Adolph S. Ochs, who served as secretary for the
Southern association. Ochs, publisher of the Chattanooga Times, would purchase the New York Times in
1896; as secretary, he largely represented the Southern Associated Press in its negotiations.28
The WAP work came to fruition on October 18, 1892, when a secret “Memorandum of
Agreement with the Southern Associated Press” was entered into the WAP records. Under the
agreement the U.P. agreed to give up all revenue it might have made from the Southern territory, and
claims to that territory, in exchange for an annual $20,000 payment for Eastern news delivered to the
South. The Western association was represented by “William Penn Nixon [president], Victor F. Lawson,
Frederick Driscoll and Charles W. Knapp, representing themselves and their associates, who propose to
organize The National Associated Press.” This was the tipping point that Lawson had been engineering.29
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Lawson explained that the situation was fluid and that nothing firm had been negotiated for the
WAP at the time, but that the New York Associated Press was in trouble. “The New York Associated
Press is doing a number of things that are improper, and, in fact, that are in violation of their obligations
toward our Association under the contract,” Lawson wrote n a confidential letter to A. J. Aikens, of the
Milwaukee Evening Wisconsin, sent just before the Southern AP agreement. Without specifically listing
the NYAP infractions, he noted that management of the NYAP seemed to have fallen into the hands of
“Mr. Howland, representing the New York Herald, Mr. Carvalho, representing the New York World, and
Mr. Jones of the Times,” implying that their management was corrupt. Carvalho and Howland, who was
chairman of the Joint Executive Committee of the two associations, he wrote, seemed to be trying to
bluff the WAP in negotiations. The Westerners in turn were demanding at least equality with the NYAP
in any future business, but Lawson hinted that might be a moot issue: “The New York Association is
making a great mistake. In fact, we believe it is approaching disintegration,” he stated, adding that the
NYAP was losing its leading members (including Whitelaw Reid) and had lost control of its monopoly on
European news from the Reuter/Havas/Wolff news service. Without Western subscribers, the NYAP
would not be able to renew the crucial European contract. With all of these weaknesses showing, the
WAP instructed its president, Nixon, to serve formal notice to the NYAP that the contract between the
two associations would end on January 1, 1863. In reassuring Aikens, Lawson revealed a lot of
information but did not show his full hand. The NYAP was not “disintegrating” so much as being taken
apart by the WAP.30
On October 20 and 21 letters, overnight messages, and telegrams were sent to up to 40 leading
members of the Western Associated Press urging them to come to an October 22 conference to be held
in a parlor at Chicago’s Grand Pacific Hotel. Many of the messages ended with the words “do not fail, on
any account, to be there.” With the Southern agreement in hand, Lawson was eager to gain approval of
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a compact to cement the business of the U.P. and the WAP. In the hotel parlor and remotely, by proxy
or by telegraph, thirty-four “first-class” members of the association voted to join such a compact.
Lawson and the executive committee could move into negotiations to finalize the U.P. relationship and
to end that with the NYAP knowing that the WAP membership was united behind their leadership.31
The New York leadership was not sitting still for this, however. Gaining information of the
Southern negotiations and other maneuvers through personal connections and an article in The Editor,
the Publisher, and the Journalist, NYAP leadership fought back. Its first attempts to establish its own
news bureaus in the Western territory and to style itself as “The” Associated Press had been brushed
back. Howland, chairman of the NYAP joint committee, attempted to schedule a meeting timed to
disrupt the WAP’s October gathering, but was rebuffed in this by Lawson. Meanwhile, news came from
William Henry Smith that the New York men were trying to claim that the WAP owed the NYAP a
significant amount of money related to proceeds from the Pacific Coast and Overland wire service. More
than that, the New Yorkers (no doubt seeing an inside job) were attempting to remove Smith from his
position as General Manager. In a stern letter to Howland, Lawson reminded the NYAP that Smith could
be removed from the NYAP rolls, but could not be fired from the joint business operation without a
decision by the Joint Executive Committee. Writing for the WAP, Lawson said: “The Committee is now
prepared to consider our relations with the New York Associated Press. Precedent however, to such an
action, we must have a satisfactory adjustment of the relations of the past ten years.” Struggling to
move nimbly against the well-planned onslaught, the NYAP found itself instead bogged down by
safeguards originally intended to protect its own dominant position. Lawson and the WAP had studied
the rules carefully during the interlude since the press wars of 1866, and knew how to maneuver now
that their network and territory were secure. He rejected an NYAP offer to meet in Chicago or to have
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any special executive sent from New York to engage in a business dialogue. Lawson turned the clumsy
NYAP claim of money owed to it into a pretext to cut off discussion: “Nothing can be done … until we
have received and considered the claim,” he declared.32
As the Chicago leaders were holding off NYAP overtures, Lawson wrote a lengthy evaluation of
the situation to Reuter’s news agent in the United States. The Western intention was to sidestep both
NYAP and U.P. attempts to monopolize the European news by establishing their own separate contract
with Reuter, which would connect them to French and German news agencies as well. Under the
opening “The Associated Press situation is now as follows,” Lawson explained that the Western
Associated Press would not renew its New York contract.
The New York Associated Press is not the strong ally it was ten years ago, either as to its
membership or its personnel. It has lost the Sun, and will lose The Tribune after the
presidential election. Mr. Dana and Mr. Reid alone – among the New York people –
understand the Associated Press business . . . this leaves the management in the hands
of the present Executive Committee – the Herald, World and Times. The Times, since
the death of Mr. Jones, is administered by his son and son-in-law, neither of whom has
had any personal experience. This leaves the administration to the Herald and World,
neither of whose proprietors live in this country. They must act through their employes
[sic] . . . the newspapers of the Western Associated Press and the country at large
cannot afford, and will not longer continue, to be placed at the manifest disadvantage of
such an unequal and hampering partnership.33

Lawson’s frank outline shows what must have been a long-formulated argument against the NYAP. Had
there ever been a true news association “peace?” Whether one had existed or not, the next section of
his extensive letter to Mends showed a matter-of-fact declaration of what he intended the news
association of the future to be. Once the new Associated Press was in place, consolidated with the
United Press, they would make a truly national news service. The consolidated association would
operate in all fifty states and territories; its contracts would forbid receiving or delivering news to any
“paper, person, or corporation not in friendly alliance with it.” The old NYAP would be cut off while the
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new consolidated service would flourish, using the United Press’s inexpensive leased telegraph lines to
give superior service even within areas the NYAP could still reach. “The result will be that … we shall
shut out the New York Associated Press from collecting or selling news in thirty-nine of the fifty states
and territories,” he declared. The victors in this bloodless contract fight would be magnanimous to their
defeated opponents because room was being made for most of them to join the new Associated Press.
“They will therefore suffer no loss in the receipt of news, but they will cease to mismanage the press
business of this country, to the great damage of the American press.” Lawson’s anger at the New York
dominance dissipated when he envisioned the future for his new organization. Making news flow over a
telegraphic network based around Chicago rather than New York was not the aim. With Reuter’s service
aligned with the newly emerging Associated Press, world news dominance might be at hand. “Such a
contract will literally place a complete news girdle around the earth,” Lawson wrote, urging early action
and signing himself Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Western Associated Press and member
of the Joint Executive Committee governing the New York Associated Press and the Western Associated
Press “under present contract.”34
Lawson must have shared this vision with others, at least with Knapp and Driscoll, but the
specificity of his goal in his description to Knapp does not occur in other communications of 1892. Later
writing, particularly by Melville Stone in the 1920s, created a different and less-specific history of the
emergence of the Associated Press, one that labeled its actions as a spontaneous revolution. In a speech
titled “The Revolution of 1893,” Stone recounted that brave Midwestern newspapers reacted to bad
men in New York, one a banker, another a telegraph operator, and a third a New York newspaper
business manager, who conspired against freedom of the press. “These men were responsible to no one
and were bent only on money making. The menace was obvious . . . the public was subject to any sort of
misinformation.” The demands of citizenship meant that it was up to the Western men to save
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Americans from losing the “fundamentals of our form of government” by placing new-gathering into the
hands of a “purely cooperative organization.” In likening the acts of 1893 to the American Revolution of
1776, Stone clearly went overboard – a news combination, while of the utmost importance to the Press,
was hardly a matter of intense public interest. Stone’s linkage of the news network to citizenship
responsibilities, however, shows that by the end of this study’s period news professionals viewed
themselves as an indispensable part of the national structure, one working in a network that was not
aligned to a particular party or political outcome.35
The ousting of the New York Associated Press was no overnight revolution and was instead a
series of carefully planned chess moves, no matter what Stone remembered later. With notice served to
the NYAP that the WAP would sever relations at the start of 1893, Lawson next moved to safeguard the
emerging Associated Press and to cement the consolidation of the United Press. Now he wrote to
influential editors and publishers to flesh out his earlier memorandum of advantages and disadvantages
with more financial detail. The new structure would eliminate $250,000 to $260,000 in U.P. costs
currently being paid by WAP members; combined with the $42,000 in savings from eliminating the NYAP
annual charge and the $20,000 expected from the Southern association, minus certain expenses, the
new association could show a $260,000 to $300,000 financial advantage, he wrote. This financial coup
was expected to remove some of the sting of the inevitable centralization of power that the Associated
Press would create. Lawson recognized that the collection of strong, independent minds that ran the
nation’s top newspapers was unlikely to welcome a change in its broadly democratic way of doing
association business. The so-called “Detroit town meeting” style used by the WAP to manage itself in
the past revealed weakness, though. He feared that the U.P. was already maneuvering to sow dissension
in the ranks of the newly forming AP. In a telegram to the San Francisco Chronicle publisher Michael
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Henry de Young sent at the end of October Lawson warned that old cronies from the New York
Associated Press, now working on the United Press side, were known to be trying to split the Chronicle
off from the WAP. “I understand they have failed with McLean of Cincinnati Inquirer, and do not believe
they will succeed with Chicago Tribune . . . if all our members remain true to the Western Associated
Press I am very confident New York will have to meet our reasonable terms,” Lawson wired, warning
that a split in the WAP ranks would mean “long and expensive warfare” with the rival news service. The
motif of warfare would appear more and more in correspondence and meeting minutes of the WAP,
and Lawson’s hopes regarding the Chicago Tribune would be dashed – that paper did defect, and its
individual decision to go it alone left the Chicago men with the insecurity of a potential enemy and spy
in their midst over the crucial year to come and afterward in the protracted struggle between the AP
and the UP.36
Recognition that other newspapers might be able to do to the AP, what the AP was doing to its
fellow associations, shows that the power of the telegraphic network was clearly understood;
meanwhile, the provision of news itself as a commodity demonstrates that the emerging AP
management was not focused only on getting the story, but on professional direction of news flow. This
is a highly advanced concept requiring a very high level of organization. Newspaper editors and
publishers may have remained idiosyncratic, colorful, violent, and fallible – M.H. de Young, for instance,
was called a newspaper blackmailer and had been shot and wounded on the street in 1884 by sugar
company owner Adolph Spreckels over personal attacks made in the pages of the San Francisco
Chronicle -- but what their association was achieving transcended personalities and political
alliances.The meticulous planning that the Executive Committee had put in place led to telegraphic
network steps being taken as 1892 wound to a close. In November the Western association cut off news
feeds from areas in the South, particularly Memphis, to the New York Associated Press. The New
36
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Orleans papers, previously mentioned, created a clamor that nearly undid the Southern AP by
demanding to join the Western AP – this was resolved by Lawson getting a joint contract for the United
Press to serve New Orleans, relieving the Southern representatives of fear that the WAP was making
incursions onto their turf. At the same time some Northern papers contacted Lawson urgently to note
that a new competitor seemed to be making inroads in WAP territory. This was the Press News
Association, later known as the Telegraphic News Company. Lawson revealed to the worried editors that
the “new” competitor was actually an arm of the WAP/AP venture. The Press News Association was
created to provide newspapers that could not join the Associated Press with a limited news feed, one
that would keep them happy and put them on a telegraphic news network without allowing them to
compete with the member papers. Lawson explained that in Chicago his two evening competitors, the
Mail and the Dispatch, were subscribers to the service. “It is foolish to think in this day of cheap
telegraphy we can absolutely stifle competition. The next best thing, and the practical thing, is to in a
large degree control it,” he wrote, asking his recipients to keep the information confidential.37
By mid-November, the Western Associated Press leaders were testing to see if the New York
press leadership would simply accept the new association structure as a fait accompli, or whether they
needed to prepare for a press “war.” William Henry Smith, angry at being fired by the NYAP, clamored
for the WAP to cut off its telegraphic news feed to the NYAP. Lawson telegraphed Smith to say that such
an action would be “impracticable” both physically (because of extensive telegraph interconnection with
NYAP member papers) and legally – the WAP contract wouldn’t expire until January and the WAP didn’t
want to give the NYAP any legal handholds to use against them. At the same time the WAP was in direct
contact with James Gordon Bennett, warning the Herald publisher to desist in trying to organize a NYAP
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Western news service. Describing the business moves made by the WAP, Lawson invited Bennett to
accept the inevitable and have individual New York City papers join the new AP. “When you cease to get
western news from our papers as an association you will not be allowed to get it from the individual
members and clients of our Association,” Lawson write Bennett. In separate messages to WAP
members, Lawson stated that it was time for WAP representatives to go to New York for a face-to-face
meeting with the enemy. The executive committee members needed to see how close their opponents
might be to folding. A meeting of the nine original stockholders in the new Associated Press would be
held in Chicago on November 29, and the next day a meeting of the old WAP was scheduled to be held
in Detroit, and each of those meetings needed to take up the business of ending the NYAP.38
In the end, it was William L. Laffan and the United Press who capitalized on the situation created
by the WAP. On December sixth William Henry Smith notified Lawson that Laffan had issued UP
franchises to the Herald, the World, and the Tribune, and that a meeting of the NYAP was scheduled for
the next day. “The World will move, and the Tribune second, the transfer of the New York Associated
Press to the United Press,” Smith wrote. Minutes of the final meetings of the NYAP entered as evidence
in a 1902 court case show that on December seventh it was unexpectedly revealed to board members
that the Herald and the World had already agreed to accept United Press stock worth $72,500 each, and
that the World took the stock because it estimated it would cost $100,000 per year to resist the Western
Associated Press. Some members of the NYAP were shocked that the others had abandoned the
association and bartered as individuals. Carvalho told them that an attempt to meld the NYAP with the
UP had already failed, though it would have been desirable from the standpoint “that it would appear
there never had been a combination rather than a surrender.” However, the telegraph would have given
that point away, he noted, because the NYAP news would obviously have come from the United Press
38
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network. When Elliott F. Shepherd, owner of the Mail & Express, asked for a day to see if he could
arrange for some way to continue the NYAP’s business, he was turned down; Stone, of the Journal of
Commerce, said that it was wise to simply “accept the inevitable.” Lawson, receiving repeated telegrams
from New York, noted the NYAP board actions in detail and declared that the NYAP was dissolved. In a
letter to Driscoll on December eighth, he wrote “the funeral ceremonies are to come off at another
meeting to-morrow,” adding in a postscript that he had just heard that the NYAP had released the New
York state press association and that the new Associated Press had made a contract with them for
$25,000 per year. “The Herald this morning booms Dana for United States Senator. Herbert de Reuter
cables congratulations on the result. I guess we are all right.”39
Telegraph messages went out from Walter Phillips to the United Press in New York to former
NYAP clients in Philadelphia, Washington, and Baltimore, offering to continue service to them, and
Phillips, himself a trained telegraph operator, testified that “they gave ‘O-K’ to it.” John Walsh
telegraphed Lawson, meanwhile, to let him know that Phillips and Laffan had taken over NYAP
operations. “The best of feeling prevails on the part of everyone . . . Nothing is printed anywhere and we
are pledged to a generous silence about the whole thing.” A giant had tumbled, demonstrating that the
continued expansion of information distribution channels could not be ignored and that the reach of the
telegraph and the demand for commodity news outweighed the specific geographic placement of any
newsgathering organization.40
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While the “best of feelings” might prevail at the opening of 1893, Lawson and the WAP faced a
huge amount of work. The old WAP organization would run in parallel with the new Associated Press for
a year as that association developed its bylaws, recruited and accepted new members, and solidified its
business structure and obligations. The anticipated good feelings between the UP and the AP
disintegrated quickly, and the idea of a business treaty consolidating the two associations died as Laffan
and elements of the old NYAP membership attempted to jam the Western Associated Press into a legal
corner in order to discomfit the new Associated Press. WAP books lodged in New York were stolen as
part of an effort to show that the United Press, successor the NYAP, was owed a huge debt for telegraph
services provided but not paid for. Lawson, repeatedly bargaining with Laffan and Phillips both in person
in Chicago and remotely in New York City, remained encumbered with “our friends, the enemy.”
Individual publishers and editors within the Associated Press ranks themselves created huge
distractions, both intentionally and unintentionally, and behaved with maddening slowness when it
came to signing on as members or complaining against other potential members. Rumors surfaced
throughout 1893 that either the AP had “swallowed” the UP or vice-versa. By February of that year, the
good fellowship that had marked January had broken down so much that UP treasurer Walsh, the
former conduit of information, now accused the Western Associated Press of trying to destroy the UP.
Michael de Young, the Chronicle publisher, poured oil onto the flames when he visited New York and
declared to the United Press that they were to go out of business and “explained to us what was to be
our lot and how complete were the plans of our western partners for our humiliation and extinction.” At
a painstakingly arranged February fifteenth meeting with Laffan, the United Press vice president refused
to answer any of the questions brought by the Western men, instead saying that Dana had forbidden
the consolidation arrangement from going forward. The reason for Laffan’s silence was explained when,
that evening, the WAP executive committee was served with a legal summons. The old NYAP interests
sprung a New York State Supreme Court case on the Western Associated Press based on the stolen
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ledgers. If this was news peace, it was a messy sort of peace, and Lawson could be forgiven for seething
in efficient indignation. On March tenth he wrote to de Young about “our friends the enemy,” explaining
that “We are very likely to have a brush with New York, but history will only repeat itself and we shall
come out on top.” He also revealed an epochal change in business management; William Henry Smith
would not lead the new Associated Press operation, and with Smith’s amicable consent Melville Stone
would serve as business manager at a salary of $10,000 per year.41
Antagonism between the two associations surprised and angered some outside observers, such
as Herbert de Reuter, who offered to bargain separately with the Associated Press. De Reuter’s reaction
was the Associated Press’ gain; Stone, sent to Europe to negotiate an exclusive contract with Reuter’s
and with secret authorization to spend up to £5,000 (approximately $746,000 in 2015 dollars) for the
privilege. Walter Neef, formerly the NYAP agent in Britain, had already accepted Lawson’s commission
to represent the new AP, and with his friendly introduction Reuter’s management agreed to the contract
for just £3,500. Neef was immediately appointed the formal European agent for the AP and Stone was
authorized to spend up to $4,000 to secure headquarters and execute European contracts; the AP
membership paid a special assessment of $50 to support this activity.42
Apparently unaware of the damage they were doing to their own cause, United Press leaders
continued making on-again, off-again demands of the emerging Associated Press. The reality gradually
sank in that the two business models, one a mutual benefit association, the other a for-profit news
service, were antithetical. Laffan and Phillips tried to renegotiate a possible consolidation based on
telegraph contracts in May, 1893. They proposed to abandon a telegraph contract made with the
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Baltimore & Ohio railroad and split the short-term gain with Lawson and the AP leaders. Such short-term
money schemes were not part of the Associated Press vision, which had grown. Lawson now suggested
that the United Press give up territory in British North America and along the Pacific Coast. Phillips, of
the UP, blustered that the Western Associated Press was trying to beat down UP revenues and that it
was a case of accept or fight. Driscoll wrote to Lawson to warn that attempts to make a deal with the UP
were doomed. “Bear in mind, it is not as though we were treating with honorable gentlemen . . .
whatever course we pursue, we are bound to receive severe criticism.” The possibility of consolidation
was waning with the introduction of personal recriminations.43
In the midst of it Joseph Medill of the Chicago Tribune notified Lawson that the Tribune would
not support a campaign against the UP, stating that the Tribune needed the UP’s Eastern news more
than it needed membership in the AP, and warning that two or three other papers would defect from
the WAP if the Tribune went out. Lawson met personally with Medill to smooth the matter over, but it
was clear that a decision point had been reached. One more effort to mend fences with the UP was tried
with a July counter-proposal to the earlier May offer made by Laffan. Laffan rejected it, saying that too
much time had passed. On July 20, the executive committee met and adopted a motion authorizing
Lawson and Stone to take action to “protect the news service of the Association by providing an
independent foreign and eastern service if necessary.” In a later motion, the committee informed
William Henry Smith that the Western Associated Press would cease its news service after July 31. From
that date, The Associated Press would go it alone, shedding the last vestige of its Western limits,
ignoring the United Press, and forming a truly national news service.44
Lawson saw this not just as a business contest, but as a fight for the soul of American journalism
itself. He told S.H. Kauffman, of the Washington, D.C., Evening Star, that he sincerely believed it was: “A
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contest for the independence of the American press as against the possibility of autocratic domination
of two or three individuals. There is much more – very much more – in this question than may appear at
first thought. The question at issue involves, not so much the matter of individuals, as of basic principles
which vitally affect our newspaper properties, and it is no exaggeration to say also go to the question of
American citizenship.”45
If a few newspaper publishers and editors working for personal profit could put a news service
at the convenience of a political party or a particular candidate, or to support monopolistic business
interests, then the network effect of news could be used for corrupt purposes. Lawson girded the AP for
war. A campaign among stockholders raised a fund of more than $300,000 for contingencies in the fight
against the UP, while a series of letters, telegrams, and delegations was sent out to enlist Eastern
seaboard papers to defect from the UP and join the new AP. The Baltimore Sun and American and the
Philadelphia North American were among those specifically approached, while others among the forty
who had continued their former NYAP relationships with the UP were also targeted. AP bureaus were
set up in Washington and New York by October, and Lawson promised satisfactory Eastern news service
as well as foreign service. By December, Lawson estimated that the UP’s revenues had been diminished
by some $300,000, even allowing for the few papers that had defected from AP ranks. “The inexorable
logic of arithmetic is now involved in this situation, and its laws all make for the success of the
Associated Press and the more or less failure of the United Press as a competing service,” he promised a
Philadelphia editor, and “our friends that enemy are in a very troubled state of mind.” The news
association fight was still intense enough, though, that some AP management telegrams were sent in
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code, including one of January 22, 1894, that obscured names but still revealed that the news fight
would be carried on to the finish.46
The fight guaranteed that the United Press model of a for-profit, tightly controlled news agency
would not prevail. By late 1894 Victor Lawson, now signing himself as president of the Associated Press,
would tout the AP as a mutual cooperative association with equal rights for all shareholders.47 It was
“Already ‘the most powerful news-gathering organization in existence,’ and . . . will surely become the
sole dominating national news-gathering organization of this country. If there are other associations,
they will no [sic] be competing associations.” In 1897, the United Press, bowing to the AP power, went
into receivership, eliminating the last vestige of the NYAP’s once-dominant structure. More had been
achieved than the dominance of one association over others, however. Melville Stone noted that in
newsgathering and distribution the AP would “sell no news, make no profits, declare no dividends, but
should be the agent or joint reporter of its members.” In doing so, the AP imposed a new standard for
brief, factual, and unbiased news. Stone viewed it as essential to national self-government that citizens
receive the news and then make up their own minds. “The Associated Press might tell the story of a
robbery, but it was not permitted to say that it was wicked,” he wrote. Stone returned repeatedly in
speeches, published articles, and an autobiography to explaining that the power of a national network
made opinions too powerful to be allowed. He believed that professional, objective, and timely news
was fundamental to citizenship. That news entered the Associated Press network at many different
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places, and its power came from the far-flung sources on the network rather than from any
concentration in a particular metropolis.48
It was ironic, then, that the success of the new Associated Press ran afoul of Illinois law.
Incorporated as an organization to sell news, produce newspapers, and run telegraph lines, the
corporation was sued in Illinois by newspapers unable to obtain full membership. State law there did not
have any provision for an exclusive corporate franchise, but New York State, much more friendly to
specialized business legislation, already had useful laws on the books for just such a case. Though
operating from Chicago, in 1900 the Associated Press dissolved its Illinois corporation and its members
joined The Associated Press, incorporated in New York.49
Few histories of the Associated Press give Victor Lawson much prominence, befitting a man
whose primary work was as an eminence grise behind a national movement. Lawson himself avoided the
limelight. He had newspapers to run in Chicago, and his work throughout the engineering of the
Western Associated Press’ successful campaign was related to correspondence to key people who could
make things happen, the smoothing of ruffled egos, and the careful positioning of business support for
events to come. He was a man of great depth, as his voluminous correspondence shows, and he seems
to have concealed his overall vision in a way that let others – Smith, Stone, Driscoll, Knapp – appear to
be the primary movers. It is no surprise that Lawson is not better known. He ran the Chicago Daily News,
which grew to be one of the nation’s biggest and most influential newspapers, in the same way. When
Lawson died in 1926, TIME Magazine featured business obituary articles on both Lawson and New York
Sun owner Frank Munsey. In a four-page column titled “Genius,” after describing Munsey’s up-anddown career, TIME’s writers remarked that Munsey had lived as part of the “big world.” Lawson, labeled
the “builder” of the Daily News, left his newspaper to be a religious and charitable trust. It was one of
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his few plans to fail – banks didn’t want to run his trust, and the Congregational Church was not suited
to make publishing decisions. “Both men realized the difficulty of passing on titanic newspaper
properties. Mr. Munsey consulted friends. Mr. Lawson consulted nobody,” wrote TIME. 50
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CHAPTER 7 RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Far from anything the size of the Chicago Daily News, The Print Shop at The Henry Ford’s
Greenfield Village in Dearborn is crowded with iron machinery and type-cases. It is a delightful exhibit.
Two page prints of the “Montrose Democrat Newspaper” hang from drying lines overhead. There’s a
Prouty Power Press No. 1 from the 1880s with its enormous hand wheel and flat paper feed mechanism,
a typical press for a country newspaper. The exhibition is centered on a Hoe “Washington” single-sheet
press made in 1858. The arched press sits bathed in the light from a broad paned window and its
traveling feed table with its bright white frisket makes a slow journey into and out of the press where a
small set of type creates a modest handbill. Around the press are related implements for display – inking
equipment, two composing sticks, a page proof quoined in a type frame, and some scattered type.
“Imagine taking all of these tiny little letters and lining them up to try to make a page,” says an
interpreter to a visiting family on a hot summer’s day. “Why, I couldn’t even tell you if this one is a ‘u’ or
an ‘a.’” She goes on to tell them that it would take hours to put together a single page, and then
demonstrates the press by running it through a cycle and stamping out a piece, pulling the press lever
while stating “three hundred pounds per square inch.” The happy daughter of the family receives the
still-sticky handbill, and it’s off into the July afternoon, with a mental picture of a newspaper print shop
as a tediously quaint place where things happen slowly and fussily.1
The Henry Ford has made an intentional interpretation of American late nineteenth century
work in its Liberty Craftworks section.2 Even for a rural print office, though, the folksy interpretation
shortchanges the reality of communication work of the 1880s. The Prouty press would have been awash
in activity, with a printer overseeing inking and feed operation while a helper cranked the big wheel at a
1
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rate of three hundred impressions an hour. The Hoe “Washington” would be pounding out job printing
work briskly – business cards, sale flyers, stationery -- while the real heart of the print shop would be the
type cases where a compositor, holding the mechanical composing stick in his left hand, would be
reading a longhand document and filling line after line with nimble fingers at the rate of at least thirtyfive words per minute. There would be no question of which piece of type was an ‘a’ and which a ‘u,’
because their position in the type case guaranteed the letter. Many editors, Horace Greeley among
them, could compose directly to the stick without writing down their thoughts, assembling the lines of
type in mirror image with apparent effortlessness. Visitors to Greenfield Village are intrigued with the
final mechanical process of a system that was run by experts, but the thump of the hand press places
the nexus of press work at the wrong point. It is the copy being printed, and not the press itself, that
shows the heart of the matter. News in the later nineteenth century was a system fed with copy by a
business workforce of dedicated writers, led by professional editors, and one that had little patience
with the idea of bucolic craft work. It was an industry that had its own professional publications, such as
The Journalist, founded in 1884. In cities from Cleveland to Chicago and St. Louis, in the same era being
shown at Greenfield Village, steam-driven Hoe rotary cylinder presses were imprinting thousands of
pages an hour in an automated system very close to that used by letterpress operations of the late
twentieth century. With some flamboyant exceptions, editors thought of themselves as being in what
has more recently been termed “the truth business,” and the increased flow of information delivered by
networks spread that business widely. Increasingly, the copy flow threatened to overwhelm even the
fast steam press; it even threatened to overwhelm the capacity of the eventual reader.3
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Historian Frank E. Fee, Jr., has demonstrated that antebellum newspaper editors and publishers
were already thinking of themselves as members of a profession and were holding gatherings to discuss
and impose sets of ethics meant to improve the quality of news and the image of newsmen. Long before
the 1877 establishment of the American Newspaper Publishers association there were serious statewide
and regional attempts to do what Fee has quoted as “exalt the profession.”4 The scale of the news
industry demonstrated in the previous chapter regarding the takeover of the Associated Press shows
that by 1890 newsmen were organized on a business basis and were manipulating capital as well as
technology to control a complex cooperative venture. Such a large effort required structures, staffing,
and dedicated executive leadership, all of which were similar to the most complex industrial businesses
described by Alfred D. Chandler in The Visible Hand. At the national level the creators and distributors of
news in the late nineteenth century behaved more like executive staff of the Pennsylvania Railroad than
they did like Samuel Clemens’s idiosyncratic editor in his essay Journalism in Tennessee. “While he was
in the midst of his work somebody shot at him through the open window and marred the symmetry of
my ear. ‘Ah,’ said he, ‘that is that scoundrel Smith of the Moral Volcano—he was due yesterday. And he
snatched a Navy revolver from his belt and fired,” wrote Clemens in his guise as Mark Twain. In Twain’s
writing the news business was rendered as a comedic series of social and physical attacks based on
personality, a mode which followed his own hapless journalistic adventures in frontier mining towns and
in the newly-developing West Coast. Twain’s frontier experiences were the source of much of the
humorous and self-deprecating lecture material that later made him famous, but they have left an
exaggerated cultural picture of the foibles of the average newsman. To be sure, general managers and
divisional superintendents of the news agencies remained colorful and individualistic, but their
employment was specific to the flow of news itself rather than to the generation of copy. Mass media
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historian Betty Houchin Winfield argues that true journalistic professionalism only arrived after 1908
with the founding of the Missouri School of Journalism, but the nature of corporate journalistic
businesses seems to argue otherwise for the industry long before the turn of the century. Metropolitan
daily newspapers of the time, even those of secondary cities, look like vertically-integrated corporations
in which specialized workers, from day-laboring delivery boys up through executive editors, dealt with
every phase of news creation and distribution in assembly-line form. Paper came in at the bottom of the
building and left as a news product to be sent by surface transportation to a chain of sales agents and
representatives. The news itself entered and left the building partly by means of the telegraph network
(and, after 1881, by telephone as well). Special departments dealt only with subsets of the news
assembly process – typesetters, pressmen, compositors, engravers, copy editors, even the staff who
broke down dead type and washed it in lye to ready it for another use, all had full-time specialized jobs
that did not include news reporting. Operating these diverse departments required intermediate
specialists such as managing editors, the very emerging managerial class that Chandler focused on as a
harbinger of modernity.5
Manton Marble certainly considered that he was entering a profession when he graduated from the
University of Rochester in 1855 at age twenty. A letter of recommendation from university president
M.B. Anderson written on Marble’s behalf affirmed that he had exhibited “integrity diligence and talent.
His scholarship is exact comprehensive and thorough. He is a clear facile and elegant writer.” After
extolling Marble’s taste in literature and art, Anderson noted “His knowledge of the world is beyond
most young men of his age. He proposes to become a journalist.” The university president
5
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recommended Marble as perfectly equipped to become an assistant editor. Other friends of high status
pitched in to help Marble realize his ambition as well. His minister, Rev. William Hague, introduced him
to the publisher of the Boston Courier, and the editor of the Rochester American sent an open letter
praising Marble’s newspaper work. Stating that Marble was a “favorite contributor,” C.P. Denny
explained that Marble was acceptable not only to the editors but also to the readers. “Consider him
eminently adapted to the life of a journalist,” the editor concluded. The letters reveal no surprise that a
university man would go into a news career, but they also show that there was an accepted picture of a
particular skill set that identified a journalist. Marble was hired by the Boston Journal, but his ambition
quickly led him to seek a position in New York City.6
In 1858 Marble successfully campaigned for ‘a position’ on the New York Evening Post with
many letters of recommendation from friends and mentors. He simultaneously sought assignments from
Boston editors, proposing regular submission of letters about New York life to George S. Hillard,
associate editor of the Boston Courier. Hillard turned him down, writing that “We are a good deal
pinched for room, and men of business would not read letters from New York, if they were as good as
Mad. De Sevigne’s,” but a later letter showed that Marble was writing about New York state
government for the Courier.7 In the next year he submitted a series of articles to Harper’s Magazine
based on western travels undertaken as the Post’s reporter.
Marble helped found the New York World in 1860. Established with political funding from the
Democratic Party, the paper was meant to be the public voice for the national Democratic platform, but
Marble also recognized that it needed to follow sound journalistic rather than political principles. A
letter received from Caleb S. Henry, editor of the New York Review magazine, reminded him that the
newspaper’s success depended on “the stockholders giving the absolute, entire & unrestricted control
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of its columns to a competent editorial body – organized and managed by some one editorial chief. If
they meddle with it . . . it will fail.” Marble set up that body and became its chief, adamantly referring to
himself as the proprietor of the World and its sole owner after April 12, 1861. Rivals at the New York
Times and the New York Tribune repeatedly attacked the newspaper’s backing, asserting that it was
secretly owned by Democrat Fernando Wood or partially funded by Copperhead interests in the North.
The World’s attacks on what Marble viewed as the excesses of the Lincoln administration got the paper
labeled a “semi-secession sheet.” In a plaintive letter to the Henry J. Raymond of the Times, Marble
wrote “I am the sole proprietor of the World. You will do me the justice to say so in the Times, will you
not?”, and added that the ongoing Civil War made newspaper quarrels “of all things most disquieting
and impertinent, nor are they ever welcome to my taste.” The audiences of the competing papers would
hardly have believed that polite correspondence could flow between the heads of ferociously rival
publications, but Raymond in a return note made gentle apologies for the public accusations. He
explained that they had occurred while he was out of town and unable to review the work of an
associate editor, and stated “I sympathize fully with your dislike of personalities and am resolved (so far
as my subordinate in my absence & the general casualties of a newspaper office will permit) to live at
peace with all my brother Editors.” The antagonistic public face of rival newspapers was often a façade
that disguised professional operating courtesy between management teams. One example occurred
when a correspondent from the New York Herald was taken prisoner by Confederate forces at Front
Royal in spring, 1862, leaving the Herald cut off from news of the operation or the fate of its reporter.
The World cordially sent information about the correspondent’s captivity to managing editor Frederic
Hudson, receiving a note of thanks in return. Not all of the cordiality would be viewed as above-board
today, though it does show how close-knit the New York editors could be; in May, 1863, editors met to
agree to an across-the-board rise in circulation prices.8
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What Marble thought of the professionalism of journalists is interestingly revealed in an
exchange of letters that began in Spring, 1863, between himself and the father of a would-be journalist.
E.D. Beach had sent Marble a selection of his son’s articles and poems with an eye toward getting the
young man a job in journalism, and Marble treated the request with seriousness, reading and
commenting on the selection. On May 21 he wrote back to Beach to praise the literary quality of the
son’s work, but added:
Many trials of young men, some as promising as he, have led me to hesitate in
inferring what I may loosely call ‘newspaper ability’ from the possession of ‘literary
ability.’ The one requires not merely such judgment tact and prudence as come hardly
otherwise to the most gifted men with experience and years, but also so much
acquaintance with affairs, with men, with the relations of men to events; requires much
long training in what seems to most clean and well-educated young men the mere
drudgery of a newspaper office that I have known many of them to break down in the
first year of such a trial who were most anxious to undergo it and who possessed all the
necessary literary ability which could be expected or desired.9
Marble went on to warn that only one in twenty men who tried to become journalists were ultimately
successful, and that the field required extraordinary dedication for scant pay. Marble would have felt
that keenly; he himself was taking a below-normal salary of just $3,500 a year in order to keep the
World budget balanced, and the World’s senior editors made no more than $2,000 annually.10 “It is not,
I am sure, any desire to represent the profession of journalist to you as something mysterious and
extraordinarily difficult” that led him to warn the father off, he wrote. Other careers were more
rewarding for less work. Journalists had to show the same industry and enterprise as any merchant, had
to be aware as any politician of a fickle audience, and as wise as a judge. “The function of the journalist
is in no way different from that of the statesman, except in this, that his judgment must be quicker and
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of its expression there can be less reticence because his paper is published daily and the people soon
forsake a paper which is not prompt.” Papers, in the meantime, were engaged in an explosive expansion
of coverage that challenged journalists at every level, Marble declared.
Without committing ourselves to the dogma that all editors are wise men, I make no
doubt that you will agree with me when I say that the wisest man [would find] scope
enough for all his wisdom if he chose to be an editor. The modern newspaper has grown
to be such an omnium gatherum that no department of human activity is out of the
range of its camera or remains foreign to its intelligence.11
After this thorough description, Marble offered to give the boy a trial if he wished to try out the
challenging but bleak profession that he had described. Later letters show that the son came to New
York and interviewed with Marble, but once back at home politely declined the opportunity.
Other Marble correspondence shows the administrative tasks that beset the growing news
organization. A subordinate, D. G. Croly, wrote to resign his editorship in order to work for a competitor,
and Marble made counter-offers to keep him. Eventually a salary of $40 per week in gold, or $70 in
greenbacks, lured Croly back into the fold, but with a promise to give up outside writing contracts. “I
promise responsibly not to write any more for the Round Table, Sunday Mercury, or any other paper,
but to devote my whole energies and time to the World,” Croly promised, assuring that he would earn
the World at least four times as much as his new salary would cost. Proposing a number of staffing
changes, Croly assured economy. “I will try to get the most work done for the least pay of any first class
office in the city,” he told Marble.12 Croly would be one of the few staff in the World office when federal
soldiers occupied it in May to suppress publication after the “Bogus Proclamation” incident, and a string
of notes and letters shows New York editors working together through the Associated Press to craft a
collective mea culpa to President Lincoln and Secretary Seward. An almost comic June letter from the
World Washington D.C. agent in charge of military correspondence demonstrates the sometimes absurd
difficulties of maintaining far-flung reporters. George W. Adams had telegraphed his resignation to
11
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Marble and sent a follow-up letter to express his frustration. Reporter after reporter had been sent to
him from New York City, demanding horses, provisions, wages, and other expenses, but none of them
had obtained the necessary passes to go to the Army front lines. When Adams didn’t give them any
cash, the enterprising would-be reporters bought things anyway, simply expensing them to the World.
The most recent reporter sent to him had cost hundreds of dollars and only after equipping him was it
realized that he had already been ejected from Army correspondence once and would be subject to
court-martial if he returned a second time. Adams was frustrated and furious; Marble had to sooth him
by telegraph and letter to retain his services.13
Problems with correspondents weren’t limited to wartime emergencies, but were perpetual, as the
1869-70 letters of Whitelaw Reid show. Reid got his start as an enterprising Washington Civil War
correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette, one whose ideas of reporting went far beyond partisan
puffery or slavish devotion to a particular politician or general. In the early days of the war Reid had
broken the rules by reporting on shoddy uniforms, defective equipment, and contaminated rations,
provided to Ohio soldiers sent to the field. His authoritative reporting of Washington affairs and later
military campaigns gained him a national following, and his articles appeared under the byline “Agate”
in many major newspapers. After the war he came to work for Horace Greely as editor of the New York
Tribune.14
Reid’s extensive business correspondence exhibits a professional executive newsman at work
dealing with reporters and molding and shaping the business of news coverage for an imagined
audience. On October 6, 1869, he orders an internal employee not to accept special telegrams without
checking with him first; on October 8, Reid sends a confidential note to a fellow editor concerning a
former reporter (“I doubt whether he will suit you. He wasn’t a first-class reporter, and we dispensed
with his services because we could do better”), admonishes a lazy reporter (“Your dispatch arrived 36
13
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hours too late, and was wholly anticipated by the arrival of the paper from which you made it up”), and
counsels a peer not to try to find editorial work in New York (“Our office is overrun with people on
temporary service. None of them able to get assignments enough to make fair wages”). The letters
reveal a community of skilled workers in a professional field who had to be taken seriously but also
collegially. On October ninth, Reid thoughtfully but firmly answered an apparent complaint from a
Washington, D.C. , reporter who disliked the way his articles were headlined, pointing out that news
must be tailored to its readers and not to the whims of its reporters. “It would not be good journalism –
at least it would not be good New York journalism – to print the matter about the Cuban Revolution
under one head and the most important facts that you give concerning it under a separate head,” Reid
wrote. His concern to teach the business of journalism demonstrates a broad approach to a discipline
rather than a tactical focus on resolving a single staff problem.15
Reid was a politically active public figure in New York City, and as such was frequently skewered by
political commentators such as Thomas Nast, who always drew Reid as a waspish, exotic, and gangly
figure obsessed with political plotting or isolated in an untidy world of his own. Nast’s obsessive dislike
of Horace Greeley may have simply been expanded to include his chief henchman, but as a public figure
Reid stood as a representative for the adversarial press.16 Within the Tribune’s operations, though, Reid
stands out more as a benevolent but firm patriarch. He hired wartime peer Bradley S. Osbon at $30 per
week to cover naval news, even though there was a “lack of special interest in naval news on the part of
Tribune readers,” because the newspaper’s city editor boosted Osbon’s abilities so highly. “I am sorry
that I cannot make you a better offer than this, but it is really an addition of so much to the share of a
department which is already drawing more than its just proportion of the amount of money at my
15
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disposal,” Reid commented. Departmental budgeting is scarcely the sign of an infant press, and Reid’s
attention to detail on expenses and salaries was considerable. In a letter to Johnny Reinhauser, a boy
learning bookkeeping in the Tribune’s offices, Reid announced a dollar raise in his weekly pay and
promised more in the future if his abilities improved. At the same time, he warned that an “old Tribune
man” had said: “The Tribune was a great place for spoiling boys and that he had known a great many
promising boys who worked here ruined. I don’t think there is any danger of you, but remembering
what has happened to other will do no harm.”17 Encouraging the work of young employees was one
place Reid could put his budget dollars; another was development of the vast network of stringers and
occasional correspondents who contributed to the paper. The Tribune tended to pay from fifteen to
thirty-five dollars for outside contributions – Maj. John Wesley Powell received the higher figure for his
article on exploring the Colorado River, while the editor of the Williamsport Daily Gazette was offered
the lower figure for local coverage of a murderer’s execution. “The Tribune, as you know, doesn’t go
very largely into reports of this sort. We would not care to make more than a column out of it, including
the telegraphic dispatch reporting the execution,” Reid notified the Gazette editor.18
In handling this web of correspondents Reid shows unique attention to the development of female
reporters. In November of 1869 Reid asked the powerful head of Western Union, Anson Stager, to
intercede with staff at the telegraph company’s Cleveland office on behalf of a woman journalist who
would be covering the Woman’s Suffrage convention for the Tribune.
We send a young lady, Miss Hutchinson, who has done a good deal of reporting . . .
Won’t you do me the kindness to give your operators special instructions that these
reports may not be delayed, as young ladies are not in a general way specially familiar
with the business of crowding forward telegraphic dispatches and watching the sharp
tricks of their antagonists. Perhaps a little kindness in this way may be of special value,
and will be gratefully appreciated.19

17

Reid to B.S. Osbon, letter of Oct. 14, 1869; Reid to Johnny Reinhauser, letter of Oct. 15, 1869, Reel 3, Reid MS,
LoC.
18
Reid to managing editor, Daily Gazette, letter of Nov. 18, Reel 3, Reid MS, LoC.
19
Reid to Anson Stager, letter of Nov. 21, 1869, Reel 3, Reid MS, LoC.

187
Other female journalists received support from Reid as well. He wrote to Susan B. Anthony to
introduce “Mrs. E. Wilmington [who] comes to you as a correspondent of the Cincinnati Enquirer,” and
asked Anthony to help explain the suffrage movement to her. Reid was against votes for women, but
cheerfully stated “She little knows what an alien and hopeless reprobate I am in your eyes. Pray make
her confidence in me good however to the extent of giving her all the information you may and
converting her if you can!” And in another case Reid offered significant encouragement to Philadelphia
contributor Rebecca Davis, saying that three recent articles (on temperance, a political figure, and a
women’s rights convention) “were good. I don’t mean to say that others have not been, but these were
notably so. Some disappointed outsider said lately his succeeding had to hit the bull’s eye of The
Tribune’s mark: you hit it each of these times. Pray do so again.” These communications belie the image
of the news business as unwelcoming to women’s contributions.20
Riding herd on the mistakes of remote reporters was another significant responsibility for Reid,
indicating the extent of the network that brought in the news. In an early 1870 telegraphic exchange
with John Russell Young, head of the Associated Press Washington, D.C., bureau, Reid found his patience
sorely tried. The Tribune had wanted a report of a ball held in honor of England’s Prince Arthur, but
Young telegraphed back that he couldn’t secure a reporter for the event. Reid sent a telegraph
demanding the coverage and followed with a hot letter laying out newspaper expectations of a remote
bureau. “The matter wanted was simply a column account of the ball, a thing which any newspaper m
an can do and which there is not a reporter in the city department of the Tribune who would not feel
himself abundantly competent to undertake,” he wrote. He then launched into a critique of the bureau,
where he felt the bureau chief ought to personally be doing more reporting work. “You have a strong
force on salary. That force is abundantly able to do much work which I find you have been engaging
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outside parties for.”21 Young was not the only target of Reid’s remote ire; the ubiquitous Henry O’Reilly,
now out of the telegraph-building game and instead acting as the Tribune’s Albany governmental
correspondent, received constant chivvying. O’Reilly’s lack of success demonstrates how the journalism
game had changed from its earlier years in the 1820s and 30s, when he had served as editor of the
politically Democratic Rochester Daily Advertiser in New York state.22 O’Reilly’s skills were not up to the
reporting load demanded of modern journalists. It had been unwise to send the aging speculator as a
journalist despite his longtime political ties and his early editorial-writing experience. O’Reilly tended to
either send too little material, or to send too much on topics that weren’t particularly newsworthy. He
regularly missed the messenger assigned to carry his dispatches or was so far behind in writing them
that the messenger was late for newspaper typesetting deadlines. When O’Reilly did come through with
something useful, other newspapers generally had beaten him on the stories or sent more stories on
other relevant topics. Even O’Reilly’s physical writing was not up to snuff, and Reid had to admonish him
that reporters needed to write their dispatches legibly in ink and only on one side of the page –
typesetters could barely make out O’Reilly’s pencil scrawl covering both sides of each sheet. As
frustrating as O’Reilly was to Reid, the blundering legislative correspondent caused the editor to reveal
fundamental journalistic reporting principles as he instructed him in his job:
As to the suggestions for which you ask, perhaps you cannot do better than to
compare the amount of news received by the Tribune from Albany with the amount
received by other papers, The World, Times, Sun & Herald during the present session.
The difference you will observe consists mainly in foreshadowing the legislative events
to happen which those correspondents have been able to make and in their familiarity
with the gossip of caucuses, talk about organization of committees, feeling of members,
&c. &c. Some of these things are not of special value, but yet the readers of The Tribune
wish to have as much news indicating present and future operations in Albany as any
other papers.23
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News now was a specific commodity and simple personal musings on legislative subjects was not
useful, while O’Reilly appeared to hew to an earlier understanding that a correspondent’s role was to
focus deeply on matters of personal interest. Reid had to warn O’Reilly not to be too credulous of
politicians who would use him as a megaphone for political party purposes only. The reporter also had
to be able to multi-task; it did no good to have a single long feature on an abstract subject, such as
canals, when other newspapers were receiving multiple different stories from the same legislative
session.
Finally, Reid had to deal with the enterprising nature of news reporters who would take a salary
from one agency and then illicitly send their material to several competitors. One such was New York
reporter George H. Stout, a Tribune employee who was detailed to work on Associated Press copy.
Rumor had it that Stout was instead helping build up an independent New York News Association to
compete with the A.P., and doing so by sharing telegraphic dispatches. In late January, 1870, Reid fired a
warning shot in a letter that inquired whether Stout was giving telegraphic news to papers outside the
Associated Press. “I should be glad to avoid this subject but the matter is forced upon me,” he warned,
citing complaints made to him about Stout. By February confidential letters from Reid to A.P. editors
showed that Stout had not complied, and that an investigation showed the reporter had been working
to become chief agent of the new news organization. The problem was that firing Stout as a Tribune
employee would “throw him into their arms,” while retaining Stout would antagonize other A.P. clients.
In a series of letters marked “private and confidential” Reid discussed either turning Stout into a doubleagent of sorts, or holding the reporter in a form of employment limbo in which the Associated Press
could decide whether he remained a Tribune employee or not. “Stout appears to be the one we want to
fight the association,” Reid told J.W. Simonton, but at the same time had worked industriously for six
months to overthrow the A.P., which meant that agency was the more injured party. No letter resolving
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the issue was found, but its picture of entrepreneurial treachery within news organizations indicates the
complicated balancing acts that managers had to maintain.24
The New York press was the heart of the nation’s news network for the bulk of the nineteenth
century, but examples of the growth of press professionalism were not limited to the metropolis. In
Louisville, Kentucky, Col. Henry Watterson held sway at the Courier-Journal in a career that left him
considered one of the deans of American journalism by the early twentieth century. Many newspaper
editors and publishers styled themselves as “colonel,” but Watterson was the real thing, having served
on Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s staff in the Confederacy’s Western armies. Known as “Marse Henry” in an
unapologetically racist and patriarchal time, he had edited the Chattanooga Rebel during 1862 and
1863, moving the newspaper operation in a box car as Northern forces pushed inexorably southward.
Watterson never repudiated his service to the Southern cause, but as editor in Louisville he sought
national reconciliation and became a leader of American thought and an ardent admirer of the legacy of
Abraham Lincoln. No fan of the “lost cause” narrative, he was impatient with attempts to resurrect the
conflict between the states. He refused to take up quarrels, as when in answer to a 1920 letter from an
attorney seeking to establish that Abraham Lincoln was illegitimately fathered by John C. Calhoun,
Watterson brusquely directed his secretary to send the man a copy of his laudatory Lincoln oration, and
the secretary, G.E. Johnson, scrawled “Ansd. Fully” on the letter in blue pencil.25
Watterson was known for employing ten or more editorial writers for the Courier-Journal, and he
wrote many essays on the field of journalism and journalists. Watterson’s work was eagerly sought by
national newspapers, and James Gordon Bennett sought his input for the New York Herald seemingly
whenever an epochal event occurred in the journalistic world. Telegrams came to him from France to
ask for a review of the Chicago political convention in July, 1892, and to ask for an authoritative obituary
24
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on Charles A. Dana, owner-editor of the New York Sun, on his death in 1897. His correspondents ranged
from Jefferson Davis (who wrote in 1877 asking him to employ a former Confederate soldier as a
reporter) to Andrew Carnegie (who in 1911 urged consumer protection through government price
regulation of business combinations).26
Watterson considered himself a news professional from an early date. Immediately after the close
of the Civil War he landed a temporary writing assignment for the Cincinnati Evening Times, a paper that
he described as a placid money machine for its owner, Calvin W. Starbuck. When the Times’s head
editor drowned in a boating accident Starbuck hired Watterson to replace him, saying “I propose to hire
you as an editorial manager. It is as if building a house you should be head carpenter, I the architect.” 27
That idea of editorial management stayed with Watterson as he and two partners revived a Nashville
newspaper, The Republican Banner, and then later when old Confederate associates urged him to come
to Louisville to take over editorship of the troubled Journal. Both the Journal and its competitor, the
Courier, offered Watterson an ownership stake and the post of sole editor, but after reviewing the
books of each he pushed for a combination of the two papers, a move that he secured with a
combination of a shrewdly-conducted newspaper circulation ‘war’ and financial bluff that nearly
bankrupted the Journal but finally convinced the Courier’s owner to give in, with the combined
publication appearing in November, 1868. After two years of holding a news monopoly in Louisville,
Watterson realized that the real value to the newspaper was not in having a captive audience for
circulation, but in managing the flow of news through licensing out the Courier-Journal press association
feed. “We found that at least the appearance of competition was indispensable and willingly accepted
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an offer from a proposed Republican organ for the Press dispatches which we controlled,” he wrote in
his autobiography, continuing “Then and there the prosperity of the Courier-Journal began, the paper
having made no money out of its monopoly.”28 An 1882 letter from the newspaper’s president Walter N.
Haldeman to Watterson shows that management of news distribution remained at the core of CourierJournal business operations, with extensive discussions about the length of time The Louisville
Commercial should be allowed to contract for dispatches and a suggestion that Watterson should
contact “Hueston of the Ass. Press, or Jones of the Times, or Hurlburt, and learn their method of
supplying N.Y. papers out of the Assn with news – for how long a time do they get to contract, &c, &c.”
The franchise service for the Commercial was valued at $25,000 and would be provided at $30 per week,
representing six percent interest on the total amount.29 Far from quaint Americana, this was hard-boiled
business involving news as a paying commodity. Watterson attributed the overall change to the Civil
War: “At its close new conditions appeared on every side. A revolution had come into the business and
spirit of journalism,” he wrote.30
Watterson was a major player in this new business attitude, and he was also involved in attempts to
safeguard it through securing federal copyright protection for newspaper articles, shown in an 1885
letter from Roswell Smith, president of The Century Company in which he wished Watterson well for
passage of “your bill for copyright on newspapers.” Newspaper articles under the exchange system had
been considered fair game for any user, and many purchasers believed ownership of a single copy of a
paper entitled them to ownership of its contents. According to Melville Stone, general manager of the
Associated Press, it was “the invention of the electric telegraph and the consequent development of
newsgathering” that created a new copyright problem. “Unless a book or painting was registered,
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publication was equivalent to abandoning the author’s rights,” Stone wrote in his memoirs in a chapter
titled “Property in News.” But to register a work and retain copyright to it in the nineteenth century
required that the printed title, two copies of the work, and a fee had to be presented to the Librarian of
Congress. The cumbersome process simply could not work in the case of news dispatches. The copyright
problem was not resolved until after the 1909 revision of copyright law specifically mentioned
newspapers, but attention from individuals such as Watterson and Stone show early professionalizing
attempts to regulate journalistic production work.31
The elaborate and formal structure of newsgathering and dissemination at the agency level also
demonstrates a commitment to press professionalization, as witnessed by the printed annual
reports of the Western Associated Press. Fifty-two papers were represented at the 1869 general
meeting of the association, which heard motions relative to admission of new newspapers into
membership and continuation of the New York Associated Press relationship for news distribution.
The twenty-page printed report of the meeting included detailed information of cable charges and
news fees being paid by the Western association: $42,000 as an annual subscription for dispatches,
twenty percent of the cost of California dispatches, $8,000 per year for the exchange of American
news, and a quarter of the expense of European cable news in excess of $150,000. At least $55,000
would be spent by the cooperative on news transmission. Charts provided by the general news
agent William Henry Smith showed total expenditures of more than $148,000 in 1867, more than
$158,000 in 1868, and an anticipated $158,000 in 1869, with a total of more than seven and a half
million words of news transmitted over the nearly three-year period. “There has been less political
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and more general news than during the same months of the preceding years, and the character of it
has been superior, though not in all respects what it should be,” Smith reported. More words were
being sent from the West to the East, though this was due to “the carelessness and verbosity of the
reporters . . . I have taken steps to correct this evil,” Smith said, and noted that a program was
underway to educate news agents and to curb reporting. The association was entitled to send eight
thousand, seven hundred words a day, and Smith was determined to make each word count.
Internal education, specific monitoring of transmissions, and exact reporting are further marks of
the professionalism that was being imposed on news flow. “I have repeatedly invited the attention
of reporters to the importance of being the first to make announcement of news, as the saving of
time is what gives to telegraphic communications their superior value,” Smith intoned in his report.
Clearly, this was a managed and modernizing operation conducted by dedicated staff, the harbinger
of a corporate approach to the news. Editors attending the meeting not only viewed themselves as
intimately connected with one another, but authorized the generation of a single journalistic
standard for news sent over the wires.32
That news was serving a burgeoning number of newspapers. Census data shows that from an
1850 total of some twenty-five hundred newspapers of all kinds, by 1880 there were more than
eleven thousand. Nearly one thousand of the 1880 total were daily newspapers, up from two
hundred and fifty-four in 1850. Even cities of small population were represented with two or more
newspapers, though the barriers to entry were increasingly high after the 1870s. The Chicago Daily
News was started when Melville Elijah Stone, Percy Meggie, and William L. Daugherty invested
$6,000 in 1875. Their first typesetter and compositor, Andrew Blainey Adair, later reminisced that
the operation leased a 21-by-21 foot space at the back of the fourth floor of 123 Fifth Avenue, and
that the newspaper’s major possessions were 150 pounds of minion-sized type, another 150 pounds
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of agate-sized type, and fifteen fonts of display head letters. Printing was done on a drum cylinder
press, one side at a time, and the papers were hand-folded and sent out in bundles of ten or twenty
in the hands of newsboys whose cry was “The daily nous, wan cent.” The building also housed the
composing room for the Morning Courier newspaper, an unaffiliated printing business that made its
money by buying early morning copies of other Chicago papers, plagiarizing their lead articles, and
issuing a later-morning edition of the copied stories.33 By the 1890s, such a startup was far more
difficult to accomplish; historian Gerald Baldasty estimates it cost half a million dollars to start a “big
city” newspaper by the turn of the century.34 The cost for presses had grown from thousands to tens
of thousands of dollars and the acceptable processes for printing were vastly more complex, while
organized skilled trades boosted wage expectations and the necessary expense of access to news
agencies, telegraph and cable lines, and professional staff made the ease of earlier startups seem
improbably simple. Part of the drive for this came from vastly increased commercial advertising,
with revenues that finally freed many newspapers from depending on their circulation price alone
for support, but that also changed the dynamic of what counted as success in the news business.
Advertisers sought out larger papers that would bring them contact with more potential customers,
a benefit to larger newspapers but an immediate challenge to smaller and startup operations. The
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advertising presence also contributed to the business shift of the newspaper for its operations that
separated editorial leadership from daily affairs of the paper.35
The public was aware of the increasing professionalization of the news in the late nineteenth
century, and in nostalgic longing for ‘the old days’ showed that they were not entirely comfortable
with the new conservative modes of coverage that were emerging. “The impersonal and commercial
journalism changed completely customs and conditions,” wrote historian James Melvin Lee in 1917.
His history of American journalism deplored the 1880s-1890s transition of the newspaper editor
from supreme commander of his publication to an executive functioning within the management
structure of a publisher. “After he ceased to have the controlling interest, it passed into other hands
represented at official councils by the business interest,” Lee wrote. Readers who had formerly
bought the day’s paper because of a close interest in an editor’s thoughts now received a cold
summary of news events. In Lee’s thinking, this separation of the business office from the editorial
one created editorial professionalism by limiting the responsibilities of those handling the news.36 In
Lee’s description It was a necessary transition due to the increasing complexity of the newspaper
business, but not a positive one, an opinion shared by many observers. Senator Knute Wilson
mourned the new professionalism in a public letter to eighty-year-old Henry Watterson. “Our great
newspapers of today are wholly impersonal. One scarcely knows who the editors or chief writers
are: and, moreover, the editorial matter of today is much inferior, both in quantity and quality, to
that of the old time,” Wilson declared.37
The dubious public welcome to the effects of a professionalizing press is intriguing because a later
generation of commentators would celebrate the transition as a hallmark of responsibility and as
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the move that positioned American newspapers (and, by implication, “the news media” including
radio and television) to serve as a bulwark of freedom and citizenship rights. Modernists of the later
twentieth century would dismiss the wild excesses of the early press as primitive evolutionary steps
toward the full-news ideal of later times. Yet it was already a professionalizing press that
incorporated new college-trained journalists, new photographic reproduction technology, new press
and production technology such as the linotype, and new communication tools such as the
telephone and the teletype. The influences of faster and broader communication bandwidth led to
an impetus to professionalize, and nineteenth century participants in the industry did so
intentionally, knowingly, and introspectively. The early participants knew that they were losing
something in the transition, but they recognized its progress. John Hay, writing to Henry Watterson
in 1902, thanked him for sending a selection of articles. “I have read with great interest, and with
the sense, which is continually darkening around me, of the rapid shrinking of my horizon,” Hay said.
He might have been speaking for a generation of earlier editors who recognized that their former
mode of work was done.38
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

On a 1902 summer vacation in Maine, Joseph Pulitzer decided that it was time for journalists to
go to college. “My idea is to recognize that journalism is, or ought to be, one of the great and intellectual
professions,” he wrote in a memorandum of his thoughts in seeking to endow a program at Columbia
College in New York City. Predicting complaints that journalism was a mere business and so could not be
numbered among collegiate professions, Pulitzer preempted future challengers by saying that so was
the Church, and statesmanship, and literature. All of them involved business methods and practices and,
like newspapers, could not help being involved in business. “To differentiate between journalism as an
intellectual profession and as a business must be a fundamental object,” he wrote. Pulitzer repeatedly
referred to journalism as a profession in his memorandum, and at the end of it concluded “I cannot help
thinking that there is no profession in which every student of the United States is more directly
interested.”1
The idea of achieving a university imprimatur on professional journalism had been around for a
long time. Whitelaw Reid had recommended it as early as 1872, though his ideas met with scorn from
others in the field such as Frederic Hudson who felt that only participation in the press could give a
reporter the special training that was needed. Communication historians have made much of the
university school of journalism as the harbinger of maturity for the press, and the early twentieth
century blossoming of schools of journalism gives a convenient threshold to date the objective and
respected press of the later century. Labeling the advent of the modern newspaper this way also
conveniently purifies the excesses of Yellow Journalism and the press’ jingoistic and self-serving role in
bringing on the Spanish American War; such behavior can be dismissed if it is attributed to a preprofessional time when journalists were not subscribers to a gentlemanly set of university-specified
1
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ground rules. But historians using this demarcation ignore Pulitzer’s own use of the word “is” in favor of
his “ought to be.” Pulitzer viewed journalism as a modern profession at the time that he conceived of his
college program. What he wanted was reporters and editors equipped with a deeper background and
more skills in finance, constitutional traditions, history, and economics, among others. This academic
knowledge would supplement education in practical journalism and editing so that newspapers would
have a ready-made cadre of employees to deal with the increasingly complex coverage needs they
faced. The New York World’s owner in the new century thought that the profession needed betterequipped reporters, and knew the demands that news coverage presented no longer allowed for the
lengthy period of training “drudgery” that the World’s founder, Manton Marble, once described to a
would-be journalist.2
There is another problem with taking the founding of university journalism schools as a
departure point, and that is their own slow acceptance. Pulitzer’s eventual $2 million grant to Columbia
College only took effect in 1912, a decade after Pulitzer’s founding memorandum and after the
publisher’s death allowed college leaders to establish its operational rationale free from Pulitzer’s micromanagement. The Missouri School of Journalism had its beginning in 1908, and others soon followed -Winfield notes that two dozen college and university programs formed over the next twenty years.3 The
contention that university-trained professionals significantly changed journalism is correct in the long
run, but the establishment of a school is a vastly different thing than its graduates having an effect. It
would take years before even the earliest graduates of the first schools would be in a position to have a
major impact on news and news coverage; an even longer time before these graduates would become
lead editors, city editors, managing editors, or publishers able to put their new thinking to work making
formative changes to the news environment. By that time newspapers faced a new contender,
broadcast radio, and another wave of technological change was speeding up the news cycle. Though
2
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contemporary organizational scholars, such as sociologist W.B. Elkin, viewed journalism as disorganized,
primitive, and chaotic, newspapers did not mark time waiting for university graduates to come and
change the profession.4
Newsmen remained dubious about university-trained journalists and about university programs.
The difficulty was not so much that the graduates would be academically overqualified, they argued, but
that they would not emerge with a profound sense of what made news. Melville Stone, who sat on the
Missouri school’s advisory board, worried that the academic approach to the news business was likely to
teach excessively liberal ideas based on socialist theory. In a 1922 speech to the Michigan Press
Association, he warned that a school of journalism was useless unless it taught history, citizenship, and
“something of our civilization and our peculiar form of government.” Otherwise, Stone felt, simply
reading the newspaper itself might be a better indoctrination to the profession.5 Stone’s writing shows
him to be a deeply conservative man with a practical business sense and a pragmatic view of how to get
things done. He reveled in the so-called “old boy” network of the time and plied associates with favors,
receiving many himself, to accomplish journalistic purposes. Stone and leaders like him had little
interest in an academically-led structure producing a new crop of idealistic reporters. They were already
working for an ideal of their own, epitomized by the Associated Press and its mission of conveying
unbiased information in terse and compact form by the most rapid means possible. The telegraph
network made newspapers into business outlets selling a perishable commodity, wrote historian James
Melvin Lee: “Shop-worn goods the merchant can sell at a special sale to bring at least the cost of the
production, but stale news a publisher cannot market at any price,” he explained.6
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This focus on freshness and speed in the news originated with commercial demands for
information that moved markets, as has been shown with reference to the early competition that
formed associations like the Harbor News Organization in New York City and its offshoot the early New
York Associated Press. War with Mexico, continued Western settlement, and the California gold rush
provided increased pressure for rapid access to news in the 1840s, and the contentious political events
and sectional tensions of the 1850s only increased the appetite for current information. It was the Civil
War, though, that brought together the elements needed for the full flowering of the news. The
importance of wartime events and the hunger on the part of millions of home-front readers for quick
word of distant battles and army movements coupled with availability of the telegraph, the railroad, and
the steamboat to move messages regardless of expense. The war destroyed ordinary rules and barriers
to participation as well, allowing recruitment a new group of young reporters access to cover the most
important events, eclipsing the old-school correspondents and political operatives who once provided
remote copy to editors. An even younger corps of new technology workers emerged to staff the
telegraphic network with its wartime demands – the telegraph became fully diffused as an innovation
during this time and those who understood it best and manipulated its technology were mere
teenagers, their age identity hidden behind miles of wire and their operating identity represented by the
speed of their telegraphy and their on-wire “fist,” or the way that they operated the telegraphic key.
Journalism historian David Mindich argues persuasively that governmental administrative use of the
network to manipulate public opinion and to conduct the vital business of the war transcended the
partisan press strictures that had prevented a truly national audience from forming. News services and
the telegraph now “delivered a single message to newspapers of all political stripes,” and dispatches
from the administration created a “shared discourse” that both heightened the power of the executive
and created a federal audience.7 This may not be quite the triumphalist achievement that Mindich
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makes it, shadowed as it is in Roland Barthes description of state power as reliant on the national press
to uphold the government as the ideal of efficiency, and Michel Foucault’s concept that journalism in
idealizing the state gives inherent legitimacy to some sources while de-legitimizing others. The
emergence of a truly national discourse does represent an evolutionary climb upward and one that built
a foundation for national dialogue to underlie the purely political or sensationalistic coverage of the
earlier press.8
The end of the war left readers with a new way of looking at the news and new expectations for what
constituted news. An expectation was set that a newspaper would have its own reporter in the field as
an authoritative source on major events, or that a vetted authoritative source from a news agency
would report as a substitute. The enterprise required of reporters during the war – writing dispatches
while riding on a train headed toward the nearest telegraph access, sending those dispatches at any
hour of the day or night, working and scheming to beat all other reporters – did not dissipate with the
passing of the war. The cadre of successful wartime correspondents continued to look for new
applications of their skills, and the rise to management of many of them staffed newsrooms with
professionals who expected equal enterprise from their staffs and who had seen the benefit of applying
new technology in creative ways.
The end of the Civil War left a vastly enhanced communication network that had been built
largely with government dollars. It was rapidly awarded, gratis, to private industry, returned to its
original patent rights holders in such a way that monopolistic consolidation was quickly effected. The
rise of Western Union over all other telegraph competitors was swift and thorough, and the unique
relationship between the wire carrier and the news agencies that used it led to professional standards
and new expectations for what constituted regular news business practices. As the minutes of press
associations show, the hand-in-glove relationship between the telegraph companies and the news
8
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organizations was carefully monitored, extensively analyzed, and deliberately constructed. The fact that
the Western Associated Press knew what its word flow was between east and west, and that its agents
trained reporters to maximize effectiveness while minimizing the number of words actually sent, shows
a managerial dedication to an enterprise that is far from chaotic. That this paralleled the continuing
postal newspaper exchange program demonstrates that newspapers depended on networks to feed the
vast appetite for copy; recent academic work tracing “viral” news stories gives evidence of the
interconnection of news organizations across geographical barriers and demonstrates that important
relationships were based on trustworthiness of the news delivered from one paper to another.9 This is
far from the “objectivity” standard that became so important in late twentieth century news analysis,
but it does represent a hewing to fact-based and spare journalistic writing whose practitioners prided
themselves on removing “opinion” from their transmissions.
This transition toward factuality bolstered the public effect of the growing news network, which
was to increase trust in reporting and the validity of any particular newspaper despite its avowed
political leaning. In doing this the newspapers created national community. At a time when personal use
of the telegraphic network was still prohibitively expensive, the newspaper traffic democratized the
network by giving readers virtual access to their national brethren. A resident of Des Moines, now on
the national transcontinental wire, could envision a direct connection to the doings of a resident of New
York City or the decisions of representatives in Washington, D.C. The newspaper, at a few pennies a day,
gave cheap access to the results of the most advanced forms of communication. As one commentator
pointed out, individuals by the 1870s no longer wondered how the telegraph worked, but simply
expected that information would fly from one end of the system to the other. The magic of real-time
communication promised so elaborately by Morse with his “What hath God wrought?” public relations
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magic had become a commonplace phenomenon, but largely through vicarious experience in the proxy
of the newspaper.
The unintended consequence of ubiquitous rail and telegraph networking was the
destabilization of previously accepted geographic strictures, epitomized by the takeover of the New York
Associated Press by the Western Associated Press (described in Chapter 5). The advantage of cheap and
rapid communication was that it worked in any direction, making it possible to manufacture a nexus for
the national news dialogue and to place it at any convenient point within the network. New York media
barons had assumed that their dominance of the news was a natural right conveyed by the economic
power of the metropolis and its unique position as the Atlantic window for commerce. They were
correct about the economic importance of the entrepot, but failed to realize that the rest of the nation
would be impatient or subservient to a news feed that magnified New York-centric events and required
tribute from the hinterland to operate. What did a Saint Louis editor care about the insurance claim for
the sinking of a New York-based commercial ship? The growth of the telegraph network and improved
cable communications direct to European sources created an environment that allowed news agencies
to contract with one another for direct feeds at (comparatively) inexpensive rates. Enterprising
Midwestern editors realized that by organizing, they could create a power shift favoring their
transmissions and serving their needs. Their success created a big business with its heart located in the
distributed network of the hinterland, no matter where its corporate offices were located. Evidence
from the Victor Lawson Papers shows that they also realized that anybody could do the same thing, and
that they put safeguards in place to protect the new national Associated Press from a similar takeover.
They created a secondary news service to keep smaller publications happy, and developed a business
structure that gave at least the illusion of competition.10 Though minor competitor agencies would rise
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up in the future, the AP monopoly and its cooperative structure left it serenely dominant for the next
century.
Within the larger picture of networked communication, newspapers of the nineteenth century
can be seen doing the work that communication scholars and theoreticians have assigned to the
“modern” newspaper. As shown in the case of the New York City Draft Riots of 1863, newspapers were
not only telling their readers about the news, but also about how to think about the news, the act
known as “framing.” The riots were conducted by a nefarious “other” population, one that could not
possibly represent the real population of the city, and national coverage both affirmed that the “other”
existed and reassured that order had triumphed and that norms had returned. Content analysis of
newspapers covering the single issue of immigration, meanwhile, finds that newspapers helped assign
identity to immigrants and to create pictures of immigrant groups that could be used by readers to
reinforce social hierarchies. Immigrant groups matured over time from early categorization as
“dangerous” to an accepted categorization of exotic but understood. The dangerous, violent Irish in the
1840s and 1850s became the politically powerful Irish of the 1890s. The dangerous, hapless Germans
[“Dutch”] of the 1850s and 60s became the lager-sipping, civically involved group whose annual
Turnfests and civic ceremonies made for interesting coverage. In constructing immigrant identity the
newspapers took on the role of instructing on citizenship. Though Robert Wiebe writes of 1880s
antialien sentiments and “abuse[ing] the immigrant in rising crescendo after the middle of the decade,”
a reading of general coverage of the time shows newspapers seeming concerned with larger issues of
immigration than particular abuse of any one immigrant group. Complex and lengthy stories dealt with
subjects such as whether England was dumping its paupers on American shores and, if so, what to do
about it? And, while nativist fear of such things as Catholic political motives remained a constant, many
news stories reassured readers about immigrant behaviors, such as stories about the dedication of mine
workers who had come from central Europe. True shrillness about immigration would emerge at the
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turn of the century as individuals like Melville Stone would warn about “uneducated” immigrants with
no fundamental American cultural values swamping the nation with uninformed voting, but the nature
of news coverage from 1840 to 1890 seems to have been a gradual rise in complex and subtle articles
and a general falling-off of reports on the exoticism of immigrant behavior, good or bad.11
In taking on the role of civic educator, newspapers collectively assigned themselves as guardians
of civic values and arbiters of reality. In the mid-twentieth century and during the Cold War journalists
and media leaders retold this story in the guise of being inheritors of First Amendment guarantees that
allowed them to stand in for the general public as privileged observers and questors for the truth. The
media narrative became one of a golden age of objectivity, the result of dismissing the “hacks” of the
nineteenth century and replacing them with monastically-dedicated professionals who held themselves
aloof from the squabbles and politics of society in order to preserve their preeminent role of preserving
American freedoms.12 Nineteenth century journalists were less concerned with the appearance of
objectivity and more concerned with being authoritative to their particular imagined audience – Manton
Marble believed there was a particular New York World reader, and Whitelaw Reid instructed his writers
to remember to look for what the New York Tribune audience wanted and expected in its newspaper.
They were frank about the newspaper being a business; the grand narrative of the press in later years
tended to mask the fact that newspapers existed as a business and tried, instead, to discuss their role as
discoverers of truth or as vehicles meant to raise uncomfortable questions into public dialogue.
Nineteenth century leaders would have been in hearty agreement with Nerone when he states that:
“Media are instruments . . . to reproduce and multiply capital, to serve the interests of capital, because
they are owned and directed by capital.” Within that admission, though, those early journalism
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improvers would have stated that doing the thing well and thoroughly, crisply, and with skill, was what
they eagerly sought in professionalizing their industry.13
Oddly today we seem to be moving back into an earlier form of journalism which is termed
“Public Journalism,” with activities including “crowdsourcing,” in which observations by untrained
observers are aggregated with limited interpretation. The all-pervasive access given by the Internet and
its World Wide Web and the immense communication bandwidth accessible to individuals at low cost
has reduced the importance of the newspaper especially, but media in general, as intermediaries. At the
same time the Internet has severely disrupted the advertising financial model that arose in the 1870s
and supported news publications through the twentieth century. The continuing shrinkage in
professional news ranks and the scrapping of many major newspapers has seemed like a race to the
bottom; many news organizations have eliminated cost centers such as copy editing pools and
independent local reporters in order to control costs. Attempts to outsource rote coverage of city
council and school board meetings to Indian-based video transcription services, or to use computerdriven writing machines to produce sports coverage, show the desperation caused by shrinking budgets.
The rise of the blogger, essentially a modern version of the amateur letter-writer of the Early Republic,
challenges the idea that there are benefits to the large business organization represented by integrated
local newspapers. Soul-searching on the part of journalists has led to statements like that of
communication professor Theodore Glasser that “Journalism is in the problem-solving business, not the
truth business,” or that journalism is a philosophy, not a professional trade. “We pretend that news is a
concrete thing that we merely collect and present, albeit with artful grace,” writes Glasser, invoking the
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philosopher Richard Rorty.14 It is an intriguing retreat from the grand narrative, and one that is
problematic, in that it encompasses media phenomena such as the highly-successful but inherently
wrong anti-vaccine movement, politically-backed ideologue sites such as the Drudge Report, and
narrowly-focused news opinion presenters like Fox News. The New York Sun and its controversial “Trip
to the Moon” hoax series of articles of 1835 may have found twenty-first century company. Attempts to
broaden the news to take citizen input into account and to deliver a product that is relevant to anticorporatist desires has removed authority from any particular news agency and rendered all accounts of
any event as fungible, as demonstrated in early 2015 with “news” coverage of the shooting of a black
man in Ferguson, Missouri. Each interest in the Ferguson case was able to reach its own Internet
audience directly, with the result of riotous standoffs based on separate sets of “facts.” The imaginary
national audience has become, instead, an audience of interests – and the question of how that differs
from that of the Party Press, or of the days of Yellow Journalism, is an interesting one.
This research has shown that early newspapers were doing “modern” things, and that they
faced many of the same network effects that have challenged the press today. They reacted to these
effects by democratizing advanced technology for public consumption; by forming managerial business
structures; by improving and increasing the type and amount of news delivered to the public; and by
professionalizing their staffs and policing their membership. Yet in seeking to reveal their advances, this
work may only have joined them to a newly superseded ethos in journalism. Was “professional”
journalism a hundred-year flash in the pan? Only time will tell.

14
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APPENDIX A
Codebook 1, 2012-13
Codebook and Protocol: 19th Century Newspapers and Immigrant Coverage
Introduction
This project assesses newspaper coverage of immigrant issues at various points from the 1840s – 1880s.
It examines the way newspaper editors and reporters portrayed immigrants and whether significant
change in portrayal occurred over the time period. Coders will be provided with articles to evaluate,
rather than entire newspapers to search. The following definitions are important.
Immigrant can mean a person coming to the United States from a foreign country or territory, a person
of foreign birth now living within the United States, or (importantly) a person as part of a movement
from one area of the United States into another. Immigrants are not necessarily from overseas.
Territories and foreign possessions were being acquired by the United States during this historic period,
which included the conquest, purchase, or occupation of land in the West. Immigrants are often
characterized by ethnic groupings popular in the 19th century but now considered demeaning in the 21st
century. Religious groupings may also characterize immigrants.
Immigration can mean the movement of people to or within the country to a particular point.
News Story for this project includes published letters, editorials, articles borrowed from other
publications, telegraphic listings, partisan political writings, editorial cartoons, and other non-advertising
copy. The coders will remember that newspapers evolved considerably in the 19th century, that many
descriptors used during the time period are now considered unusable or scurrilous language, and that
the concept of requiring “balance” or “fairness” in news belongs more to the 20th century.
Primary Presentation of immigrants means the most significant identification, e.g. Irish immigrants may
be identified primarily by their Roman Catholic faith, or primarily by their Irish heritage. In a story that
may involve two or more immigrant characterizations, one must be chosen as the primary presentation
(e.g. in a crime story involving an Irish perpetrator and a German victim, the primary presentation would
be whichever person the story was primarily about – if it is about arresting the perpetrator, it’s an Irish
story, or if it is about the unfortunate victim, it’s a German story).

Procedure
The coder will first SKIM through the numbered news story provided in order to gain a general
overview. The coder should not need to read the story at a deep level.
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The coder will then return to the story to analyze its content according to the variables in the codebook.
As stories will already have been documented for newspaper source, date, and location in the paper,
coders will only need to record the identifying number for the story before beginning to code.
The coder should not worry about comparing or changing results of earlier coding they may have done
as they gain experience and comfort working with the articles. One of the aims of the coding project is
to make the coding results themselves abstract so that data compilation can be done in a valid way.
Coders should remain detached about their results and not try to force patterns into existence. Coding
errors and difficulties will make themselves obvious later on in processing the project, and can be
accounted for then.
Clarification of Variables
In identifying story origins (V2.), the coder will use clues such as bylines, datelines, editorial style, or
headlines to try to determine where the story originated. Newspapers of the time borrowed from one
another heavily, but often without attribution.
In identifying other newspaper coding (V3.), “East Coast newspaper” would include cities such as New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, Washington, D.C., Charleston, Richmond, and Atlanta
“Large City newspaper not East Coast” would include cities such as Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee,
Cincinnati, St. Louis, New Orleans, and the like.
The term “Other newspaper/cannot tell” can include religious or ethnic papers as well as smalltown papers or political movement publications (e.g. temperance, suffrage).
Coverage type (V4.) is a binary choice between apparently simple stories and apparently complex ones.
Simple stories are those that are short, that present little immigrant information or
characterization, that present only one aspect of an immigration story, contain only statistical
information, or that simply reinforce stereotypes. An example would be the arrival of a number of
immigrants on a particular ship, or a crime story that simply identifies the background of a criminal as a
non-American one.
Complex stories need not be extremely long to count as complex. They are those that invite
analysis, that may discuss several immigrant types and differentiate between them, that may discuss
national policies on immigration, or countries of origin, or political approaches to immigration, etc. An
example of a complex story might be a feature-type story of walking the immigration docks, or a
discussion about the intentions of Chinese immigrants entering the United States.
For Primary Presentation, the identifier “F” (foreign, generalized group) should be used if multiple
immigrant types are mentioned either as part of a “they’re all foreign, you can’t trust them” type of
approach; or if the story is a survey or roster of all foreign arrivals, such as a port entry listing; or if
immigrants are being discussed in general, as in “tour Castle Garden but be prepared for the smell as the
immigrants get off the boat . . . “.
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Variable 8 (V8.), story intent, includes six definitions that are meant to form a scale of values, from
urging action against immigrants to urging assistance to immigrants. The coder should try to guess the
intention behind the choice to write or publish the article, and place the article somewhere on this scale.
As an aid to understanding the terms, “Supports calm about immigrants” might include an
article from the West Coast stating that Chinese immigration is self-limiting, while “Supports wariness
about immigrants” might include an article stating that European paupers are being dumped on
American soil, or might include crime reports that show immigrants as criminals.
“Warns of immigrant effects” might include health warnings, such as a cholera outbreak, or
economic warnings that American jobs are at risk due to immigrant pressures.
The variable (V9.) regarding “Citizenship Approach” seeks to determine whether news articles move
beyond simply reporting events, and to see whether the articles are recommending actions related to
participating in the republic.
For the purposes of this project, there is a citizenship approach present if the articles make
policy recommendations, discuss voting, discuss naturalization, recommend actions for citizens to take,
or recommend actions for immigrants to take.
An article that discusses governmental recruitment of immigrants to come to America may have
a citizenship approach; an article that discusses participation of immigrants in an election may have a
citizenship approach; an article that only discusses immigrant arrivals probably has no citizenship
approach.
“Context of story,” (V10.), is meant to gain an overall view of the story. The selection “Multiple
Contexts” is not a favored choice, but if a story has multiple contexts, the coder should list “M” first, and
then list the two most significant contexts, one over the other, with a diagonal dash leading from “M” to
each one:
C
M
L
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VARIABLES

V1. Story Identification
V2. Apparent story origin
1 = newspaper’s own reporter
2 = newspaper’s editor/editorial staff
3 = letter writer or occasional contributor
4 = another newspaper*
5 = telegraph or wire service
6 = graphic artist or cartoonist
V3. Other newspaper coding (*code if V2. = 4)
1 = East Coast newspaper
2 = Large City newspaper not East Coast
3 = Foreign newspaper
3 = Other newspaper/cannot tell
V4. Coverage type
A = Simple (single mention of immigrant origin, no analysis, stereotype)
B = Complex (more than brief mention; may play one immigrant group off against another; implications
of political or citizenship involvement).
V5. Characterization of coverage
P = Positive, welcoming of immigrants.
N = Negative, dismissive, rejecting, or warning of immigrants/immigrant behaviors.
W = Neutral
V6. Characterization of immigrants in story
O = overseas, from outside the U.S., in local terms
B = from within the U.S. or from areas contiguous with the U.S., in local terms
E = in-transit, not a long-term local population
G = general, not a local phenomenon.
V7. Primary presentation of immigrant groups in story
F = foreign, generalized group.
I = Irish
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G = German
T = Italian
M = Mexican
C = Chinese, other Asian
B = Catholic
P = non-Catholic religious sect (includes Mormon, Quaker, etc.)
V8. Story intent
A = Urges action against immigrants
D = Supports wariness about immigrants
Q = Warns of immigrant effects
Z = Supports calm about immigrants
X = Urges assistance to immigrants
V = No intent indicated
V9. Is there a citizenship approach?
I = Discusses voting
D = Discusses naturalization/intent to obtain citizenship
E = Discusses legislation aimed at immigrants, either pro or con
F = Recommends behaviors for immigrants to follow to become citizens
G = Shows citizens dealing with immigrant issues
N = Article not responsive to citizenship issues
V10. Context of story
C = Crime, as either perpetrator or victim
S = Social, including relief or charity issues, population growth
P = Political, including issues of municipal infrastructure
L = Labor, including employment issues
E = Education, including assimilation programs
M = Multiple contexts (list two most significant)
N = No particular context.
(Codebook 1 proved to be too granular for the limited data set available. The codebook was rewritten
and definitions clarified for the second data collection).

Codebook 2, 2015

Codebook and Protocol: 19th Century Newspapers and Immigrant Coverage
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Introduction
This project assesses newspaper coverage of immigrant issues at various points from the 1840s – 1890s.
It examines the way newspaper editors and reporters portrayed immigrants and whether significant
change in portrayal occurred over the time period. Coders will be provided with articles to evaluate,
rather than entire newspapers to search. The following definitions are important.
Immigrant (or Emigrant) can mean a person coming to the United States from a foreign country or
territory, a person of foreign birth now living within the United States, or (importantly) a person as part
of a movement from one area of the United States into another. Immigrants are not necessarily from
overseas. Territories and foreign possessions were being acquired by the United States during this
historic period, which included the conquest, purchase, or occupation of land in the West.
Immigration/Emigration can mean the movement of people from overseas to America, or within
America from one place to another.
News Story for this project includes published letters, editorials, articles borrowed from other
publications, telegraphic listings, partisan political writings, speech transcripts, and other nonadvertising copy.

Procedure
The coder will first SKIM through the numbered news story provided in order to gain a general overview.
The coder should not need to read the story at a deep level or know the history of a particular time or
place. Each story has been selected because it has key words within it – immigrant, emigrant, national
origins (e.g. German) or social attributes (e.g. Fenian, an Irish associative term). Some lengthy stories
may have only a single section involving immigrants – the reader can limit themselves to that section.
The coder will then return to the story to analyze its content according to the variables in the codebook.
Coders do not need to name the article; they will only need to record the identifying number of the
story before beginning to code. Results should be listed in an MS-Excel worksheet which is included on
the thumb drive given to the coder.
Nineteenth century articles can be hard to read. They type font and typeface can be difficult. Each
article is presented as an Adobe Reader file so that you can manipulate the size and view. Newspaper
identities are present as headers in most of these .pdf files and may be a helpful tool for answering
prompts V1 and V2. Please try to avoid getting caught up in the narrative, always a risk when reading
newspapers.
As your first work, please code the ten stories listed under Group Five, Lot 4, and send the results to me
as soon as possible. I will use these results to measure inter-coder reliability, that is, whether each coder
is seeing roughly the same results as they analyze the stories.
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The coder should not worry about comparing or changing results of earlier coding they may have done
as they gain experience and comfort working with the articles. One of the aims of the coding project is
to make the coding results themselves abstract so that data compilation can be done in a valid way.
Coders should remain detached about their results and not try to analyze patterns or discover trends.
Any coding errors and difficulties will make themselves obvious later on in processing the project, and
can be accounted for then.
Clarification of Variables
Story identification number is the number of the story file itself. Coders may ignore the group and lot
numbers (they are there for later analysis) and simply use the sequentially assigned story numbers.
There are 193 stories in the sample.
In identifying story origins (V2.), the coder will use clues such as bylines, datelines, editorial style, or
headlines to try to determine where the story originated. Newspapers of the time borrowed from one
another heavily, but often without attribution.
In identifying newspaper coding (V3.),
“East Coast newspaper” would include cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston,
Washington, D.C., and the New England states.
“Western Newspaper” would include cities such as Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, St.
Louis, Indianapolis, and states including Wisconsin and Minnesota.
“Southern Newspaper” would include Charleston, Richmond, Atlanta, New Orleans, and states
like Arkansas and Texas.
The term “Other newspaper/cannot tell” can include religious or ethnic papers as well as smalltown papers or political movement publications (e.g. temperance, suffrage).
Coverage type (V4.) is a choice between apparently simple stories, intermediate ones, and apparently
complex ones.
Simple stories are those that are short, that present little immigrant information or
characterization, that present only one aspect of an immigration story, contain only statistical
information, or that simply reinforce stereotypes. An example would be the arrival of a number of
immigrants on a particular ship, or a crime story that simply identifies the background of a criminal as a
non-American one.
Intermediate stories might offer some analysis, but may not fully develop an issue. An example
would be a story explaining the love-triangle background to an immigrant suicide, or mentioning that
immigrant trains to Manitoba are uncomfortable.
Complex stories need not be extremely long to count as complex. They are those that invite
analysis, that may discuss several immigrant types and differentiate between them, may discuss national
policies on immigration, or countries of origin, or political approaches to immigration, etc. An example
of a complex story might be a feature-type story of walking the immigration docks, or a discussion about
the intentions of Chinese immigrants entering the United States.
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Primary Presentation of immigrants (V7) means the most significant identification, e.g. Irish or German.
In a story that may involve two or more immigrant characterizations, one must be chosen as the primary
presentation (e.g. in a crime story involving an Irish perpetrator and a German victim, the primary
presentation would be whichever person the story was primarily about – if it is about arresting the
perpetrator, it’s an Irish story, or if it is about the unfortunate victim, it’s a German story).
For Primary Presentation, the identifier “F” (foreign, generalized group) should be used if
multiple immigrant types are mentioned either as part of a “they’re all foreign, you can’t trust them”
type of approach; or if the story is a survey or roster of all foreign arrivals, such as a port entry listing; or
if immigrants are being discussed in general, as in “tour Castle Garden but be prepared for the smell as
the immigrants get off the boat . . . “.
Story Intent (V8) means the coder’s judgment of what the news story was probably meant to
accomplish. Did it urge action against immigrants, such as limiting their arrival, legislating against them,
or asking to have them removed? Did it warn about immigrants or their behaviors (e.g. Hungarians may
be dangerous)? Did it support immigration or point it out as a good thing? Use the categories offered to
characterize the news story.
As an aid to understanding the terms, “Supports calm about immigrants” might include an
article from the West Coast stating that Chinese immigration is self-limiting, while “Warns about
immigrants” might include an article stating that European paupers are being dumped on American soil,
or might include crime reports that show immigrants as criminals.
“Warns of immigrant effects” might include health warnings, such as a cholera outbreak, or
economic warnings that American jobs are at risk due to immigrant pressures.
“Lists immigrant action” might include simple information such as an arrest, an arrival, or a note
that a number of immigrants passed a particular point on a route.
Citizenship approach (V9) means analyzing the article to see whether it proposes ways for immigrants to
behave as denizens of the U.S. Does the article prescribe ways immigrants should behave in order to act
as U.S. Citizens? Does the article discuss citizenship values (e.g. voting responsibilities or general civic
behavior)? Does the article attempt to isolate immigrants as a class separate from citizens?
For the purposes of this project, there is a citizenship approach present if the articles make
policy recommendations, discuss voting, discuss naturalization, recommend actions for citizens to take,
or recommend actions for immigrants to take.
An article that discusses governmental recruitment of immigrants to come to America may have
a citizenship approach; an article that discusses participation of immigrants in an election may have a
citizenship approach; an article that only discusses immigrant arrival numbers probably has no
citizenship approach.
“Context of story,” (V10.), is meant to gain an overall view of the story. The selection “Multiple
Contexts” is not a favored choice, but if a story has multiple contexts and no clear dominant theme the
coder should list “M.”
VARIABLES
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V1. Story Identification Number _________
V2. Apparent story origin
1 = newspaper’s own reporter
2 = newspaper’s editor/editorial staff
3 = letter writer or occasional contributor
4 = another newspaper
5 = telegraph or wire service

V3. Newspaper actually publishing the story
1 = East Coast newspaper
2 = Western newspaper
3 = Southern newspaper
4 = Other newspaper/cannot tell
V4. Coverage type
A = Simple (single mention of immigrant origin, no analysis, stereotype, or simple list)
M = Intermediate (some analysis or care has been taken).
B = Complex (more than brief mention; may play one immigrant group off against another; implications
of political or citizenship involvement).
V5. Characterization of coverage
P = Positive, welcoming of immigrants or praising immigration.
N = Negative, dismissive, rejecting, or warning of immigrants/immigrant behaviors.
W = Neutral
V6. Characterization of immigrants in story
O = overseas, from outside the U.S., in local terms
B = from within the U.S. or from areas contiguous with the U.S., in local terms
E = in-transit, not a long-term local population
G = general, a national, not a local, phenomenon.
V7. Primary presentation of immigrant in story
F = foreign, generalized group.
D = domestic, internal migrants.
I = Irish
G = German
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T = Italian
OE = other European
M = Mexican, other Spanish
C = Chinese, other Asian
B = Religious group
V8. Story intent
A = Urges action against immigrants
D = Warns about immigrants
Q = Predicts immigrant effects
Z = Supports calm about immigrants
X = Urges assistance to immigrants
L = Lists immigrant action
V9. Is there a citizenship approach?
I = Discusses voting
D = Discusses desirability of immigrant group for U.S.
E = Discusses legislation aimed at immigrants, either pro or con
F = Recommends behaviors for immigrants to follow to become citizens
G = Shows citizens dealing with immigrant issues
N = Article not responsive to citizenship issues
V10. Context of story
C = Crime, as either perpetrator or victim
S = Social, including relief or charity issues, population growth
P = Political, including issues of municipal infrastructure
L = Labor, including employment issues
E = Education, including assimilation programs
N = No particular context.
(Some categories of Codebook 2 resulted in too diffuse a sample to be evaluated. Results from Variable
8, Story Intent, were combined as follows: A+D, Q+L, and Z+X. Results from Variable 9, Citizenship
Approach, were combined as I+D, E, and F+G.)
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This dissertation examines the change that came to American newspapers and reporting
between 1840 and 1892 as the result of increasing communication bandwidth and the emergence of
fast communication networks. Improvements in news distribution by post roads, steam navigation, and
steam railways, followed by application of telegraphic communications, significantly speeded the news
and changed the news cycle itself by linking metropolitan news centers with peripheral newspapers. The
American Civil War brought this new information technology together with an event that created
massive audience demand for timely and factual news, as opposed to purely political or commercial
information. In postwar years the press moved toward an increasingly fact-based and professionalized
form of reporting that supplanted the earlier Party Press and Penny Press. Newspapers democratized
the expensive new communication technology of the Morse telegraph, making its benefits available to a
wide audience, but also created a powerful news monopoly in the process. Newspapers assigned
themselves new roles of interpreting national issues for an imagined national audience, and used
techniques such as framing and agenda setting to create media identities for groups like Irish, German,
and Chinese immigrants or events such as the New York City Draft Riots of 1863. The rise of
communication networks under Western Union and ancillary telegraph networks eventually allowed
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Western Associated Press newspapers in the hinterland to take power away from the dominant New
York Associated Press, supplanting it with a new national news organization named the Associated Press
but based in Chicago. This created a new kind of news coverage, one that was spare, uniform in style,
and which attempted to move beyond opinion, presaging the twentieth century “full news” approach to
journalism. In this process the newspapers of the mid- to late nineteenth century demonstrated
intentional progress toward a modern form of journalism. This represents an era in newspaper
development that is separate from the later rise of the Yellow Press, the Muckraking Press, and
Sensationalism.
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